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A New Understanding of  
the Bankruptcy Clause 
Stephen J. Lubben†  
“The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o establish . . . uniform 
Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United 
States . . . .”1 
Abstract 
In the contest for least-studied part of Article I, Section 8 of the 
Constitution, the Bankruptcy Clause—Clause 4—certainly might win. 
Although we have lived with a permanent bankruptcy law since the 
end of the nineteenth century, efforts to understand the Clause 
typically extend little further than an assumption that the Clause is 
the bankruptcy counterpart to the much better-known Commerce 
Clause. To the extent the Bankruptcy Clause is given any thought at 
all, the modern conception is to assume it part of a larger 
Hamiltonian effort to federalize the economy: the Commerce Clause, 
the Bankruptcy Clause, and the Contracts Clause—combined perhaps 
with the Supremacy Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause—
work together to provide that the most important aspects of 
commerce are federalized and kept from piecemeal regulation by the 
states. Indeed, this conception has probably been the most common 
understanding for almost a century. 
That may have been the Framers’ intent, and it works well in 
explaining the recent past, particularly since the New Deal, but if 
struggles as an explanation once we remember that Congress only 
rarely exercised its powers under the Bankruptcy Clause for almost a 
century after the nation’s founding. It also neglects the understanding 
of the Bankruptcy Clause that developed shortly after ratification: 
namely, that Congress’s powers regarding insolvency were simply to 
impose uniformity, and that the states continued to enjoy full power 
to enact bankruptcy legislation that would apply to debtors within 
their realm. 
 
† Harvey Washington Wiley Chair in Corporate Governance & Business 
Ethics, Seton Hall University School of Law. This Article is all the 
better because Michelle Harner, Eddie Hartnett, Emily Kadens, Rich 
Levin, Troy McKenzie, Daniel Pines, John Pottow, Mark Roe, David 
Skeel, Charles Tabb, and Jay Westbrook took the time to read early 
drafts and provide their comments, and it also benefited from 
exceptional research assistance by Amanda E. McKinlay and Sarah B. 
Chopnick and historical discussions with Monty Waller. 
1.  U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
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In this Article, I argue that the only way to really understand the 
Bankruptcy Clause is to relearn its history. Thus, I begin with the 
ways in which American bankruptcy—as enacted by the colonies and 
the states—diverged from that of England. This divergence helps to 
explain why the federal 1800 Bankruptcy Act, which was heavily 
reflective of English bankruptcy practice, was so ill received. From 
there, the Article traces the long era of state bankruptcy regulation, 
consistent with the postratification understanding of the Clause. It 
was only after interstate commerce began to grow and, following the 
Civil War, the Fourteenth Amendment changed the state-federal 
dynamic that a long-term federal Bankruptcy Act was considered 
needed and palatable. In short, I view the enactment of permanent 
bankruptcy legislation more as the result of external factors and less 
the result of the cyclical process that Charles Warren famously 
described. 
The Article concludes with a revised understanding of the 
Bankruptcy Clause, one that I argue is more faithful to the history 
and evolving understanding of the Clause. I argue that the 
Bankruptcy Clause, as currently understood, is not the limited thing 
it once was, but that the current understanding is the process of an 
evolution that was far from inevitable. 
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Introduction 
The Bankruptcy Clause—Article I, Section 8, Clause 4—is 
something of an oddball. After all, Congress was already granted the 
power to regulate interstate commerce in the preceding clause,2 so 
why single out bankruptcy for separate treatment?3 And why lump 
bankruptcy with nationalization?4 Purists might note that the 
Bankruptcy Clause is not limited to interstate activities, both by its 
terms5 and by the requirement that laws passed thereunder operate 
uniformly.6 But that suggests consideration of the Bankruptcy Clause 
in the first place, which might be a bit of a stretch because it is so 
often overlooked. 
To the extent the Bankruptcy Clause is given any thought at all,7 
the modern conception considers it part of a larger Hamiltonian effort 
to federalize the economy: the Commerce Clause, the Bankruptcy 
Clause, and the Contracts Clause—combined perhaps with the 
Supremacy Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause—work 
together, ensuring that the most important aspects of commerce are 
federalized and kept from piecemeal state regulation.8 Indeed, this 
conception has probably been the most common understanding for 
 
2. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
3. See generally James Monroe Olmstead, Bankruptcy a Commercial 
Regulation, 15 Harv. L. Rev. 829, 831 (1902) (discussing the origin of 
the Bankruptcy Clause at the Constitutional Convention). 
4. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o 
establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the 
subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States . . . .”). 
5. Compare id. (covering “bankruptcies throughout the United States”), 
with U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (authorizing regulation of 
“commerce . . . among the several states”). 
6. See Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 376 n.13 (2006) 
(rejecting an argument that the uniformity requirement “cannot be 
interpreted to confer upon Congress any greater authority . . . than is 
conferred, for example, by the Commerce Clause”). 
7. For example, Professor Tribe spends not quite two pages in total on it 
in his treatise. 1 Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional 
Law 846–48 (3d ed. 2000). 
8. See David A. Skeel, Jr., Debt’s Dominion: A History of 
Bankruptcy Law in America 23 (2001) (noting James Madison’s 
belief that the federal dominion embodied in the Bankruptcy Clause 
was “necessary to prevent debtors from fleeing to another state” to 
avoid their debts); cf. Emory Speer, Alexander Hamilton, 16 Yale 
L.J. 94, 106–07 (1906) (discussing the importance of Hamilton’s views 
on the federal government and its powers, particularly regarding the 
nation’s banking system). 
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almost a century.9 That may have been the framers’ intention, and it 
works well in explaining the recent past, particularly since the New 
Deal, but it struggles as an explanation once we remember that 
Congress only rarely exercised its powers under the Bankruptcy 
Clause for almost a century after the nation’s founding.10 Typically 
this inconvenient fact is explained away by reference to Charles 
Warren’s history of, as he calls it in his opening line, the “gloomy and 
depressing subject.”11 
Although that opening line says much about Warren’s writing 
style, ultimately it is Warren’s argument that the early bankruptcy 
laws were responses to financial crises—which fell away once the 
crises had passed—that lingers as our understanding of the Clause. In 
essence, Warren argues that the country’s Jeffersonian and Jacksonian 
impulses largely won the argument, until they didn’t. This 
interpretation has been widely influential ever since, but it is itself the 
product of its New Deal heritage.12 Additionally, Warren’s argument 
neglects the understanding of the Bankruptcy Clause that developed 
shortly after ratification—namely, that Congress’s powers regarding 
insolvency were simply to impose uniformity and that the states 
continued to enjoy full authority to enact bankruptcy laws applying 
to debtors within their jurisdictions.13 
The Supreme Court’s 1819 decision in Sturges v. Crowninshield,14 
striking down a New York bankruptcy law under the Contracts 
Clause,15 upended this postratification understanding that states 
enjoyed nearly unfettered authority with regard to bankruptcy. But 
the issue remained contested—and thus the need for a national 
bankruptcy law debated—until the Gilded Age.16 By this time,  
9. See F. Regis Noel, A History of the Bankruptcy Clause of the 
Constitution of the United States of America 98 (1918) (published 
dissertation, Catholic University of America) (stating that “uniformity of 
the laws” was a concern during the drafting of the Constitution). 
10. See infra Parts II–III. 
11. Charles Warren, Bankruptcy in United States History 3 
(1935). Warren’s opening is similar to an earlier one on the same topic. 
H.H. Shelton, Bankruptcy Law, Its History and Purpose, 44 Am. L. 
Rev. 394, 394 (1910) (“I am aware of the fact that my subject is an 
unpopular one. It is neither a cheerful nor a pleasing theme, because it 
deals with financial disaster, and we dislike the gloom attending ruin.”). 
12. The first chapter of David A Skeel, Jr.’s Debt’s Dominion can be seen as a 
better-written version of the Warren story. Skeel, supra note 8, at 23–47. 
13. See infra Part II. 
14. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819). 
15. Id. at 196–208. 
16. In some sense, Sturges and the resulting continual debate relegated the 
Bankruptcy Clause to an obscure corner of the larger notion of 
constitutional protectionism. 
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relations between the states and the federal government had been 
hugely revamped by the Fourteenth Amendment, making the original 
Hamiltonian project more consistent with the overall conception of 
the Constitution.17 
In this Article I argue that the only way to really understand the 
Bankruptcy Clause is to relearn its history, free from Warren’s 
influence. Thus, I begin by sketching the pre-Crowninshield era. 
Central to my suggested view of the Bankruptcy Clause is 
understanding the ways in which American bankruptcy law—as first 
enacted by the colonies and the states—diverged from that of 
England. This divergence was well established by the time of the 
American Revolution and helps to explain why the federal 
1800 Bankruptcy Act,18 which was heavily reflective of English 
bankruptcy practice, was so ill received. Thus, Part I looks at the 
colonial understanding of bankruptcy and insolvency, and Part II 
looks at the early years under the Constitution. Part III then 
examines the contest over Crowninshield from 1819 until 1898. This 
was an era of two temporary bankruptcy laws, much state innovation 
in the area, and even some attempts to reverse the holding of 
Crowninshield through constitutional amendment. 
At adoption of the Constitution, there were several possible 
interpretations of the Bankruptcy Clause. First, for a Federalist, the 
Clause might have been seen as an insolvency counterpart to the 
Commerce Clause, preempting state action in the field of bankruptcy, 
whether or not Congress exercised its power. At the other extreme, 
the Jeffersonian or Jacksonian view of the Clause (along with a 
certain understanding of the Contracts Clause) might have been read 
to permit state bankruptcy laws, at least to the degree such laws were 
a part of general debtor-creditor law before the adoption of the 
Constitution. 
Instead, the Supreme Court adopted a kind of muddled, middle-
ground position in a series of cases beginning with Crowninshield and 
extending at least through Ogden v. Saunders,19 which held that a 
state bankruptcy law was permissible, under certain conditions.20 
Namely, the law could only operate prospectively and apparently 
could only apply to citizens of the state of enactment.21 This holding 
seemingly constitutionalized the issue more than it needed to, perhaps 
 
17. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 125 (1873) (Swayne, J., 
dissenting) (“These amendments are a new departure, and mark an 
important epoch in the constitutional history of the country.”). 
18. Act of Apr. 4, 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19 (repealed 1803). 
19. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827). 
20. Id. at 369. 
21.  Id.  
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because of the Court’s limited ability to affect state laws at the time; 
overrode extant law regarding enforcement of contracts across 
jurisdictions; and left both Federalists and Jeffersonians confused. As 
a result, both continued to argue their original positions, despite the 
Supreme Court’s decisions. 
Part IV then examines the modern era, which nominally features 
two bankruptcy laws—the 1898 Bankruptcy Act22 and the 1978 
Bankruptcy Code23—but I submit these were extensively amended so 
many times that the United States has actually had about a half 
dozen bankruptcy laws during this period. This period began to 
embrace something closer to the Federalist understanding of the 
Bankruptcy Clause, but I argue that this is more a result of a new, 
post–Civil War understanding of the federal government combined 
with the increased nationalization of credit markets. In short, I view 
the enactment of permanent bankruptcy legislation more as the result 
of external factors and less the result of the cyclical process that 
Warren described in his famous book. 
The Article concludes with a revised understanding of the 
Bankruptcy Clause, one that I argue is more faithful to the history 
and evolving understanding of the clause. I argue that the 
Bankruptcy Clause, as currently understood, is not the limited thing 
it once was, but that the current understanding is the process of an 
evolution that was far from inevitable. 
I. The Colonial Years 
By the time the Constitution was enacted, England had several 
centuries of experience with bankruptcy laws. This experience 
naturally influenced practice in the colonies and in the early years 
under the Articles of Confederation. What follows is a necessarily 
abbreviated history of English debtor-creditor law, focusing in particular 
on those aspects of the law that have had special salience in the 
discussion of American bankruptcy law. It should not be mistaken for a 
comprehensive account of the history of English debtor-creditor law, 
which is far more complex and worthy of separate treatment. 
Ultimately, the American colonists knew English bankruptcy law 
as a collective collection remedy for business debts more than a device 
for the relief of honest but unfortunate debtors.24 And they knew 
 
22. Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541. 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978).  
23. Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended 
at 11 U.S.C.). 
24. An account of one debtor’s experience in the English bankruptcy system 
in the early nineteenth century can be found in Edmund Townsend, 
An Extraordinary History of a Bankruptcy (1811). 
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English bankruptcy as a process that could result in severe penalties 
that were erratic in application.25 
A. Early Influences on English Bankruptcy 
It is common to date bankruptcy to either the Old Testament and 
Mosaic Law or Roman Law.26 The principle outlined in Deuteronomy27 
is an early example of the law in the books not corresponding to the 
law in practice—the development of the prosbul, a kind of early 
waiver of the biblical forgiveness rule, avoided the obvious effects 
routine forgiveness would have on the development of early credit 
markets.28 Eventually, the rule of Deuteronomy was simply ignored by 
the Jewish community.29 As for the Roman antecedents, while they 
may have had indirect influence by way of neighboring countries like 
France and the area we now know as Belgium, which in turn 
 
25. See 2 William Blackstone, Commentaries *482 (“The brankrupt, 
upon this examination, is bound upon pain of death to make a full 
discovery of all his estate . . . .”). 
26. See, e.g., 3 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the 
United States ch. XVI, §§ 1107–1108 (Boston & Cambridge 1833) 
(dating bankruptcy and its system of discharging persons to Roman 
law); R.P. Hobson, Federal Bankruptcy Act—Its History and Operation, 
21 Ky. L.J. 86, 86 (1932) (transcript of a radio lecture) (tracing 
bankruptcy law “back more than three thousand years to the Mosaic 
law” but tracing the more modern law of “assignment for the benefit of 
creditors” to Roman law); see also Rhett Frimet, The Birth of 
Bankruptcy in the United States, 96 Com. L.J. 160, 162 (1991) (Code of 
Hammurabi, Islamic, and Jewish law); Andrew J. Duncan, From 
Dismemberment to Discharge: The Origins of Modern American 
Bankruptcy Law, 100 Com L.J. 191, 191 (1995) (Roman law). The myth 
of the “broken bench”—whereby an insolvent merchant’s debtors would 
come to the marketplace and break the bench on which he conducted 
business over his head—appears to have been just that, a myth with 
little basis in actual practice. Sandor E. Schick, Globalization, 
Bankruptcy and the Myth of the Broken Bench, 80 Am. Bankr. L.J. 
219, 222, 251–52 (2006). 
27. Deuteronomy 15:1–3 (New English) (“At the end of every seventh year 
you shall make a remission of debts. This is how the remission shall be 
made: everyone who holds a pledge shall remit the pledge of anyone 
indebted to him. He shall not press a fellow-countryman for repayment, 
for the Lord’s year of remission has been declared.”). 
28. 10 The Jewish Encyclopedia 219–20 (Isidore Singer et al. eds.,1912) 
(discussing the prosbul’s amelioration of creditor concerns and the resultant 
stabilization of liquidity in ancient credit markets). Procedurally, the 
prosbul was “a declaration made in court, before the execution of a loan, to 
the effect that the law requiring the release of debts upon the entrance of 
the Sabbatical year shall not apply to the loan,” which was “attested by 
witnesses or by the judges of the court.” Id. at 219. 
29. See id. at 220. 
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influenced English law, it is hard to find a direct connection between 
Roman law and late medieval England.30 
B. Methods Available to Early Creditors 
In England and in colonial and early independence America, 
creditors began with two basic means of collecting unpaid debts; the 
creditor could proceed against the debtor’s assets or against the 
debtor’s person.31 Sometimes a creditor might pursue both means of 
collection. Asset-based collection obviously was more likely to result 
in actual payment, but for a variety of reasons—including limitations 
on collection against real estate, the difficulty of finding assets, and 
the broader risk of fraudulent transfers—it seems to have been 
slightly used, at least when compared to modern practice. 
Instead, defaulting debtors were often thrown in debtor’s prison, 
which was only likely to result in actual collection if the debtor had 
secreted away assets, had substantial exempt assets, or had wealthy 
friends willing to help out.32 Otherwise, prison mostly vindicated the 
moral aspects of the debtor-creditor relationship.33 
 
30. See Shelton, supra note 11, at 396 (noting that in parts of Continental 
Europe at the turn of the last century, the requirement that a bankrupt 
person or entity must still pay debts in entirety or face criminal punishment 
was still prevalent); cf. Israel Treiman, Acts of Bankruptcy: A Medieval 
Concept in Modern Bankruptcy Law, 52 Harv. L. Rev. 189, 192–97 (1938) 
(discussing the harshness of Continental Europe’s bankruptcy laws as 
perhaps reflective of the relative ease with which a debtor could abscond 
outside the territory over which his creditors had political influence). 
31. See Peter J. Coleman, Debtors and Creditors in America: 
Insolvency, Imprisonment for Debt, and Bankruptcy, 1607–
1900, at 3–5 (1974) (describing the colonial procedural mechanisms of 
writ of execution against debtors); see also Imprisonment for Debt, 11 
Am. Jurist & L. Mag. 289 (1834) (reviewing the arguments for and 
against imprisonment for debt). 
32. See Coleman, supra note 31, at 5 (noting that insolvent debtors could 
be held until family or friends paid their debts for them). 
33. This is perhaps most vividly illustrated by reference to the specific 
example of William Marvell, the hangman in London from 1715 to 1717. 
He was arrested for unpaid debts, and thus unable to perform his job. 
Since he was paid by the execution, his financial picture became ever 
bleaker the longer he remained in prison, until he was eventually 
replaced as hangman and thus lived the remainder of his life in poverty. 
Horace Bleackley, The Hangmen of England 23–35 (1929). 
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Creditors also developed a variety of tools that allowed for 
monitoring defaulting debtors and even distributing the debtor’s 
assets through compositions and assignments, which were short of the 
formal collection mechanisms. But these tools suffered from problems 
that remain familiar today. Most importantly, some creditors 
preferred to become holdouts and some debtors were uncooperative. 
Thus, while  
[l]etters of licence, deeds of inspectorship and assignments were 
available to all and provided the mainstay of unofficial ways of 
dealing with insolvency and failure . . . [i]t was often easier for 
creditors to move from haranguing their debtors for repayment 
to official forms of debt collection . . . . Bankruptcy put all 
creditors upon an equal footing [and] allowed the bankrupt to 
be questioned closely about his estate . . . .34 
C. First English Bankruptcy Laws  
 The first bankruptcy law is often said to be a statute passed in 
the final years of Henry VIII’s long reign, entitled “An Act againste 
suche persones as doo make Bankrupte.”35 The first Henry VIII 
statute was unlike traditional common law debtor-creditor law in that 
it provided for a collective collection process.36 Essentially, various 
high officials from the Privy Counsel were tasked with arresting the 
debtor, selling his assets, and distributing the proceeds to creditors. 
There was no discharge under this law.37 
 As Lord Coke noted, the concept of a debtor absconding to avoid 
payment was not newly minted in the sixteenth century, but the 
problem had previously been addressed by narrowly tailored statutes 
 
34. Julian Hoppit, Risk and Failure in English Business, 1700–1800, 
at 31 (1987). 
35. 34 & 35 Hen. 8, c. 4 (1542–43) (Eng.); see also 2 William 
Blackstone, Commentaries *474 (indicating that this was “the first 
statute made concerning any English bankrupts”). Note that the dating 
of these statutes is somewhat imprecise, given differences in calendars 
and citation conventions. Emily Kadens, The Last Bankrupt Hanged: 
Balancing Incentives in the Development of Bankruptcy Law, 59 Duke 
L.J. 1229, 1236–37 (2010). Until the mid-1700s, England marked the 
new year as beginning on Lady Day (March 25th). John Sugden, Sir 
Frances Drake 288 (1990).  
36. 4 W.F. Finlason, Reeves’ History of English Law, from the 
Time of the Romans to the End of the Reign of Elizabeth 382 
(New Amer. ed. 1880). See generally Louis Edward Levinthal, The Early 
History of Bankruptcy Law, 66 U. Pa. L. Rev. 223, 225–26 (1917) 
(describing the collective collection process in detail). 
37. An Acte Againste Suche Persones as Doo Make Bankrupte, 34 & 35 
Hen. 8, c. 4, § 6 (1542–43 ) (Eng.) (“Such Debtors shall remain liable for 
Amount of Debts not satisfied.”). 
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that did not invoke the term “bankruptcy” for the problem at hand.38 
For example, under Henry VII, a statute had been enacted that 
penalized debtors that tried to avoid creditors while fraudulently 
transferring goods.39 That statute is less known, because it did not use 
the magic word “bankruptcy.”40 It has been noted that it shares the 
same preamble as its more famous and newer counterpart, suggesting 
a similarity of purpose.41 
From the enactment of the statute in Henry VIII’s reign through 
the restoration of the House of Stuart,42 Parliament enacted a series of 
similar laws designed to address the problems of absconding or hiding 
debtors.43 It was these statutes that adopted the notion that 
bankruptcy was something that only applied to “traders,”44 and began 
 
38. Edward Coke, The Fourth Part Of The Institutes Of The 
Laws Of England: Concerning The Jurisdiction Of Courts 277 
(1669); see also Schick, supra note 26, at 252–55 (discussing the 
influence of medieval Italian laws on the English system). 
39. An Acte Agaynst Fraudulent Deede of Gyft, 3 Hen. 7, c. 4 (1487) (Eng.); 
see also Finlason, supra note 36, at 193–94 (discussing the statute). 
40. Max Radin traces the term to 1533. Max Radin, The Nature of 
Bankruptcy, 89 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 1 n.2 (1940). By 1600, the word was 
apparently in common use, as Shakespeare used the phrase “Upon that 
poor and broken bankrupt there?” in his play, As You Like It. William 
Shakespeare, As You Like It act 2, sc.1 (H. J. Oliver ed., Penguin 
Books 1968) (c. 1600). 
41. Finlason, supra note 36, at 381 n.(a). 
42. The requirement that the debtor be a merchant or trader was suspended 
during the Commonwealth period, when the focus was expanded to include 
all imprisoned for debt. C.P. Cooper, A Brief Account of Some of 
the Most Important Proceedings in Parliament 243 n.† (1828). 
43. An Acte Touchyng Orders for Bankruptes, 13 Eliz., c. 7 (1571) (Eng.); An 
Acte for the Better Reliefe of the Creditors Againste Suche as Shall Become 
Bankrupte, 1 Jac., c. 15 (1603–04) (Eng.); An Acte for the Discripceon of a 
Banckrupt and Releife of Credytors, 21 Jac., c. 19 (1623–24) (Eng.).  
44. See 13 Eliz., c. 7, § 1 (applying to “any Merchaunte or other pson using 
or exercysinge the Trade of Marchaundize by way of Bargaynynge 
Exchaunge Rechaunge Bartrie Chevisaunce or otherwyse, in Grosse or 
by Ratayle, or seeking his or her Trade of lyvinge by buyinge and 
sellinge”); Alexander v. Vaughan, 98 Eng. Rep. 1151, 1151–52 (K.B. 
1776) (foreigner who was a trader, was subject to 21 Jac., c. 19 (1623–
24)); see also Richard Brown, Comparative Legislation in Bankruptcy, 2 
J. Soc. Comp. Legis. 251, 251–52 (1900) (discussing English 
bankruptcy law as it applied to traders); Louis Edward Levinthal, The 
Early History of English Bankruptcy, 67 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 16 (1919) 
(noting that bankruptcy statutes after Henry VIII’s reign were 
subsequently limited to traders); cf. Lavie v. Phillips, 97 Eng. Rep. 1094 
(K.B. 1765) (holding that a married woman, trading as part of her 
individual business, could be subject of bankruptcy commission). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 64·Issue 2·2013 
A New Understanding of The Bankruptcy Clause 
330 
to list specific acts of bankruptcy, rather than the general idea of 
“fraud” contained in the first statute.45 
1. Limited Application to Merchants and Traders 
The limitation of bankruptcy to merchants or traders is often seen 
today as stinginess: why shouldn’t others have the benefit of a 
discharge too? But this is anachronistic thinking. 
First, it’s not clear that the statue of Henry VIII did not contain 
an implicit condition to be a merchant, simply by using the term 
“bankrupt.”46 Moreover, in a world where penalties for bankruptcy 
were severe and quite random in application, as discussed below, 
bankruptcy was connected with great shame. Further, because the 
bankruptcy system was typically involuntarily imposed on debtors, it 
was seen as something of a benefit to not be deemed a trader. 47 
Thus, a statute passed during the reign of Charles II expressly 
protected the “divers noblemen, gentlemen, and persons of quality” 
who owned and traded stock in the East India Company or the 
Guiney Company and participants in the royal fishing trade from 
being subjected to the bankruptcy laws on that basis alone.48 
 
45. The statute from Henry VIII’s reign did implicitly provide that fleeing 
or keeping house was an offense. 34 & 35 Hen. 8, c. 4, § 6 (1542–43) 
(Eng.) (providing remedies for creditors of “any souche offendour or 
offendoures whiche shall keape his or theyre house or houses, or whiche 
shall absent or withdrawe themselves into places uknowne”); see also 13 
Eliz., c. 7, § 1 (Those who “hathe or at any tyme hereafter shall departe 
the Realme, or begyn to kepe his or her House or Houses, or otherwyse 
to absent hym or her self, or take Sanctuary, or suffer hym or her self 
wyllyngly to be arrested for any Debt or other Thinge not growen or 
due for Monye delyved Wares sold or any other just or lawfull cause or 
good consideration or purposes, hath or will suffer hym or her self to be 
outlawed, or yeld hym or her self to prysion, or depte from his or her 
Dwellyng House or Houses, to thentent or purpose to defraude or 
hynder any of his or her Credytors, being also a Subject borne as is 
aforesaid, of the just Debt . . . shalbe . . . taken for a Banckrupt”). See 
generally 2 William Blackstone, Commentaries *477–79 (outlining 
to whom the bankruptcy law applies); Israel Treiman, Escaping the 
Creditor in the Middle Ages, 43 L.Q. Rev. 230, 233–36 (1927) 
(describing the practice of “keeping house,” where debtors used the 
English “rule against breaking into a man's house for the purpose of 
executing civil process” to their advantage).  
46. I’m grateful to Emily Kadens for pointing this out. 
47. Cf. W. J. Jones, The Foundations of English Bankruptcy: Statues 
and Commissions in the Early Modern Period, 58–59 (1979) 
(published as Volume 69, Part 3 of the July 1979 Transactions of the 
American Philosophical Society Held at Philadelphia for Promoting Useful 
Knowledge) (discussing the nuanced but important social distinctions that 
existed between various economic classes in England at the time). 
48. An Act Declaratory Concerning Bankrupts, 14 Car. 2 c. 24, § 1 
(1662) (Eng.). 
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Similarly, the law establishing the Bank of England protected its 
members from being subject to the bankruptcy laws.49 Landowners, 
farmers, and “gentlemen” actively wanted to keep the threat of 
bankruptcy away.50 
2. Procedural Devices and Commissions 
Through the years, the statutes explicitly adopted the procedural 
devices originally developed for administrative convenience. It was 
never very likely that the Lord Privy Seal, the Keeper of the Great 
Seal, or any of the other high officials listed in the original 1544 
statute would personally preside over the arrest of a debtor and the 
sale of his assets, even if the literal language of the statute seemed to 
so provide. One treatise writer explained: 
[The statute of Henry VIII] merely provided generally that the 
chancellor, etc., should “take order” in the matter. What should 
be done in the matter appears to have been left wholly 
uncertain, and especially as to who should be the authorities 
practically to execute or carry out the law and what powers 
they should exercise. Probably for this reason the act does not 
seem to have been of much practical effect . . . .51 
 Eventually the daily work of the bankruptcy process was typically 
delegated to commissions, and increasingly the Lord Chancellor was 
given the sole responsibility for appointing the commissions.52 
Professor W.J. Jones described this English bankruptcy process:  
49. An Act for Making Good the Deficiences of Several Funde Therein 
Mentioned and for Enlargeing the Capital Stock of the Bank of 
England and for Rasing the Publick Creditt, 8 & 9 Will. 3 c. 20, § 47 
(1696–97) (Eng.). 
50. See Hoppit, supra note 34, at 24–25, 145, 147–48 (noting that the 
bankruptcy laws at the time only applied to merchants and traders, to 
the exclusion of other professions and classes, due to what was 
commonly viewed as the inherent uncertainty of overseas commerce). 
Such distinctions were common in other areas of the law too; for 
example, only gentlemen were exempt from the press gangs that staffed 
Royal Navy warships. See generally An Act for the Increase and 
Encouragement of Seamen, 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 21, § 13 (1695–96) (Eng.) 
(offering some protection for “Landmen” from impressment). 
51. Finlason, supra note 36, at 381–82 n.(a); see also 1 Edward Christian, 
The Origin, Progress, and Present Practice of the Bankrupt 
Law, both in England and in Ireland 9 (2d ed. 1818) (“This statute 
continued alone for twenty-eight years, but I have not found a single case in 
the books upon the construction of any part of it”). But see Jones, supra 
note 47, at 18 (noting several specific commissions where the statute of 
Henry VIII was used, even after the enactment of newer statutes, since the 
prior statute was not explicitly repealed). 
52. 13 Eliz., c. 7, §§ 2, 4, 5 (1571). An early form of commission can be found in 
Thomas Goodinge, The Law Against Bankrupts 7–9 (1695). 
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[Under the process the] lord chancellor alone was authorized to 
issue commissions of bankruptcy under the Great Seal and to 
appoint “such wise and honest discreet persons as to him shall 
seem good.” He would do this on receiving a complaint or 
petition in writing. The practice developed, certainly during the 
Stuart period, that this must be accompanied by an affidavit 
that debts were owed—from 1624 the specific sum of £100 or 
more had to be mentioned—and that an act of bankruptcy had 
been committed. The petitioning creditors would suggest the 
names of possible commissioners in a separate document . . . .53 
The commissions handled the work of today’s bankruptcy judges but 
were unlike the judges in their informality and in the fact that they 
were comprised of multiple members, somewhat like many early 
American trial courts.54 As one writer explained, 
although it is usual to speak of the Court of the Commissioners 
of Bankrupt, and to name the Commissioners judges, yet it has 
been frequently decided, that the Commissioners have none of 
the requisites of a court of justice; that their authority, although 
nearly approach to the judicial, is not judicial, but executory 
and ministerial . . . .55 
Thus, while it is often said that modern bankruptcy courts are 
“court[s] of equity,”56 this reflects a misunderstanding of a process 
 
53. Jones, supra note 47, at 25 (footnotes omitted). Strictly speaking, 
despite this, the Chancellor would not “do” anything. There was an 
office of bankruptcy which handled the appointment of commissioners; 
the process was fully bureaucratic. See 2 William Blackstone, 
Commentaries *479–85. See generally Edward Christian, 
Practical Instructions for Suing Out and Prosecuting a 
Commission of Bankrupt (1816) (describing the requirements for 
suing out a commission of bankruptcy). 
54. Stephen C. Hicks & Clay Ramsay, Law, Order and the Bankruptcy 
Commissions of Early Nineteenth Century England, 55 Tijdschrift 
voor Rechtsgeschiedenis 123, 133 (1987). And the connection 
between the commissions and today’s bankruptcy judges is anything but 
linear. Cf. Thomas E. Plank, Why Bankruptcy Judges Need Not and 
Should Not Be Article III Judges, 72 Am. Bankr. L.J. 567, 575–78, 
587–89 (1998) (arguing that bankruptcy’s early chancery setting 
indicates it should proceed differently than Article III courts and their 
common law predecessors). 
55. Cooper, supra note 42, at 256. For a blistering critique of the bankruptcy 
commissions, see Francis Vesey, Jr., Regulations in Bankruptcy, 31 Eng. 
Rep. 908, 908 (1801) (“The Lord Chancellor took the first occasion of 
expressing strong indignation at the frauds committed under cover of the 
Bankrupt laws, and his determination to repress such practices.”). 
56. NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 527 (1984); Local Loan Co. 
v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 240 (1934); see also Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U.S. 
726, 732 (1946) (“It is true that a bankruptcy court is also a court of 
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that has from inception been statutory and bureaucratic.57 As 
Chancellor Kent recognized, bankruptcy commissions happened to be 
overseen by the same official that oversaw English chancery courts, 
but that did not create any equitable jurisdiction in the 
commissions.58 As one early nineteenth century writer noted, “[an] 
order of the Lord Chancellor in bankruptcy is analogous to a decree of 
the Court of Chancery.”59 
Indeed, actions of the commissions initially could be challenged in 
either equitable or common-law courts.60 And once the commissions 
were appointed, they were subject to only limited Chancery oversight 
of their routine operation.61  
Commissions typically assigned the debtor’s assets to an 
“assignee”—who in the early days was also a creditor—and who 
actually marshaled and liquidated them.62 As one contemporary 
 
equity.”); Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 304 (1939) (“[F]or many 
purposes ‘courts of bankruptcy are essentially courts of equity . . . .’”); 
cf. Marcia S. Krieger, “The Bankruptcy Court Is a Court of Equity”: 
What Does That Mean?, 50 S.C. L. Rev. 275, 278 (1999) (examining 
the technical differences between actions at law and actions at equity); 
Adam J. Levitin, Toward a Federal Common Law of Bankruptcy: 
Judicial Lawmaking in a Statutory Regime, 80 Am. Bankr. L.J. 1, 24 
(2006) (discussing the importance of a statutory authorization of equity 
powers). Admittedly, what is likely going on here is that equity is being 
used in a loose sense, to mean a court that is somewhat informal, rather 
than in its historical and technical sense. 
57. See 1 Edward E. Deacon, The Law and Practice of 
Bankruptcy 9 (1827) (“The jurisdiction of the Lord Chancellor in 
Bankruptcy is both legal and equitable; but this arises more from long 
practice, perhaps, than from any precise authority on the subject.”). 
58. 1 James Kent, Commentaries on American Law 382 (6th ed. 1848) 
(“This [bankruptcy] jurisdiction of the English chancellor is not in the 
court of chancery, but in the individual who holds the great seal . . . .”). 
59. Francis Whitmarsh, A Treatise on the Bankrupt Laws 3 
(1817) (emphasis added). 
60. E.g., Martin v. Sharopin, 125 Eng. Rep. 960 (C.P., 1731) (concerning an 
action brought in common pleas court); see also Cooper, supra note 42, 
at 253 (describing common law courts as having “concurrent jurisdiction 
with the Chancellor”). 
61. 1 W.S. Holdsworth, A History of English Law 257–58 (1903) 
(“These acts gave no jurisdiction in Bankruptcy to the court of Chancery. 
The act gave the Chancellor no control over the commissioners.”); see also 
Lord Nottingham’s ‘Manual of Chancery Practice’ and 
‘Prolegomena of Chancery and Equity’ 162 (D.E.C. Yale ed., 1965) 
(describing the difficulty regulating the commissioners, “because they think 
they have authority by Act of Parliament”). 
62. 2 William Blackstone, Commentaries *485. For more detail on the 
role of assignees, see Commissioner of Bankrupts, The Law for and 
against Bankrupts: Containing all the Statutes, Cases at Large, 
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source explained: “[The debtor’s] affairs having unfortunately gone 
wrong, a commission of bankruptcy was issued against him upon the 
12th January 1757, and upon the 15th of the same month, his effects 
were as usual conveyed to assignees under that commission.”63 
Eventually this practice was formally recognized in the statutes, and 
the power to appoint assignees was given to the creditors.64 The 
assignees then began to be regulated and subject to removal by the 
Lord Chancellor.65 
3. Severe Penalties and Erratic Application 
This was an era of increasing commerce and increasing financial 
fragility. Credit markets were thin and obligors were highly 
interconnected.66 One default could lead to a chain of systemic failure. 
Thus, Parliament increasingly sought to ensure debtors’ compliance 
with their obligations through the use of sticks rather than carrots. 
Thus, debtors in part of this period faced the possibility of time in the 
pillory and removal of an ear.67 
All of this reached a head during Queen Anne’s tenure, following 
the Pitkin Affair—a scandal involving fraud in the London cloth 
industry that exceeded $150 million in modern terms.68 Most notably, 
the penalty for obstinate debtors was increased to death without 
benefit of clergy,69 a fate that befell a small but not insignificant 
number of debtors.70 
 
Arguments, Resolutions, Judgments and Decrees, under the Head 
of Bankruptcy, Down to the Present Time 81–95 (1743). 
63. Petition of Robert Stevenson, and Others, Assignees Under the 
Commission of Bankruptcy, Issued Against George Forbes of London, 
Merchant, at 2 (July 10, 1765). 
64. An Act to Prevent the Committing of Frauds by Bankrupts, 5 Geo. 2, c. 
30, § 30 (1731–32) (Eng.). 
65. 1 William Cooke, The Bankrupt Laws 338–39 (2d ed. 1788). 
66. Kadens, supra note 35, at 1238 (“[T]he insolvency of one person who 
owed significant debts could lead to the failure of many others.”). 
67. 21 Jac., c. 19, § 6 (1623–24) (“[Debtors convicted of fraud] shalbe sett 
upon the Pillory in some publique Place, for the space of Two Houres, 
and have one of his or her Eares nayled to the Pillory and cutt off.”); 
Garrard Glenn, Essentials of Bankruptcy: Prevention of Fraud, and 
Control of Debtor, 23 Va. L. Rev. 373, 381 (1937) (noting that these 
punishments were considered mild by contemporary standards). 
68. Emily Kadens, The Pitkin Affair: A Study of Fraud in Early English 
Bankruptcy, 84 Am. Bankr. L.J. 483, 484 (2010). Many contemporary 
sources reference the Pitkin Affair and assume familiarity with it; Kadens’s 
article is the only complete exposition of the Affair that I have discovered. 
69. The “benefit of clergy” originally allowed priests to avoid the harsh 
penalties (like death) associated with the secular courts, but then almost 
anyone who could read a Bible verse, or recite one from memory, could 
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For example, in 1759 John Perrott71 followed the Pitkin model: he 
suddenly started to expand his business by purchasing goods on credit 
that he immediately turned around and sold at a discount.72 
Eventually he announced to his creditors his inability to pay for the 
goods purchased because the cash was gone, and a commission was 
given the task of sorting out his affairs.73 The commissioners found 
Perrott evasive in several depositions and kept him in Newgate 
prison; meanwhile he made an unsuccessful attempt to get a writ of 
habeas corpus from King’s Bench.74 
Then the commission learned of a woman who might be 
considerately referred to as Perrott’s girlfriend.75 She had possession of 
several halves of bank notes—Perrott turned out to have the other 
halves hidden in his belongings in debtor’s prison—and some larger 
notes, which she had received after an attorney had exchanged many 
bank notes at her request.76 Until a few years before, the woman in 
question had been a fellow lodger with the woman who was to become 
her maid, at which time she “had no money, and was in great want of 
cloaths, and all other necessaries.”77 
In September of 1761 the assignees indicted Perrott for 
bankruptcy fraud, and he was found guilty by the jury in the 
following October: 
 
avoid the harshest penalties as members of the “clergy,” unless the 
statute specifically excluded this right. See generally Finlason, supra 
note 36, at 216 (discussing the benefit of clergy in capital cases). 
70. See An Act to Prevent Frauds Frequently Committed by Bankrupts 4 
& 5 Ann., c. 4 (1705) (Eng.) (enacted because “many Persons have and 
do daily become Bankrupt”); John Paul Tribe, Bankruptcy and Capital 
Punishment in the 18th and 19th Centuries (Jan. 16, 2009) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1329067. 
There is some debate in the literature as to how to properly count the 
number of debtors hung. 
71. For a fuller account of Perrott, see Kadens, supra note 35, at 1272–85. 
72. 1 An Authentic Narrative of the Proceedings Under A 
Commission of Bankruptcy Against John Perrott 4–5 (1761). 
73. Id. at 1. Most of the proceedings in the commission, including the 
depositions mentioned in the text, took place at the Half-Moon tavern 
on Cheapside. Id. at 2, 11, 20, 23. This was typical of the practice of the 
times, and there were often complaints about the size of the 
commissioners’ bills for food and drink.  
74. Id. at 27–28. 
75. 2 An Authentic Narrative of the Proceedings Under A 
Commission of Bankruptcy Against John Perrott 8 (1761) 
(recounting how the woman’s maid testified that her employer said that 
she always made her “fellows . . . pay for favors received”). 
76. Id. at 11–15; see also 1 Perrott, supra note 72, at 21. 
77. 2 Perrott, supra note 75, at 8. 
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In his subsequent behavior, to the time of his execution, this 
unhappy criminal is reported to have evinced great penitence; 
and it would almost border on inhumanity to doubt his 
sincerity: but certain it is, that he could not, by any means, be 
prevailed on, to make any further retribution to his injured 
creditors, though there is the utmost reason to believe it to have 
been in his power. The deficiency in his affairs amounts to at 
least 17000£ [about £3 million today78].79 
4. Limited Relief: Discharge 
 The Statute of Anne80 is quite often portrayed as the beginning of 
modern, enlightened bankruptcy practice because it introduced a 
discharge.81 Such a view obviously overlooks its rather draconian 
penalty.82 The discharge was an innovation, 83 but it was exceedingly 
hard to get a discharge under this law, especially following 
amendments to the statute shortly after enactment.84  
 
78. For the calculation of present value, see Inflation Calculator, Bank of 
England, http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/education/Pages/inflation/
calculator/flash/default.aspx (calculate the value of £17000 in 1761 
compared to 2012). 
79. 2 Perrott, supra note 75, at 42. 
80. 4 Ann, ch. 17 (1705). 
81. See, e.g., Hoppit, supra note 34, at 20–23 (“With the certificate of 
discharge, freeing the bankrupt from his debts, the businessman was 
offered an escape from his unsuccessful spirit of adventure. . . . [T]he 
past would not hang round his neck like an albatross.”); Charles 
Jordan Tabb, The Law of Bankruptcy 40 (2d ed. 2009) (“While 
the quasi-criminal nature of bankruptcy remained, the Statute of Anne 
established the roots of a more humanitarian legislative attitude toward 
honest but unfortunate debtors.”). 
82. See Cooke, supra note 65, at 479 (“This is a penal law and a severe 
one, for it reaches to the life of the bankrupt . . . .”). 
83. Ian P.H. Duffy, English Bankrupts, 1571–1861, 24 Am. J. Legal Hist. 
283, 287–88 (1980) ([T]he [discharge] reforms were clearly revolutionary 
and aroused understandable anxiety that bankrupts would be able to 
escape their liabilities too easily.”); see also Douglass G. Boshkoff, 
Limited, Conditional, and Suspended Discharges in Anglo-American 
Bankruptcy Proceedings, 131 U. Pa. L. Rev. 69, 70 n.7 (1982) 
(describing the discharge provision as originally enacted to be quite 
“generous,” which triggered subsequent legislative constraints). 
84. See Kadens, supra note 35, at 1289–93 (arguing that the lack of a 
realistic discharge, combined with the outrageous penalty for non-
cooperative debtors, actually increased corruption in the English 
bankruptcy system); see also John C. McCoid, II, Discharge: The Most 
Important Development in Bankruptcy History, 70 Am. Bankr. L.J. 
163, 167–68 (1996) (detailing the additional restrictive conditions upon 
debtors seeking a discharge). 
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This statute would remain in place, with minor changes, during 
the reigns of Georges I through III—the remainder of the colonies’ 
attachment to the home country.85 Contemporaneous treatises referred 
to one as being “liable” to bankruptcy, rather than benefiting from it, 
under the law of this period.86 The “benefit” of the discharge was still 
restricted to “traders” and, more generally, the concept of bankruptcy 
in England at the time by definition only applied to traders, and 
despite the lax definition of what constituted “trading” as the century 
progressed, getting a discharge remained difficult but the risk of 
draconian penalties, although slight, remained real.87 
D. First Colonial Bankruptcy Laws 
Through a hodgepodge of general bankruptcy laws, often not 
titled as such, and private bills, the American colonies managed to 
provide a system of bankruptcy relief. In the early years, this system 
was heavily influenced by English practice, but it was never the case 
that English practice applied directly in the colonies. Moreover, the 
laws of the time broadly centered on the plight of imprisoned debtors, 
with somewhat lesser emphasis on the issue of insolvent traders (to 
the exclusion of other debtors) than found in the home country.  
In the American colonies, many early debtor-creditor laws lacked 
the collective nature of bankruptcy as it had already developed in 
England. For example, the Charter of Philadelphia, granted in 1701, 
contained its own debtor-creditor law, including provisions for what 
we would now term debt slavery.88 The practice seems to have been a 
 
85. E.g., 5 Geo. 2, c. 30, § 1 (1732) (providing that bankrupts who fail to 
surrender to the commission “shall suffer as felons, without benefit of 
clergy”). This was the statute in effect during the Revolution, through 
the passage of America’s first bankruptcy statue in 1800. The 
progression after 4 & 5 Ann., c. 17 (1705) was 6 Ann., c. 22 (1706) and 
5 Geo. 1, c. 24 (1718). These acts were all then consolidated in 5 Geo. 2, 
c. 30 (1732), which was amended by 46 Geo. 3, c. 135 (1806) and 49 
Geo 3, c. 121 (1809). All were eventually repealed and replaced with 6 
Geo. 4, c. 16 (1825), but by then the United States had long obtained 
its independence. Note it was only this latter act that formally repealed 
the old statutes, which remained in force, if underused. Cooper, supra 
note 42, at 243 n.*. 
86. The Spirit of the Bankrupt Laws 2 (4th ed., corr., enl., Edward 
Green, comp., 1780); Thomas Davies, The Laws Relating to 
Bankrupts, Brought Home to the Present Time 1 (1744). 
87. On the definition of what constituted “trading,” see 2 Charles 
Petersdorff, A Practical And Elementary Abridgment Of 
The Common Law As Altered And Established By The Recent 
Statutes, Rules Of Court, And Modern Decisions 16–20 (1842) 
(collected cases); see also 2 William Blackstone, Commentaries 
*475–77 (discussing who qualifies as a “trader”). 
88. Debt bondage was common in the colonies, especially in Virginia before 
the introduction of African slaves. See generally Edmund S. Morgan, 
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feature of the debtor-creditor law in Pennsylvania until at least 1729, 
as the Commonwealth revisited the vexing problem of unpaid debts 
every few years.89  
Noel credits Maryland with the “first formulated bankruptcy law 
on the American continent,” a statute passed in 163890 that tracked 
then-existing English law, without using the term “bankruptcy.”91 
Likewise, in 1714 Massachusetts enacted a statute92 modeled on a 
decade-old English statute,93 and Pennsylvania also enacted a 
bankruptcy statute94 that followed English practice, including 
provisions for putting the uncooperative debtor into the pillory and 
removing bits of the debtor’s ear.95 
Massachusetts then followed its original statute with two others—
one in 1757 and another in 1765 after the Crown had struck down the 
first—of more local origin.96 Similarly, from 1755 to 1770, New York 
 
American Slavery, American Freedom: The Ordeal of 
Colonial Virginia 381–84 (1975) (explaining Jefferson’s aversion to 
debt bondage, which he felt was contrary to the republican ideal of self-
support and left the nation susceptible to tyranny). Following the 
introduction of African slaves in the South, debt servitude became a 
Northern phenomenon. And unlike African slavery and some modern 
examples of debt slavery, debt servitude in the colonies was subject to 
legal limitations on applicability—for example, several states limited it 
to unmarried men, although some border states like Delaware used 
racial categories for applicability—and was generally not hereditary, 
although fathers could sometimes bind their sons to satisfy the claims. 
Coleman, supra note 31, at 40–41, 210–11, 253. 
89. F. Regis Noel, A History of the Bankruptcy Law 54–66 
(William S. Hein & Co. 2003) (1919).  
90. Act of March, 1638 (Md.). 
91. Noel, supra note 89, at 43–44. Notably, Coleman describes this period of 
bankruptcy law in Maryland’s history somewhat differently, despite citing 
Noel among his sources. Coleman, supra note 31, at 162–63 (“Maryland 
modified creditor rights more fundamentally than did most communities in 
the region, but its relief system was also highly unstable and confused.”). It 
should also be noted that Noel would heartily disagree with the thesis of 
this Article. Noel’s book reflects a typically Progressive Era, Hamiltonian 
view of federal power, and thus he argues (based on reviewing Maryland 
and Pennsylvania) that states were largely incompetent in the bankruptcy 
area, and that the states enacted little more than “transcript[s] of the 
British statutes.” Noel, supra note 89, at 83. 
92. Act of 1714 726–29 Mass. Bay Acts and Resolves. 
93. Coleman, supra note 31, at 45. 
94. The Statutes of Pennsylvania from 1682 to 1801, at 129–30, 249–51. 
95. In all cases, the assumption that the extant English statutes did not apply 
directly in the colonies has interesting implications for latter, Revolutionary 
era disputes about Parliament’s efforts to impose statutes on the colonists. 
96. Coleman, supra note 31, at 45–47. 
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expanded an existing system for release of impoverished debtors from 
prison to include the ability to bind holdout creditors to a workout 
agreed to by the majority of creditors.97 In doing so, New York 
effectively backed itself into a bankruptcy system, but one that was 
unlike the English ones of the time. 
Maryland did a similar thing with a 1774 law—passed in the last 
legislative session before the American Revolution—that released 
debtors from prison and was later interpreted by a court to protect 
the debtor’s future earnings from past creditors.98 This law stayed in 
effect until repeal in 1817. 99 
A common problem throughout most of the colonies was the 
requirement that any commercial legislation, including bankruptcy 
statutes, obtain the approval of the Privy Counsel and its Lords of 
Trade. Quite often, colonies enacted statutes only to have them 
revoked by officials in London. For example, in 1771 New York 
attempted to expand its original impoverished-debtor-release law to 
protect the debtor’s property acquired following release from prison. 
London said no.100 
But the process worked the other way too: Massachusetts 
attempted to repeal its bankruptcy statue in 1766, only to have the 
Board of Trade revive the statute.101 As might be expected, dueling 
authority did not make for stability in bankruptcy legislation during 
this period. A solution was to proceed by way of private bill, 
discharging specified debtors.102 London often explained that it 
preferred general acts that made clear to creditors ex ante the 
potential for discharge, yet a substantial number of private bills from 
multiple colonies managed to slip through the Privy Counsel.103 
 
97. See id. at 108–09 (noting that by 1756 statutes extended relief to 
debtors throughout the colony). 
98. Id. at 164–65. 
99. E.g., A General Act for the Relief of Prisoners, ch. 28, 1774 Md. Laws 5 
(1776), repealed by Supplement to An Act for the Relief of Sundry 
Insolvent Debtors, ch. 183, 1817 Md. Laws 191. 
100. Coleman, supra note 31, at 113. 
101. Id. at 48. 
102. Kurt H. Nadelmann, On the Origin of the Bankruptcy Clause, 1 Am. J. 
Legal Hist. 215, 222–23 (1957). 
103. See, e.g., id. at 222–24 (discussing the special acts of Connecticut 
and Pennsylvania). 
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II. Bankruptcy in the United States  
Before Crowninshield 
A. Differing Views of the Bankruptcy Clause 
While some merchants apparently hoped for a national 
bankruptcy law, the Articles of Confederation never provided one. 
Indeed, enacting such a law would have required unanimous consent 
of all the colonies, something that was not apt to happen with regard 
to the divisive issues of whether there should be such a law and what 
such a law might look like. But with the adoption of the Constitution 
in 1787, the Bankruptcy Clause gave the federal government the 
power to enact “uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies 
throughout the United States.”104 Despite this seeming progress 
toward uniform bankruptcy laws, views of the Bankruptcy Clause’s 
purpose and grant of authority differed greatly. 
In the Federalist, Madison argued that the federal bankruptcy 
power was intimately connected with the interstate commerce 
power,105 an argument Hamilton would echo with even greater force 
when he pointed to the federal government’s power to override state 
bankruptcy laws as indicative of a larger federal supremacy in 
economic matters, which supported the creation of a national bank.106 
Others, most notably the late Kurt Nadelmann, have argued that 
the Bankruptcy Clause was actually connected to the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause. Specifically, he traces the origins of the Bankruptcy 
Clause to an effort to amend the Full Faith and Credit provision to 
provide equal weight to private bills passed by state legislatures, 
especially those that were used in the colonies and states to discharge 
specific debtors.107 He notes that it was unclear whether these acts, or 
discharges granted under general state bankruptcy laws, were valid in 
other states.108 He attributes the Bankruptcy Clause’s ultimate 
location in the Constitution to the Committee on Style, rather than 
any clear connection to the Commerce Clause.109 
Under Nadelmann’s reading of the Bankruptcy Clause, its purpose 
was to ensure that state-granted discharges would be valid 
 
104. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.  
105. The Federalist No. 42, at 221 (James Madison) (The Gideon ed., 2001); 
see also The Federalist No. 10, at 44 (James Madison) (The Gideon ed. 
2001) (discussing the inherent tension between debtors and creditors). 
106. Alexander Hamilton, Opinion on the Constitutionality of an Act to 
Establish a Bank (Feb. 23, 1791), in 8 The Papers of Alexander 
Hamilton 97, 109 (Harold C. Syrett et al. eds., 1965). 
107. Nadelmann, supra note 102, at 219–20. 
108. Id. at 224. 
109. Id. at 226–27. 
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nationwide. The Supreme Court’s failure to understand this—which 
he excuses since Madison’s notes were not yet available to the 
Court—lead to a much different reading of the Clause than originally 
intended.110 Of course, all of this turns on acceptance of a secret 
meaning of the Bankruptcy Clause, known only to the Founders, that 
was not apt to be apparent to those at any of the ratifying 
conventions, which then begs the question of whether, even if true, it 
really matters. 
Or, more generally, we might note the possibility that some 
members of the convention may have favored a Hamiltonian reading 
of the Clause, while others, particularly early Jeffersonian-
Republicans, likely favored the one proffered by Nadelmann.111 It was 
not really necessary for these two interpretations to be reconciled, 
since both lead to support for inclusion of the Clause in the final 
document.112 
And ultimately the Bankruptcy Clause’s most important role in 
the first decades of the United States was its use, by analogy, in 
Hamilton’s Opinion on the Constitutionality of an Act to Establish a 
Bank. Otherwise, the federal government largely ignored the Clause, 
leaving the states free to act.113  
B. State-Based Regulation Following Constitutional Adoption 
Some early opinions held that the states remained free to address 
insolvency despite the Constitution.114 And certainly the legislatures of 
 
110. Id. at 228. 
111. On the broader Hamiltonian-Jeffersonian split, see Stanley Elkins & 
Eric McKitrick, The Age of Federalism 4 (1993) (discussing the 
“enmity that arose” between Hamilton and Jefferson). 
112. See Thomas E. Plank, The Constitutional Limits of Bankruptcy, 63 Tenn. 
L. Rev. 487, 527 (1996) (noting the Constitutional Convention adopted 
the proposed clause with little debate to indicate legislative intent). 
113. E.g., Wall v. Court of Wardens, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 434, 436 (S.C.C.P. 1795) 
(describing the purposes of, and ultimately applying, the South Carolina 
Insolvent Debtor’s Act); see also 1 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy 
in America 107 n.* (Henry Reeve trans., 3d Amer. ed., rev. and corr. 
1839) (explaining that Congress neglects its right to make a general law of 
bankruptcy, and instead each state makes such law for itself). 
114. E.g., Blanchard v. Russell, 13 Mass. (12 Tyng) 1, 12 (1816); Clarke v. Ray, 
1 H. & J. 318, 320 (Md. 1802) (“The legislatures of the several states have 
competent authority to pass laws for the relief of all persons who are not 
comprehended within the act of Congress. That part of the constitution of 
the United States relating to bankrupts, is carried into operation by the law 
of Congress, as far as that body thought it was politic and expedient; and 
the law of Congress constitutes the only restriction which is imposed on the 
state legislatures in the case of insolvent debtors.”); Pettit v. Seaman, 
2 Root 178, 180 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1795) (“As to the objection made to the 
constitutionality of the act of the state of New York, respecting insolvency, 
drawn from the Constitution of the federal government having vested 
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the several states that enacted legislation at least implicitly expressed 
the belief that such power remained with the states.115 Moreover, 
beginning in 1790 and then several times thereafter, Congress enacted 
legislation that gave the federal government a priority in bankruptcy 
proceedings, which necessarily referenced state insolvency proceedings 
since there was no federal law; therefore, these enactments could be 
seen as a kind of congressional acquiescence in the development of 
state statutory schemes.116 Chief Justice Marshall upheld a version of 
this priority statute, arguing more than a decade before McCulloch v. 
Maryland117 that such a law could be supported under the Necessary 
and Proper clause, as “it would be incorrect and would produce 
endless difficulties, if the opinion should be maintained that no law 
was authorised which was not indispensably necessary to give effect to 
a specified power.”118 
Thus, the primary means of resolving financial distress remained 
with the individual states. For example, a 1788 New York law119 
provided for the general discharge of all debts upon agreement of 
three-quarters of the creditors, and an 1813 New York law,120 in effect 
through the end of the nineteenth century, reduced the requirement 
from requiring three-fourths of creditors in agreement to two-thirds.121 
 
Congress with the sole power of making general laws of bankruptcy, that 
never can be understood and construed, to supersede the power of the state 
governments, to make and to continue in force and exercise their respective 
insolvent laws, until Congress shall exercise the powers vested in them, by 
making and promulgating general laws of bankruptcy through the states, 
which will be the supreme law of the land. This not having been done at 
this time, the law of the state of New York is in force.”). 
115. See Hollis R. Bailey, A Discharge in Insolvency, and Its Effect on Non-
Residents, 6 Harv. L. Rev. 349, 351 (1893) (listing New York, 
Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Louisiana as states that enacted insolvency 
laws, and rendered judicial decisions based on those laws, after 1789). 
116. Priority of Payment, Given to the United States in Cases of 
Bankruptcy, Insolvency, &c., 1 U.S. L. Intelligencer & Rev. 219, 
220 (1829); see also United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 384 
(1805) (noting that it was necessary for the federal government to claim 
priority of payment in order to protect government revenue from fraud 
by debtors who absconded across state lines). 
117. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).  
118. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 396.  
119. Act of March 21, 1788, ch. 92, 1788 N.Y. Laws 823. 
120. Act of April 12, 1813, ch. 98 (R.L.), 1813 N.Y. Laws 450. 
121. Coleman, supra note 31, at 123–24. New York financial distress laws 
predate these 1788 and 1813 acts. See Bankruptcy and Insolvency, 21 Alb. 
L.J. 106, 106–07 (1880) (discussing the early history of New York law as it 
applied to the discharge of debt and dating such laws to 1755); see also Act 
of Apr. 13, 1786, ch. 34, 1786 N.Y. Laws 242 (providing relief of insolvent 
debtors); Billings v. Skutt, 1 Johns. Cas. 105, 105–06 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1799) 
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It was one of these series of statutes—an 1811 New York Act122—that 
the Supreme Court would take up in Crowninshield,123 and a version 
of the three-fourths act was the subject of Saunders.124 But until then, 
thousands of debtors obtained a discharge of the debts under the 
statute, and several hundred were released from prison. 
In addition to states like New York, which already had extensive 
experience with bankruptcy laws that were not called bankruptcy 
laws, many other states responded to the general economic decline 
after the war and enacted legislation.125 As explained by Lawrence 
Friedman: “The colonies had constantly tinkered with this or that law 
for the relief of debtors, and the Revolution did not interrupt the 
process; indeed, the dislocations of the war, and the economic misery 
that followed, gave a strong push to debtor relief.”126  
Some other Federalist-leaning states, like Rhode Island, initially 
refrained from enacting any new bankruptcy legislation, with the 
expectation that the Congress would act.127 But eventually they too 
would return to the task of addressing financial distress at the state 
level.128 
C. The Bankruptcy Act of 1800: Short-Lived  
Exception to State Regulation 
The obvious exception to the larger story of federal indifference in 
the early years is the Bankruptcy Act of 1800,129 which was drafted 
 
(finding that a pre-discharge confession of judgment was unenforceable due 
to the defendant’s discharge under the 1786 insolvency law). 
122. Act of April 3, 1811, ch. 123, 1811 N.Y. Laws 200 (benefitting Insolvent 
Debtors and their Creditors). 
123. Coleman, supra note 31, at 125. 
124. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827). The three-fourths acts 
date back to 1761. Bankruptcy and Insolvency, supra note 121, at 106–07. 
The specific three-fourths law at issue in Saunders was enacted in 1801. Act 
of April 3, 1801, ch. 131, 1801 N.Y. Laws 316 (providing relief in cases of 
insolvency) (commonly referred to as the three-fourths act). This was a 
revision of the 1788 Act. Bankruptcy and Insolvency, supra note 121, at 107.  
125. An Analysis of the Insolvent Laws of Pennsylvania, 2 Amer. L.J. 242, 
242 (1809) (describing the 1808 insolvency law, which was a 
reenactment of the 1798 statute). 
126. Lawrence H. Friedman, A History of American Law 201 (rev. 
3d ed., Touchstone Books 2005) (1973). 
127. See Coleman, supra note 31, at 276 (noting that “Rhode Island 
abandoned its relief system in 1819 when the Supreme Court declared 
state bankruptcy laws unconstitutional”). 
128. However, Rhode Island did wait to act for more than fifty years after 
Saunders in 1827. Id. 
129. Act of Apr. 4, 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19 (repealed 1803). 
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and shepherded through Congress by John Marshall.130 This first 
attempt at a federal bankruptcy law131 came after more than a decade 
of indecision and tortured debate.132 The 1800 Act “was by its terms 
limited to a five years’ operation, but it only lasted three years.”133  
1. Similarity to English Bankruptcy Law 
The statute closely tracked the English practice that had 
developed throughout the eighteenth century,134 and the leading 
treatise on the Act is peppered with cross-references to English 
statutes and cases.135 Bankruptcy petitions were filed against traders 
who had committed specified acts of bankruptcy,136 and, as initially 
drafted, the district courts appointed a commission to handle the 
proceedings.137  
As with all bankruptcy laws, the end result was a common 
collection for creditors and by “the 36th section of the Bankrupt Law, 
Congress has given the district Judge the same authority in allowing 
the certificate [of discharge], as is by the English statutes lodged in 
 
130. See Jean Edward Smith, John Marshall: Definer of a Nation 
256–58, 348 (1996) (noting that Marshall was a principal author of the 
Act in the House of Representatives and discussing his calculated efforts 
to ensure the measure would pass). 
131. Act of Apr. 4, 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19 (repealed 1803). 
132. See Bruce H. Mann, Republic of Debtors: Bankruptcy in the 
Age of American Independence 254–63 (2002) (discussing the 
ideological debate that led to the Act, namely whether bankruptcy 
should primarily be a process for creditors to seize the debtor’s assets 
“in a more orderly fashion” or instead a “social safety net” to allow 
debtors a second chance to become productive economic contributors). 
133. Warren, supra note 11, at 19; see also 2 George Tucker, The Life 
of Thomas Jefferson, Third President of the United States 
157–58 (1837) (discussing the factors that led to Jefferson’s repeal of the 
1800 Act, especially downsizing the federal government). 
134. Roosevelt v. Mark, 6 Johns. Ch. 266, 285 (N.Y. Ch. 1822) (“The 
bankrupt act of the United States, of April, 1800, was a consolidation of 
the previous provisions in the English statutes of bankruptcy; and the 
English decisions on their statutes prior to that date, properly apply as 
rules of construction to this act of Congress.”). 
135. See Thomas Cooper, The Bankrupt Law of America, Compared 
with the Bankrupt Law of England (1801) (comparing a number 
of English statutes and cases with their American counterparts). 
136. See, e.g., Barnes v. Billington, 2 F. Cas. 858, 859 (C.C.D. Pa. 1803) 
(finding that the party in question was “a trader within the meaning of 
the bankrupt law”). 
137. Karen Gross et al., Ladies in Red: Learning from America’s First Female 
Bankrupts, 40 Am. J. Legal Hist. 1, 9–10 (1996); see also Maxim v. 
Morse, 8 Mass. (7 Tyng) 127, 127–28 (1811) (describing a defendant 
pleading his case to a bankruptcy commission under the 1800 Act). 
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the hands of the Chancellor.”138 In short, this statute ignored the ways 
in which American insolvency law had already drifted away from 
English practice in the decades before the American Revolution.139 It 
was limited by its terms to merchants or traders, meaning that it 
applied to but a small sliver of the potential debtors.140 And it 
provided the kind of limited discharge that the states had already 
found unworkable.141 
2. Amendment 
Shortly after Jefferson’s inauguration in 1801, the Bankruptcy Act 
of 1800 was amended to take the power to name commissioners away 
from the district courts, which were seen as Federalist, and give the 
power to the President.142 Among the commissioners thus removed 
from office was future President John Quincy Adams, attempting to 
restart his law practice after many years abroad as a minister during 
his father’s administration.143 Shortly thereafter, continued 
Democratic hostility to the bankruptcy law resulted in its complete 
repeal.144 
3. Federal-State Balance 
Notably, the 1800 Act itself acknowledged the existence of state 
bankruptcy statutes and provided that enactment of the Act did not 
 
138. 1 George Caines, An Enquiry into the Law Merchant of the 
United States 588 (1802). 
139. See Noel, supra note 89, at 132 (discussing the view that the English 
system of commercial insolvency laws could not be properly applied in 
the largely agricultural United States). 
140. Act of Apr. 4, 1800, ch. 19, § 1, 2 Stat. 19, 20 (repealed 1803); see also 
Wood v. Owings, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 239, 250–51 (1803) (noting that the 
Act applies to “any merchant”); Caines, supra note 138 at 483 
(describing a bankrupt under the 1800 Act as “a person [who is] a resident 
within the United States, actually using the trade of merchandise, by 
buying and selling in gross or retail, or dealing in exchange, as a banker, 
broker, factor, underwriter, or marine insurer”). 
141. See Coleman, supra note 31, at 274 (noting that the Bankruptcy Act of 
1800 was abandoned in part because it embodied the English 
bankruptcy style). 
142. Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 31, § 14, 2 Stat. 156, 164. 
143. See Morris Weisman, Of Jefferson and Adams and a Commissioner in 
Bankruptcy, 48 Com. L.J. 248, 249 (1943) (discussing John Adams’s 
appointment of his son, John Quincy Adams, as a bankruptcy 
commissioner and the latter’s removal by Thomas Jefferson). 
144. Act of Dec. 19, 1803, ch. 6, 2 Stat. 248 (repealing the 1800 Act); see 
also David A. Skeel, Jr., The Genius of the 1898 Bankruptcy Act, 
15 Bankr. Dev. J. 321, 323–24 (1999) (discussing the political struggle 
between Federalists and Jeffersonian Democrats that led to the repeal of 
the 1800 Act). 
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supersede such statutes “except so far as the same may respect 
persons, who are, or may be clearly within the purview of this act.”145 
Maryland’s response to the enactment of the 1800 Act is quite 
telling. Its legislature proclaimed that the Constitution did not take 
away the power of the states to enact bankruptcy laws, and then 
proceeded to enact the 1800 Act as another option for debtors at the 
state level.146 Given the scarcity of federal district courts at the time, 
this was probably more useful than the 1800 Act itself. 
Indeed, the 1800 Act was but a flash in the pan compared with 
the serious, longer-term efforts at addressing bankruptcy at the state 
level. Thus, an 1805 Maryland insolvency statute is described in a 
long-forgotten opinion in terms that would be familiar to any 
contemporary bankruptcy lawyer: 
[T]he great principal upon which it is founded, is, that the 
debtor shall surrender all his property for the common benefit of 
all his creditors. He can only obtain his discharge on complying 
with this requisite, and some others of an inferior nature. When 
he has complied, then he is entitled to his discharge.147 
Within a few short years, dozens had applied to the Baltimore court 
to obtain a fresh start under this law.148 
A review of the case law during this period suggests a fairly 
vibrant insolvency system was at work, albeit one that comprised 
many parts instead of a single whole as some of the Framers may 
have envisioned.149 Private bills likewise continued to discharge 
specific debtors.150 
 
145. Act of Apr. 4, 1800 § 61. 
146. Coleman, supra note 31, at 176 n.30. 
147. In re Stewart, 2 Am. L.J. 184, 186 (Md. Ch. 1809). 
148. See Insolvents, 1 Am. L.J. 393, 393–95 (1808) (listing those who had 
been discharged, and those for whom petitions were pending, based on 
the records of the Baltimore County Court). 
149. See, e.g., Reily v. Lamar, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 344, 353 (1805) (finding that 
a Maryland insolvency statute only applies to residents of Maryland); 
Packwood v. Foelckell, 1 Mart. (o.s.) 60, 60 (Orleans 1809) (looking to the 
construction of the Louisiana Territory insolvency statute); Hale v. Ross, 
3 N.J.L. 807, 809 (N.J. 1811) (applying a New York insolvency statute to 
litigants in New Jersey) overruled by Wood v. Malin, 10 N.J.L. 208 (N.J. 
1828); Baker v. JJ. of Ulster Com. Pl., 4 Johns. 191, 191 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1809) (per curiam) (holding defendant could not plead discharge under a 
New York insolvency act); Cross v. Hobson, 2 Cai. 102, 102–03 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1804) (per curiam) (denying defendant’s application to be discharged 
under a New York insolvency statute); Miller v. Hunter, 5 N.C. (1 Mur.) 
394, 395 (1810) (interpreting a North Carolina insolvency statute from 
1773); Anonymous, 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) 481, 481 (1797) (per curiam) 
(holding defendant must separate good debts from bad debts); Wilt v. 
Schreiner, 4 Yeates 352, 352 (Pa. 1807) (applying the Pennsylvania acts of 
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There was also a degree of comity at work during this period, 
with states and even some federal courts151 honoring discharges 
granted by sister jurisdictions,152 while protecting the due process 
rights of distant creditors who were without notice of the 
proceedings.153 The aim in all cases was to provide relief to the 
“honest and unfortunate debtor.”154 
But throughout the system, there lingered important 
Constitutional questions. Namely, did the Bankruptcy Clause, like the 
Commerce Clause,155 contain an implicit preemption of most state 
 
insolvency); Fabre v. Zylstra, 2 S.C.L. (2 Bay) 147, 150 (S.C. Ct. App. 
1798) (remanding to determine the issue of fraud under the state’s 
insolvent debtor’s act); Hunt v. Simons, 2 S.C.L. (2 Bay) 104, 105 (S.C. 
Ct. App. 1797) (granting defendant’s discharge under the state’s insolvent 
debtor’s act); Commonwealth v. Chapman, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 137, 139 
(1803) (noting a state act allowing persons imprisoned for fines to take the 
oath of insolvency). 
150. See, e.g., ch. 36, 1807-8 Md. Laws (relieving James West, an insolvent 
debtor), reprinted in 1 Am. L.J. 87, 89 (1808); see also Barber v. 
Minturn, 1 Day 136, 137 (Conn. 1803) (finding that the assembly passed 
“a special act of insolvency” to discharge each defendant); Jeffries v. 
Thompson, 2 Yeates 482, 482 (Pa. 1799) (describing Maryland 
legislation that discharged several named debtors); Coleman, supra 
note 31, at 69 (noting that for private bills enacted in Vermont between 
1785 and 1821, the vast majority merely provided a stay of execution 
rather than a full discharge). 
151. See Wray v. Reily, 30 F. Cas. 653 (C.C.D.C. 1808) (recognizing a state 
insolvency law in federal court). 
152. See McKim v. Marshall, 1 H. & J. 101, 102 (Md. 1800) (honoring 
defendant’s discharge under Pennsylvania insolvency law); Baker v. 
Wheaton, 5 Mass. (4 Tyng) 509, 512 (1809) (honoring defendant’s 
discharge under Rhode Island insolvency law) overruled by Marsh v. 
Putnam, 69 Mass. (3 Gray) 551, 567 (1854); Hare v. Moultrie, 2 Yeates 
435 (Pa. 1799) (honoring defendant’s discharge under South Carolina 
insolvency law); see also Haddon v. Chambers, 1 Yeates. 529, 531 (Pa. 
1795) (suggesting that a Maryland discharge would have been honored, 
but for the specific facts of the case). 
153. See Hayton v. Wilkinson, 11 F. Cas. 917, 918 (C.C.D. Md. 1808) 
(Chase, J.) (questioning whether a British creditor could be discharged 
under Maryland insolvency law, when the creditor had not be listed by 
the debtor); Webster v. Massey, 29 F. Cas. 553, 553–54 (C.C.D. Pa. 
1808) (discharge under Pennsylvania law released debtor from prison 
when contract was governed by non-Pennsylvania law, but left the 
contract between debtor and creditor still in force). 
154. In re Brown, 1 Mart.(o.s.) 158, 159 (Orleans 1810). This is one of the 
earliest references to the famous phrase; see also Stellwagen v. Clum, 
245 U.S. 605, 617 (1918) (stating that the federal system of bankruptcy, 
in part, “intends to aid the unfortunate debtor”). 
155. While it is beyond the scope of this Article, nothing in this Article 
should suggest that the Court’s development of its dormant Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence has been any clearer than its Bankruptcy Clause 
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legislation in the field, even when the bankruptcy power went 
unexercised?156 And, if not, as some state courts had already 
suggested, did the Contracts Clause to the Constitution nonetheless 
limit the states’ ability to discharge debts?157 
Indeed, during the antebellum period, any consideration of 
bankruptcy and the Bankruptcy Clause necessarily involved 
consideration of two, and sometimes three, competing issues. First, 
what meaning should be given to the Bankruptcy Clause itself? 
Second, if the Bankruptcy Clause did not preclude state laws entirely 
what role did the Contracts Clause play with regard to state laws? 
And third, in cases involving federal appeals, the Court at this time 
might also apply general constitutional law, incorporating a kind of 
common law of due process into the analysis.158 In such cases, the 
Venn diagram includes three overlapping circles of constitutional 
considerations. Quite often it becomes impossible to discern precisely 
which piece of constitutional law was at play in a particular case. 
 
jurisprudence. Cf. Felix Frankfurter, The Commerce Clause 
Under Marshall, Taney and Waite 28–29, 50–51, 96–101 (1937) 
(discussing the varied views of three influential Chief Justices on the 
proper role of the dormant Commerce Clause). But the existence of a 
dormant Commerce Clause is presumed; whereas the dormant 
Bankruptcy Clause is, at most, implied. Undoubtedly, this is partly the 
result of the narrower focus of the Bankruptcy Clause: it is much easier 
for Congress to occupy a greater part of the field with regard to 
bankruptcy. 
156. See Malcolm P. Sharp, Movement in Supreme Court Adjudication—A 
Study of Modified and Overruled Decisions, 46 Harv. L. Rev. 593, 595–96 
(1933) (discussing contemporary arguments that existed for a bankruptcy 
companion case to Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824)); see also Norman 
R. Williams, Gibbons, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1398 (2004) (discussing the early 
debate surrounding the Dormant Commerce Clause); David P. Currie, The 
Constitution in the Supreme Court: State and Congressional Powers, 
1801–1835, 49 U. Chi. L. Rev. 887, 916 (1982) (discussing Justice 
Marshall’s dictum “that the commerce power might be exclusive”). 
157. See Stephen A. Siegel, Understanding the Nineteenth Century Contract 
Clause: The Role of the Property-Privilege Distinction and “Takings” 
Clause Jurisprudence, 60 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 12 (1986) (discussing the 
disputes over the application of the Contract Clause raised by the 
bankruptcy controversy). 
158. See Michael G. Collins, October Term, 1896—Embracing Due Process, 45 
Am. J. Legal Hist. 71, 74–76 (2001) (discussing the “public purpose” 
limitation on state taxation as an early application of due process from 
general constitutional law); Michael G. Collins, Before Lochner—Diversity 
Jurisdiction and the Development of General Constitutional Law, 74 Tul. 
L. Rev. 1263, 1304–15 (2000) (discussing the application of general 
constitutional law in federal jurisdiction for assessing whether state tax 
rates for businesses are confiscatory and allow a fair return). 
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D. Courts Weigh in on the Bankruptcy Clause Debate 
1. Early Cases and Disagreement 
It was not until 1812 that the Hamiltonian, or Federalist, view of 
the Bankruptcy Clause that undergirds these questions began to 
appear in federal court litigation.159 And by then, although Hamilton 
had been dead eight years since his encounter in Weehawken,160 his 
legacy lived on at the Supreme Court in the form of Chief Justice 
Marshall.161 
 But it took a while for the cases to reach the Chief Justice.162 In 
the interim, some courts felt that the issue had been resolved. For 
example, in an 1817 opinion the Chief Justice of the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court observed that  
all the states have passed insolvent laws, and Congress has 
passed one, for the district of Columbia, the validity of which 
has never been questioned. This act was not made under the 
express power given to Congress to pass a bankrupt law, 
(because that was to be general and uniform, throughout the 
Union), but under the power vested in them, to legislate for the 
district of Columbia. Had it been thought that an insolvent law, 
was the impairing of a contract, within the meaning of the 
constitution, we can hardly suppose, that Congress would have 
passed one for Columbia, although not prohibited expressly by 
 
159. See Coleman, supra note 31, at 31 (“[N]o one challenged the 
constitutionality of state relief laws until after 1812.”). 
160. See James D. Myers, Bringing the Vice President into the Fold: Executive 
Immunity and the Vice Presidency, 50 B.C. L. Rev. 897, 923 (2009); 
Ron Chernow, Alexander Hamilton 650–55, 680–709 (2004).  
161. See Benjamin Fletcher Wright, Jr., The Contract Clause of the 
Constitution 27–28 (1938) (referring to Marshall as the “greatest of 
[Hamilton’s] disciples,” and heralding the importance of his appointment to 
the development of a broader conception of the Contract Clause for 
protection of private property rights); see also William E. Nelson, The 
Eighteenth-Century Background of John Marshall’s Constitutional 
Jurisprudence, 76 Mich. L. Rev. 893, 894–95 (1978) (noting that Marshall 
“consciously furthered the political goals of the Federalist Party”). 
162. As early as 1809, the Chief Justice heard a case involving a discharge 
granted under Virginia’s insolvency statute, but it appears that the issue 
of the statute’s constitutionality was never raised. Slacum v. Simms, 
9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 363 (1809). An even earlier opinion, to a similar 
effect, can be found in Turner v. Fendall. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 117 (1801). 
The issue that the Court ultimately considered in Saunders was nearly 
addressed before Chief Justice Marshall’s tenure in Emory v. Grenough, 
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 369 (1797), but the case was ultimately dismissed for 
lack of diversity. 
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the constitution; because, to say the least of it, it would have 
been setting a very bad example.163 
The Pennsylvania court was likely weighing in on a dispute that was 
then percolating amongst the Supreme Court Justices.164  
 The issue was also splitting the state courts. For example, the 
New Jersey high court held that Congress had exclusive control over 
bankruptcy and that “a law discharging a debtor from his debts, 
without payment, if not a bankrupt law, is a law impairing the 
obligation of contracts, the power of making which is, by the said 
constitution, expressly forbidden to the individual states.”165 The New 
Jersey court thus held the New York insolvency statute 
unconstitutional before the Supreme Court reached the same result in 
Crowninshield. 
In 1812, Justice Story, while riding circuit in Rhode Island, 
considered whether that state’s colonial era insolvency law discharged 
a foreign creditor on a contract made in a foreign jurisdiction.166 
Justice Story acknowledged doubts about the true meaning of the 
Bankruptcy Clause before finding a way to elide the dispute on 
procedural grounds that suggested the discharge was not binding.167 
 
163. Farmers’ & Mechs.’ Bank v. Smith, 3 Serg. & Rawle 63, 71 (Pa. 1817) 
rev’d sub nom. Farmers’ & Mechs.’ Bank of Pa. v. Smith, 19 U.S. 
(6 Wheat.) 131 (1821). 
164. See Gerald T. Dunne, Joseph Story: The Great Term, 79 Harv. L. 
Rev. 877, 896–97 (1966) (discussing the tactics aspects surrounding the 
difference in opinion among Supreme Court Justices regarding the 
construction of the Contract Clause). 
165. Olden v. Hallet, 5 N.J.L. 466, 469 (N.J. 1819). 
166. See Babcock v. Weston, 2 F. Cas. 306, 306 (C.C.D.R.I. 1812) (doubting 
whether private bill by legislature could discharge Massachusetts 
creditor’s claim); see also Gerald T. Dunne, Joseph Story: 1812 
Overture, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 240, 253 (1963) (noting that the Babcock 
case was where Justice Storey “began his work in structuring the 
American law of bankruptcy”). The reporting on some of these early 
cases leaves much to be desired—for example, in the Babcock opinion as 
it appears on Westlaw and in Federal Cases, Justice Story is alleged to 
have cited not only Crowninshield, which was decided in 1819, but also 
Saunders, from 1823, a neat trick in an 1812 decision. It appears that 
Federal Cases used the second edition of the original Gallison reporter. 
This edition, produced in 1845, adds a footnote that contains the 
offending citations. Babcock v. Weston, 1 Gall 168, 169 (C.C.D.R.I. 
1812). Somehow the footnote was moved to the text when Federal Cases 
was produced late in the nineteenth century. 
167. See Van Reimsdyk v. Kane, 28 F. Cas. 1062, 1065 (C.C.D.R.I. 1812) 
(suggesting that state insolvency law cannot apply to “controversies 
affecting citizens of other states”). 
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In 1814, Justice Washington had ruled that a Pennsylvania 
insolvency statute was unconstitutional.168 In short: 
[Justice Washington] reasoned that the grant of a power to the 
federal government without any mention of the states suggested 
that the grant was complete and therefore exclusive. In 
addition, the concept of a uniform bankruptcy system logically 
demanded a single regulation applicable throughout the Union; 
such a system necessarily depended on congressional action and 
an exclusive constitutional grant of power for that purpose. 
Finally, he suggested that it would be incorrect to restore to the 
states, by implication, a power that the Constitution specifically 
assigned to the federal government. The parallel inclusion of the 
naturalization and bankruptcy provisions in the same 
constitutional section added weight to the view that in both 
areas a concurrent power would violate the framers’ intent.169 
This was followed by an 1816 decision, in which the South 
Carolina Circuit Court followed Justice Washington’s reasoning, and 
held: 
[B]y the constitution of the United States the individual states 
have given up their rights of legislating as to commerce and 
bankruptcy; that this right is now solely in possession of the 
United States government . . . ; that no bankrupt law existing 
at this time does not affect the main question, because the right 
in government still remains to enact one.170 
To the modern reader, the decision in this case seems something of a 
reach, inasmuch as the complaining creditor was without notice of the 
South Carolina proceedings, providing an obvious basis for finding the 
discharge inoperative that avoided the Constitutional question. But 
this naive counterargument forgets that the states were not yet 
subject to the Due Process Clause.171 
Then, in 1817, Justice Livingston rejected Justice Washington’s 
analysis in an opinion regarding the retroactive application of New 
York’s insolvency statute.172  
 
168. Golden v. Prince, 10 F. Cas. 542, (C.C.D. Pa. 1814). 
169. Herbert A. Johnson, Bushrod Washington, 62 Vand. L. Rev. 447, 465 
(2009) (footnotes omitted). 
170. Gill v. Jacobs, 10 F. Cas. 373, 375 (C.C.D.S.C. 1816). 
171. Cf. Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250–51 (1833) 
(holding that the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause was only a 
limitation on the federal government’s power).  
172. See Adams v. Storey, 1 Fed. Cas. 141, 143–44 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1817) 
(holding that Congress does not have exclusive power to create 
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Justice Livingston argued that while the precise statute at issue 
had been enacted after the contract in question was signed, New York 
had long had similar insolvency statutes—the present one differed but 
in detail—and thus the contract law of New York and most other 
states had long included the possibility that contracts might be 
discharged as part of the debtor’s insolvency proceedings.173 
Livingston also took a thoroughly modern view of insolvency 
legislation, arguing that the inability of debtors to obtain a “fresh 
start” would produce a drag on economic activity. 174 
2. Sturges v. Crowninshield Affirms State Authority to Regulate 
Bankruptcy 
Shortly thereafter, Justice Story, who was riding circuit in 
Boston, was faced with a challenge to the very same New York 
statute that Justice Livingston had previously upheld. Story took a 
third course: he accelerated Richard Crowninshield’s case to the full 
Supreme Court, on the basis of the courts’ apparent division.175 
Crowninshield had defaulted on two loans worth approximately 
$1,500, and sought relief under New York’s insolvency statute.176 His 
creditor argued that because of the Bankruptcy Clause, only Congress 
had the power to pass bankruptcy laws, and moreover state 
insolvency laws violated the Contracts Clause.177 
The majority hinted at a broader reading of the Bankruptcy 
Clause, noting: 
Congress is expressly vested with the power of passing bankrupt 
laws, and is not prohibited from passing laws impairing the 
obligation of contracts, and may, consequently, pass a bankrupt 
law which does impair it; whilst the states have not reserved the 
power of passing bankrupt laws, and are expressly prohibited 
from passing laws impairing the obligation of contracts.178 
But ultimately it did not seize the moment. 
 
bankruptcy legislation and rejecting any interpretive parallel to the 
federal exclusivity of naturalization doctrine). 
173. Id. at 148. 
174. Id. at 146. 
175. Dunne, supra note 164, at 896–97. 
176. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 122 (1819) (noting 
the action was brought by “the maker of two promissory notes . . . for 
the sum of 771 dollars and 86 cents each”). 
177. See Robert L. Hale, The Supreme Court and the Contract Clause, 57 
Harv. L. Rev. 512, 519–20 (1944) (discussing Justice Marshall’s 
response to both of these arguments). 
178. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 191. 
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Given the Chief Justice’s role as the guardian of the Hamiltonian 
legacy, his decision to pass on the first argument179 and ground his 
opinion in the second seems somewhat counterintuitive.180 But, unlike 
Hamilton, Chief Justice Marshall had lived several decades with the 
knowledge that Congress was unlikely to actually use its authority 
under the Bankruptcy Clause.181 
Thus, the Court focused in on the retroactive nature of the New 
York statute, seemingly ignoring Justice Livingston’s point that some 
sort of insolvency statute had been in effect for a long time in New 
York and held that discharge of preexisting contractual obligations 
violated the Contract Clause.182 Despite the Chief Justice’s probable 
inclinations to join Justice Washington in holding the Bankruptcy 
Clause to create an exclusively federal power, his opinion instead 
holds that the states retain a residual ability to address insolvency in 
times when Congress has failed to act.183 
Taken together, the Court’s holdings with regard to the two 
Clauses resulted in the apparent rule that states could pass 
bankruptcy statutes, so long as they had the foresight to pass the 
statute well before it might be needed.184 In many ways, this 
suggested a hostility to innovation: states that passed an insolvency 
statute and let it alone would provide the most benefit to their debtor 
citizens.185 
 
179. See Kenneth N. Klee, Bankruptcy and the Supreme Court 170 
(2008) (noting that Crowninshield held that the Bankruptcy Clause 
alone did not preempt state laws). 
180. See Daniel W. Levy, A Legal History of Irrational Exuberance, 48 Case 
W. Res. L. Rev. 799, 814 (1998) (“Marshall’s initial concession 
regarding whether New York had any power with respect to debt relief 
was as unlikely as ever for the great believer in a broadly construed, 
preemptive federal regulatory power.”). 
181. See Smith, supra note 130, at 440 (discussing Marshall’s view that 
unless the states were permitted to enact insolvency laws, “no relief 
would be forthcoming”). 
182. Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the 
United States, 3 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 5, 15 (1995). 
183. See Note, The Abstention Doctrine in Bankruptcy, 116 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
942, 950 (1968) (noting that “the Bankruptcy Act does not encompass 
all questions relating to bankruptcy, and state regulation of potentially 
conflicting areas has been sanctioned”). 
184. See Robert L. Hale, Some Basic Constitutional Rights of Economic 
Significance, 51 Colum. L. Rev. 271, 279–80 (1951) (discussing a 
number of cases exhibiting hostility to contract impairment that support 
this conclusion). 
185. See Malcolm P. Sharp, Movement in Supreme Court Adjudication—A 
Study of Modified and Overruled Decisions, 46 Harv. L. Rev. 361, 
368–69 (1933) (noting the Court’s “protection of contracts once formed 
in reliance on an existing state of the law”). 
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3. Expansion of Crowninshield 
But hardly anyone seems to have read the case as the last word 
on the meaning of the Bankruptcy Clause. And as the Court’s later 
opinion in Saunders would make clear, it turned out that 
Crowninshield’s apparent reconciliation of the Justices’ competing 
conceptions of the Clause was merely temporary.186 
The true meaning of Crowninshield was further confused when, 
the day after announcing its opinion in that case, the Chief Justice, 
acting again on behalf of an apparently united Court, issued a short 
opinion proving that: 
[T]his case was not distinguishable in principle from the 
preceding case of Sturges v. Crowninshield. That the 
circumstance of the State law, under which the debt was 
attempted to be discharged, having been passed before the debt 
was contracted, made no difference in the application of the 
principle. And that as to the certificate under the English 
bankrupt laws, it had frequently been determined, and was well 
settled, that a discharge under a foreign law, was no bar to an 
action on a contract made in this country. 
Judgment affirmed.187 
The defendant had obtained not one discharge but two: in both 
Louisiana and England. Neither seemed to work in the eyes of the 
Court. 
In one fell swoop, the Chief Justice seemed to have greatly 
expanded the holding of Crowninshield to cover most state 
bankruptcy laws and foreign laws too.188 But for reasons that remain 
unclear, no one seems to have taken this opinion at face value, and 
the holding of the opinion was undermined by subsequent events.189 
 
186. See Donald G. Morgan, Mr. Justice William Johnson and the 
Constitution, 57 Harv. L. Rev. 328, 354 (1944) (noting that, in 
Saunders, a new majority upheld the New York insolvent debtor law). 
187. McMillan v. McNeill, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 209, 212 (1819). 
188. See Bailey, supra note 115, at 352 (“[T]he language of the court in 
M’Millan v. M’Neill, was such as to induce a belief that the court meant 
to declare all State insolvent laws unconstitutional, as impairing the 
obligation of contracts.”). 
189. In two of the majority opinions in Saunders, Justices suggested that the 
reporter misstated the Chief Justice’s McMilllan holding. Interestingly, 
the Chief Justice did not address the issue in his Saunders dissent. 
Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 255, 272 (1827). 
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III. The Fight Crowninshield Provoked 
 The true meaning of the Bankruptcy Clause remained a matter of 
contention despite a second effort at a federal bankruptcy code and 
two interventions by the Supreme Court. In many respects 
Crowninshield’s compromise satisfied no one. Hamiltonians still felt 
that bankruptcy should be purely federal by virtue of the Bankruptcy 
Clause.190 And, as the years progressed, state insolvency laws got 
swept along in a larger, slavery-focused argument for “States’ 
Rights.”191  
Thus, Vermont’s high court held that all state bankruptcy laws 
were unconstitutional following Crowninshield,192 while at almost the 
same time the New Jersey high court upheld the use of a 
Pennsylvania discharge in a contract suit.193 The Supreme Court of 
Ohio found the federal cases totally inapplicable to its state 
insolvency statute, provided that all the relevant action in the case 
occurred within the boundaries of Ohio after the enactment of the 
statute.194 Somewhat similarly, the Supreme Court of New York held 
that “an insolvent or bankrupt law, in force when the contract was 
made, does not, in the sense or meaning of the constitutional 
provision, impair the obligation of such contract.”195 
But the high court of Illinois felt itself bound by the full 
Hamiltonian position it felt the Supreme Court had adopted, but also 
made clear that it questioned the “correctness” of Crowninshield.196 At 
the same time, members of various state legislatures questioned the 
Supreme Court’s decision as well.197 And, in New York, there was at 
least one suggestion that Crowninshield should be overruled by 
Constitutional amendment.198 In short, the actual meaning of the  
190. See Coleman, supra note 31, at 35 (noting that even after 1827 many 
influential people held the view that state insolvency laws were 
prohibited by the Constitution, as reflected by many state legislatures’ 
refusal to act after Crowninshield). 
191. Shelton, supra note 11, at 400. 
192. Herring v. Selding, 2 Aik. 12, 18 (Vt. 1826). 
193. Rowland v. Stevenson, 6 N.J.L. 149, 150 (N.J. 1822). 
194. Smith v. Parsons, 1 Ohio 236, 241 (1822). 
195. Mather v. Bush, 16 Johns. 233, 249 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1819). 
196. Mason v. Wash, 1 Ill. (Breese) 39, 41 (1822) (“But as the supreme court of 
the United States has determined that the discharge is equally unavailing 
whether the contract was made before or after the passage of the act, this 
court feels itself bound to yield to that opinion, how much soever some of 
the court might be disposed to question its correctness.”). 
197. E.g., Jurisdiction of the District Judges of the United States, in 
Bankruptcy, 1 U.S. L.J. 15, 15 (1822). 
198. Id. 
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Bankruptcy Clause remained a source of confusion after the Supreme 
Court’s first effort.199 
A. Ogden v. Saunders: The Court’s Attempted Clarification 
The Court’s next attempt at resolving the issue hardly helped, as 
the Court fractured dramatically in Ogden v. Saunders.200 Saunders 
involved an earlier version of the New York insolvency law at issue in 
Crowninshield,201 the primary difference between the two statutes 
being the number of creditors needed to bind holdouts to a discharge.  
The creditors took the opportunity to reassert the Hamiltonian 
view of the Bankruptcy Clause, arguing for a general prohibition on 
state insolvency laws. For example, Daniel Webster told the Court: 
The constitution was intended to accomplish a great political 
object. Its design was not so much to prevent injustice or injury 
in one case, or in successive single cases, as it was to make 
general salutary provisions, which, in their operation, should 
give security to all contracts, stability to credit, uniformity 
among all the States, in those things which materially concerned 
the foreign commerce of the country, and their own credit, 
trade, and intercourse among themselves. The real question is, 
therefore, a much broader one than has been argued. It is this, 
whether the constitution has not, for general political purposes, 
ordained that bankrupt laws should be established only by 
national authority? We contend that such was the intention of 
the constitution; an intention, as we think, plainly manifested 
by a consideration of its several provisions.202 
This argument was buttressed with the argument that the New York 
law also violated the Contracts Clause. Importantly, however, the 
contract in question in Saunders had been entered into in 1806, while 
the New York statute at issue was enacted in 1801.203 That is, unlike 
Crowninshield, this case did not involve the question of retroactive 
application of the statute.204 
The Supreme Court initially produced four distinct “majority” 
opinions—each member of the majority writing separately.205 And 
 
199. Coleman, supra note 31, at 127. 
200. See Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827) (decided by a 
4–3 split).  
201. Id. at 213–214.  
202. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 237. 
203.  See id. at 271. 
204.  See id.; Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 122–23 (1819). 
205. Siegel, supra note 157, at 13–14; see also Currie, supra note 156, at 917 
(stating, in its explanation of the justice’ different approaches: “Headless 
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Chief Justice Marshall wrote a rare dissent for himself and Justices 
Duvall and Story.206 
Then, to make matters more interesting, the second half of the 
opinion involved a shift by Justice Johnson to join the dissenters in a 
new majority, with the remaining three Justices of the former 
majority in dissent.207 
The primary holding was that the Court would not revisit the 
notion of a dormant Bankruptcy Clause, despite the Chief Justice’s 
reported desire to do just that,208 and prospective application of a 
state bankruptcy statute did not violate the Contract Clause.209 But, 
as noted, the majority could not agree amongst themselves precisely 
why this should be so. 
In the second half of the case, the Court held that the application 
of a prospective state bankruptcy statute must be limited within state 
borders.210 That is, a state insolvency statute could have no extra-
territorial effect.  
What provision of the Constitution this second holding was based 
on, and where it came from, is hard to figure.211 Logic would seem to 
 
for the first time, the majority reverted to the pre-Marshall practice of 
seriatim opinions”). 
206. See Paul Brest et al., Processes of Constitutional 
Decisionmaking: Cases and Materials 145 (5th ed. 2006) (referring to 
Marshall’s dissent as his only one in a constitutional case); cf. Herbert 
Hovenkamp, The Classical Corporation in American Legal Thought, 76 
Geo. L.J. 1593, 1606 (1988) (discussing the Federalists’ concerns with 
“the threat to American creditworthiness that might result from state 
debtor relief legislation passed during the 1780s recession”). 
207. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 358, 369. 
208. See Smith, supra note 130, at 498. Smith argues that Marshall’s dissent 
was likely written as a majority opinion several years earlier, when the 
case was first heard. Id. at 498 n.*. The Court delayed the decision in 
the case when the justices tied three to three due to one seat on the 
court being vacant for more than two terms. Id. at 498. 
209. Cf. Judith Schenck Koffler, The Bankruptcy Clause and Exemption 
Laws: A Reexamination of the Doctrine of Geographic Uniformity, 
58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 22, 49–50 (1983) (noting Justice Marshall’s concern 
that allowing nonuniform state bankruptcy statutes would have the 
practical effect of increasing the economic uncertainty of potential 
foreign and interstate trade partners, thus suppressing commerce). 
210. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 368. 
211. David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The 
First Hundred Years, 1789–1888, at 154–55 (1985) (“Justice 
Johnson composed a mysterious cadenza . . . . It seems certain that this 
opinion was not based upon the contract clause; to determine what it 
was based on is appreciably more difficult.”). It seems that the second 
half of the opinion was the actual Saunders case, while the first holding 
reflected the outcome of some companion cases that are only obliquely 
mentioned in the opinion. See 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 213, 357; see also 
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rule out the Contracts Clause, which has no geographical component. 
Perhaps a rare appearance by the dormant Bankruptcy Clause? 
The case predates the Fourteenth Amendment and application of 
much of the Bill of Rights to the states; a holding based on due 
process thus is out of the question.212 Since the case involves an appeal 
from the district court, general constitutional law might be in play. 
But, in a footnote to Saunders, Justice Johnson applied the holding of 
the primary case to a state court appeal, seemingly ruling out that 
possibility.213  
The dormant Bankruptcy Clause might win this argument by 
process of elimination, but then there is the primary holding of the 
case, which seems to rule out any sort of dormant Bankruptcy Clause 
whatsoever. How could the states enact their own prospective 
insolvency laws if such a dormant clause was operative? Perhaps some 
notion of fundamental rights and vested property interests in 
contracts?214 
In any event, Justice Johnson provides the deciding vote and 
forms the common link between the two parts of the case.215 
B. Resulting Confusion 
Application of this muddled holding, or set of holdings, would 
plague courts, and result in much confusion, for the remainder of the 
nineteenth century. And if the Federalists and latter Whigs hoped 
that Crowninshield and Saunders would prompt Congress to finally 
use its power under the Bankruptcy Clause, the larger States’ Rights 
trend would leave them sorely disappointed.216  
Smith, supra note 130, at 499 (indicating that Justice Johnson—the 
Saunders swing vote—disagreed with “the principle that all state 
bankruptcy legislation was unconstitutional” but joined Chief Justice 
Marshall for the second half of the opinion, which was addressed the 
complicated issue of the case “since it involved a contract with an out-
of-state citizen”). At the very least, the second half relates to the actual 
facts of Saunders as elsewhere described in the opinion. 
212. See Currie, supra note 211, at 155 (explaining how due process was 
thought to apply solely to the federal government until the landmark 
incorporation cases of the mid-twentieth century). 
213. Shaw v. Robbins, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 369 (1827) (reported in note a 
following Saunders). 
214. See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810) (holding that a state 
contract granting land cannot be subsequently repealed to the detriment 
of a later good-faith purchaser—even if originally illegally procured by 
bribes—and, accordingly, invalidating a state law that attempted to do 
so on Contract Clause grounds). 
215. See 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 271, 358.  
216. See Story, supra note 26, at § 1105 (“It cannot but be matter of 
regret, that a power so salutary should have hitherto remained . . . a 
mere dead letter.”). 
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As one writer noted in 1841, just before Congress finally and 
briefly acted again, 
[F]or the last thirty-seven years, indeed, with the exception of 
three years, from the adoption of the federal constitution, we 
have had no national bankrupt law. No commercial country, at 
all comparable with the United States in the extent of its 
commerce, has been without such laws within the last 
century. . . . And the fact seems still more singular, when the 
condition of our country and the characteristics of our people 
are considered. Our country is comparatively new; the mass of 
its population are born to toil; there are vast resources to 
develop, and numerous hands for their development, with but a 
scanty supply of the necessary pecuniary means. . . . [T]he 
whole country, the old and new parts, in different degrees, are 
indebted for pecuniary aid to the capitalists of Europe.217 
Almost inevitably, states that had previously recognized out-of-state 
discharges felt bound to reject such discharges following the Court’s 
opinion in Saunders.218  
But even this did not become a hard and fast rule, and courts 
developed a myriad of approaches to deal with the contract signed in 
state or out of state, the creditor who was a resident but who then 
moved out of state, and the debtor who likewise relocated. Consider, 
for example, the out-of-state resident who signed the contract in state 
before leaving again or the parties who live in one state but signed a 
contract in some commercial center like New York or New Orleans 
and then relocated to a third jurisdiction. The permutations were 
almost endless.219 
And courts were not the only players involved in this confusing 
attempt to settle on the meaning of the Bankruptcy Clause. State 
legislatures continued to pass debtor-relief measures, especially in 
times of financial crisis, prompting one commentator at the time to 
observe: 
It is occasionally remarked, by those who deal in sweeping 
arguments, that these laws are unconstitutional, and therefore 
to be disregarded. . . . [Yet u]ntil these statutes have been 
 
217. Joshua M. Van Cott, A General Bankrupt Law, in 4 Merchants’ 
Magazine & Commercial Review 22, 22–23 (Freeman Hunt, ed. 1841). 
218. Hollis Bailey first noted this in his 1892 article. See Bailey, supra 
note 115, at 354–58 (listing affected decisions by state). 
219. For a discussion illustrating the complications of these rules with regard 
to the New York insolvency statutes, see Art. VI—Bankrupt and 
Insolvent Laws, 4 Am. Jurist & L. Mag. 98 (1830). 
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declared unconstitutional by some competent tribunal, their 
operation is the same as if their validity were unimpeachable.220 
Another author complained that because of Congress’s failure to act, 
there had developed at least “twenty distinct systems of bankruptcy, 
or insolvency, each differing from all the rest, in almost every 
provision intended to give security to the creditor, or relief to the 
debtor.”221 
Finally, some continued to argue that Congress had the exclusive 
power to deal with the subject: that is, the full “Hamiltonian” 
position continued to be advocated, despite the Supreme Court’s 
efforts to construct a sphere of joint responsibility.222 For example, one 
anonymous author, published in 1823, but perhaps writing somewhat 
earlier (but clearly after the Crowninshield opinion), argued: 
[B]ankrupt laws form a prominent and important branch of 
international law: 1. Because they involve the rights of citizens 
and subjects of foreign States, as well as of our own. 2. Because 
the government of every State is bound to protect the rights of 
its own citizens, in all cases whatsoever, and particularly in 
commercial cases, which relate to the intercourse and comity of 
nations: And 3dly, Because, in the communication between the 
courts and tribunals of different nations, evidence from the 
highest authority is always expected. Proceedings with respect 
to the bankrupt’s estate, or those relating to the discharge of his 
person, can not emanate from local jurisdiction, but must be 
stamped with the seal of national authority.223 
C. The 1841 Bankruptcy Act: A Brief Federal Intrusion  
in Response to the Panics of 1837 and 1839  
 Congress then briefly intruded with the 1841 Bankruptcy Act.224 
Somewhat ironically, many suggest225 that the law was modeled on the 
 
220. Art. II—On a National Bankrupt Law, 1 Am. Jurist & L. Mag. 35, 
39 (1829). 
221. Van Cott, supra note 217, at 29. The author goes on to argue that the 
states have done the best they could, given the Constitutional 
constraints they were required to operate under. Id. at 33. 
222. Notwithstanding the Court’s majority position, Justice Story was 
skeptical of the states’ purview over debtors. See Story, supra note 26, 
at § 1103 (“Very few persons engaged in active business will be without 
debtors or creditors in many states in the Union. The evil is incapable of 
being redressed by the states. It can be adequately redressed only by the 
power of the Union.”). 
223. Bankrupt Law of the United States, 1 U.S. L.J. 446, 450 (1823). 
224. Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440 (repealed 1843). For a section-
by-section analysis of this law, see 1 J.B. Staples, The General 
Bankrupt Law 21–38 (1841). Several Pennsylvania cases decided 
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extant Massachusetts insolvency law.226 The federal law was to last 
but eighteen months in this instance.227 
It is generally argued that the Whig Congress that enacted the 
1841 Act intended the Bankruptcy Bill to provide relief to those who 
had suffered economic losses during the Panics of 1837 and 1839.228  
1. Voluntary Bankruptcy Petitions 
The 1841 Act is often noted for its “innovation” in allowing 
voluntary bankruptcy petition229 by a wide range of debtors.230 The 
1841 Act provided that, “All persons whatsoever, residing in any 
State, District or Territory of the United States, owing debts . . . shall 
be deemed bankrupts within the purview of this act, and may be so 
declared accordingly by a decree of such court.”231 Voluntary petitions 
were unknown to English bankruptcy practice at the time,232 but 
 
under the 1841 Act, and one long-in-the-tooth case decided under the 
1800 Act, are reproduced in the Pennsylvania Law Journal’s Reports of 
Cases in Bankruptcy. See, e.g., Ex parte Bennet, 1 Penn. L.J. 145 
(1842); In re Leppein, 1 Penn. L.J. 223 (1842). Also reproduced are 
cases from other jurisdictions, including a circuit opinion of Justice 
Story. See In re Randall, 1 Penn. L.J. 133 (C.C.D. Mass. 1842). 
225. 5 Carl B. Swisher, History of the Supreme Court of the 
United States: The Taney Period, 1836–1864, at 133 (1974).  
226. Act of Apr. 23, 1838, ch. 163, 1838 Mass. Acts 83. This law is discussed in 
Insolvent Law of Massachusetts, 19 Am Jurist & L. Mag. 302 (1838). The 
law provided for voluntary and involuntary petitions. Id. at 314–15, It also 
provided a discharge “as extensive as is supposed to be consistent with the 
constitution of the United States.” Id. at 324. The law had been developed 
over several years of legislative work. Proposed Insolvent Law of 
Massachusetts, 6 Am. Jurist & L. Mag. 116 (1831). 
227. See Act of Mar. 3, 1843, ch. 82, 5 Stat. 614 (repealing the 1841 Act).  
228. Edward J. Balleisen, Vulture Capitalism in Antebellum America: The 1841 
Federal Bankruptcy Act and the Exploitation of Financial Distress, 70 Bus. 
Hist. Rev. 473, 479 (1996). Support for this proposition can also be found 
in a 1841 article, where the author states that the prior ten years had 
resulted in mass economic devastation warranting a new federal bankruptcy 
statute. Van Cott, supra note 217, at 33. President Van Buren had 
proposed a bankruptcy bill for banks only during the crisis. See President 
Martin Van Buren, Special Session Message (Sept. 4, 1837), available at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=67234.  
229. Warren, supra note 11, at 60; Rhett Frimet, The Birth of Bankruptcy 
in the United States, 96 Com. L.J. 160, 180 (1991). 
230. Tabb, supra note 182, at 16 (explaining that the “final compromise” 
that culminated in the 1841 Act did not limit eligibility for relief to 
“merchant debtors”).  
231. Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, § 1, 5 Stat. 440, 441 (repealed 1843).  
232. Edward J. Balleisen, Navigating Failure: Bankruptcy and 
Commercial Society in Antebellum America 105 (2001). 
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many of the state laws already discussed herein provided just such 
relief to debtors. And efforts to enact a voluntary federal bankruptcy 
law actually dated back some twenty years earlier, when such a law 
was considered by Congress.233 
The alleged novelty of voluntary petitions, and the lack of any 
such petitions in England at the time of the Constitution, did lead a 
few lower courts to hold the 1841 Act unconstitutional.234 The bulk of 
these decisions were overturned, and a New York court upheld the 
constitutionality of the voluntary provision, albeit after repeal.235 That 
court, which included a future Supreme Court Justice in the majority, 
used the occasion to interpret the Bankruptcy Clause: 
Looking thus at the uniform popular acceptation of the word 
from the earliest times and in all English countries, and 
supposing that to be the true one, I read the constitution thus: 
“Congress shall have power to establish uniform laws on the 
subject of any person’s general inability to pay his debts 
throughout the United States.” I do not deny that if we were 
bound to apply the English statute definition of the 
word bankruptcy, the power of congress would be unequal to the 
discharge here pleaded . . . . It seems to me too that there is 
something quite forced and unnatural in supposing that the 
members of the convention intended to contract the action of 
congress on the subject of bankruptcies within a limit narrower 
than that allowed by the British constitution; above all that 
 
233. Olmstead, supra note 3, at 837; see also John C. McCoid, II, The 
Origins of Voluntary Bankruptcy, 5 Bankr. Dev. J. 361, 371 (1988) 
(explaining how three separate bankruptcy bills that Congress 
considered between 1820 and 1830 failed to become law). 
234. See, e.g., In re Klein, 14 F. Cas. 719 (D. Mo. 1843), rev’d, 14 F. Cas. 
716 (C.C.D. Mo. 1843); Wattles v. Lalor, 3 W.L.J. 315 (C.C. Ill. 1843) 
(case reported in 1845), rev’d, 8 Ill. (3 Gilm.) 225, 227 (1846). But see 
Nelson v. Carland, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 265, 265–66 (1843) (dismissing case 
for want of jurisdiction, but noting that the constitutionality of the act 
had been raised in a handful of cases); In re Irwine, 13 F. Cas. 125, 130 
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1842) (internal citations omitted) (“[I]nasmuch as this 
[voluntary bankruptcy] is a principle unknown to the bankrupt law of 
England, and of these states before the constitution, or the act of 1800, 
it ought not to be expanded by construction, so as to interfere with the 
rights of creditors, further than the law authorizes, or exempt the debtor 
from any restrictions imposed upon him as requisites to his discharge.”). 
The New Hampshire Supreme Court suggested that the inability of the 
United States Supreme Court to hear appeals under the 1841 Act might 
call into question the law’s uniformity, as required by the Bankruptcy 
Clause. Kittredge v. Warren, 14 N.H. 509, 513 (1844). For a discussion 
of the Supreme Court’s limited jurisdiction under the 1841 Act, see Ex 
parte Christy, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 292, 292–293 (1845). 
235. Kunzler v. Kohaus, 5 Hill 317, 321–23 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1843); Sackett v. 
Andross, 5 Hill 327, 327–28 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1843). 
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they intended to hamper that body by the letter of the statute, 
when it was well known that British legislation had already 
extended itself in one case, and might thereafter, as it has in 
fact done, extend itself to other cases not then provided for. I 
allude to the 34 and 35 H. 8, ch. 4, and the 6 Geo. 4, ch. 16, the 
first of which comprehended all classes of persons, as well 
traders as others, and the latter introduced the right of a trader 
voluntarily to declare himself a bankrupt. The argument is 
repugnant to the whole spirit of American legislation. It 
moreover supposes the convention, while engaged in framing a 
fundamental law, to have been utterly regardless of those 
obvious vicissitudes in a world full of changes, which might call 
for a corresponding enlargement or contraction of the bankrupt 
system.236 
2. Commissioners and Assignees 
 As in 1800, the 1841 Act followed the English model in providing 
for the appointment of a commissioner (now one individual, instead of 
a panel) by the federal court and the management of the debtor’s 
property by assignees.237 But in contrast to the 1800 Act, the 1841 
Act provided that title to all the bankrupt’s property vested in the 
assignee by operation of law, without involvement of the 
commissioner.238  
According to Owen’s Rules in Bankruptcy, the primary role of the 
commissioner was “to take the proof of debts and to take testimony 
to be used in the Circuit or District Court in all hearings in cases of 
bankruptcy.”239 But unlike the assignee, the use of a commissioner was 
not required by the Act—Rule 34 indicates that the court had the 
 
236. Kunzler, 5 Hill at 321–23.  
237. 1 Frank Olds Loveland, A Treatise on the Law and 
Proceedings in Bankruptcy 12 (4th ed. 1912). 
238. Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, § 3, 5 Stat. 440, 442–43 (repealed 1843); see 
also Loveland, supra note 237, at 11 (“The court appointed an 
assignee, in whom the title to all the bankrupt’s property, real, personal, 
and mixed, vested by operation of law.”). 
239. Samuel Owen, Rules in Bankruptcy, in A Treatise on the Law 
and Practice of Bankruptcy app.1, app.8 (1842) (stating Rule 33). 
The Rules in Bankruptcy contained in the appendix to this treatise 
appear to be directed at New York jurisdictions, but similar Rules under 
the 1841 Act can be found in the jurisdictions of Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. Section 6 of the 1841 Act 
provided the basis for these enactments. Act of Aug. 19, 1841, § 6; see 
also Nugent v. Boyd, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 426, 432 (1845) (“’Proceedings in 
bankruptcy,’ as per section 6, are of exclusive cognisance in the District 
Courts of the United States.”); Staples, supra note 224, at 30 
(describing the district court’s rule making authority under § 6 as 
serving the purposes of providing “simplicity and efficiency”). 
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power to refer to a commissioner “at its own instance, or on motion of 
either party.”240  
Thus, most of the real power under the 1841 Act resided with the 
federal courts and their appointed assignees—and little control was 
left in the hands of the creditors.241 In addition to their role in the 
selection of assignees and commissioners, judges in bankruptcy cases 
under the 1841 Act had broad discretion to interpret the vague rules 
of the written law,242 which also at least partially explains the 1841 
Act’s short shelf life.  
3. Shortcomings 
Anonymous commentary published following the passage of the 
1841 Act lamented the likelihood that only large bankrupts in major 
cities would be able to avail themselves of the benefits of voluntary 
bankruptcy. In contrast, the commentary continued,  
[S]mall traders who live in the interior who may be as 
unfortunate and quite as honest as the others cannot secure to 
themselves this advantage. The distance of their residence from 
the seat of justice; the expense of employing lawyers; the 
exorbitant fees which marshalls, clerks, assignees, commissioners 
and newspaper publications will consume, will place relief 
beyond their reach. . . . The wreck of his ruined fortune will be 
consumed in the costs of litigation, and the officers of the law 
will be the only parties who derive any thing [sic] from the 
division of the estate.243  
Creditors who brought claims under the 1841 Act also claimed 
inadequate dividends were paid, blaming in large part the expenses 
that administration incurred.244 Under the 1841 Act, the fees earned 
by professionals—attorneys, and court administrators, such as 
clerks—often exceeded the recovery from debts owed to creditors.245  
 
240. Owen, supra note 239, at 8.  
241. Warren, supra note 11, at 82.  
242. Id. (citing Roscoe Conkling, then Representative of New York, in 
reflecting on the incompleteness of the Act: “Indeed the Judges were 
driven to turn legislators and to help it out by vigorous construction 
and by cumbrous and interminable rules . . . .”). 
243. J.C.L., Observations on the Law to Establish a Uniform System of 
Bankruptcy Throughout the United States, 1 La. L.J. 39, 64 (1842).  
244. These concerns were not baseless—according to the 1846 and 1847 
congressional reports regarding the 1841 Act, court costs incurred 
totaled nearly $1,000,000. H.R. Doc. No. 223, at 31 (1846); H.R. Doc. 
No. 99, at 8 (1847); see also Balleisen, supra note 228, at 481 n.14 
(indicating that this figure was perhaps even an underestimate).  
245. Balleisen, supra note 232, at 137–38.  
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More generally, a federal bankruptcy law meant the expansion of 
federal power. And in the 1840s, there was broad and pronounced 
hostility to greater federal power from those states that would 
eventually form the Confederacy.246 Indeed, one of the leading 
Supreme Court decisions involving the 1841 Act pointedly involved 
dueling orders from the District of Kentucky and a Kentucky state 
court. The state court purported to sell the debtor’s property in the 
face of the pending bankruptcy case.247 
All the while, the question remained whether Crowninshield and 
Saunders were rightly decided from the Hamiltonian perspective. For 
example, one circuit court decision under the 1841 Act argued: 
The power “to pass uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies 
throughout the United States,” is given in the constitution, and 
belongs to the same class of powers, “as to regulate commerce, 
establish a uniform rule of naturalization, coin money, establish 
post-offices and post roads, and to declare war.” These, in my 
judgment, are all exclusive powers. It is true, the supreme court 
have held that a state may pass a bankrupt law, to operate 
upon all contracts subsequently made within the state. But I 
cannot comprehend the principle on which this decision rests.248 
D. After 1841 
1. Initial Return to State Regulation and Continuing Debate 
The 1800 Act had lasted three years,249 but the 1841 Act barely 
survived for a year and a half.250 For more than twenty-five years 
 
246. Id. at 104; see also J.M.C., Observations on the Bankrupt Law, 1 La. L.J. 
1, 1 (1842) (responding to J.C.L., supra note 243) (“[H]is arguments very 
much resemble the squadron which has been drilled by [D]emocratic 
leaders . . . . The Bankrupt Law involves a high constitutional question, 
affecting not only the political relations between the several States and 
the Union, but also the social and commercial relations of men. The 
consideration of the question should therefore be approached with a mind 
wholly free from the taint of political prejudice . . . .”). 
247. Shawhan v. Wherritt, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 627, 641, 645 (1849). This case, 
like many during the era, reminds us that insolvency in this era had 
extreme consequences for the debtor’s slaves, whose lives could be 
upended by their owner’s missteps. Id. at 628 (reporter’s note explaining 
that debtor’s property included “five negroes, two wagons and teams, 
about 400 head of hogs”); see also William Goodell, Slavery Tested by 
Its Own Code, 1 Q. Anti-Slavery Mag. 21, 26 (1835) (describing the 
devastating effect on slaves’ family stability that arose from being 
bought and sold as chattels). 
248. McLean v. Lafayette Bank, 16 F. Cas. 253, 254 (C.C.D. Ohio 1843).  
249. See Loveland, supra note 237, at 10 (indicating that the 1800 Act was 
“repealed by the act of December 19, 1803”).  
250. Act of Mar. 3, 1843, ch. 82, 5 Stat. 614 (repealing the 1841 Act). 
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following the repeal of the 1841 Act, there was no federal bankruptcy 
law in place in the United States. Once again the states returned to 
trying to apply their own statutes, now with the added confusion 
concerning what had happened to those statutes during the brief 
period of the 1841 Act’s life.251 
The debate about the Bankruptcy Clause, and the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation thereof, remained as vital as ever: 
The State Legislatures can pass insolvent laws, and administer 
them, much better than Congress. . . . The two cases of Sturgis 
v. Crowinshield, and Ogden v. Saunders, were most unfortunate 
cases for the people of this country. They have had a most 
disastrous influence on multitudes of unfortunate debtors, and 
have very much embarrassed Congress and the whole country. 
That the decisions in these cases, especially that of Ogden v. 
Saunders, are not in conformity to the Constitution, there 
cannot, it appears to me, be a doubt . . . .252 
Taking the Jeffersonian approach to the Clause, the author 
anticipated the Nadelmann argument by urging that the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause should be read to support judgments under state 
bankruptcy statutes.253 
Others were more hopeful about the state of insolvency laws. For 
example, Theophilus Parsons reasoned: 
We have no national bankrupt law now. We shall probably 
never have one until another similar national emergency shall 
arise; and perhaps not then, because the State insolvent laws 
are now so well constructed and systematized, that they effect, 
though not quite so well, nearly all the purposes of a national 
law.254 
 
251. Franklin Chamberlin, American Commercial Law, Relating To 
Every Kind Of Business 627 (1869). For a summary of New York’s 
insolvency laws of the time, see James P. Holcombe, The Law of 
Debtor and Creditor in the Unites States and Canada 149 
(1848). For cases discussing the interplay of federal and state insolvency 
laws at this time, see Ex parte Eames, 8 F. Cas. 236 (C.C.D. Mass. 
1842); In re Hawkins, 34 Conn. 548, 551 (1868); Griswold v. Pratt, 50 
Mass. (9 Met.) 16 (1845); Judd v. Ives, 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 401 (1842). 
252. Daniel Raymond, The Late Bankruptcy Law, 1 W.L.J. 489, 493 (1844).  
253. Id. at 490. 
254. Theophilus Parsons, The Elements of Mercantile Law 299 
(2d ed. 1862). 
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At the same time, others still argued that the Bankruptcy Clause was 
more properly read as vesting the entire topic under congressional 
authority.255 
The unsettled state of the Bankruptcy Clause can also be seen in 
the Confederate constitution, which provided in its Section 8 that 
The Congress shall have power— 
. . .  
4. To establish uniform laws of naturalization, and uniform laws 
on the subject of bankruptcies, throughout the Confederate 
States; but no law of Congress shall discharge any debt 
contracted before the passage of the same;256 
The initial portion tracked the Constitution directly, but the 
concluding phrase imposed a kind of Contracts Clause on the 
bankruptcy power that the Supreme Court had already held applied 
only to the states. This represented an extreme position, largely 
absent from the larger debate in the years before the Civil War.257 It 
was also not in the initial, interim Confederate constitution. 
Writing in 1857, prolific treatise author Theodore Sedgwick 
summarized the law concerning the Bankruptcy Clause and its 
interaction with the Contracts Clause thusly: 
It appears, then, to have been decided by the Supreme Court of 
the United States, that the power of Congress to pass a 
bankrupt law is not exclusive; that the exercise of that power by 
the States, as to future contracts, does not impair their 
obligation; that a contract made and to be performed in one 
State is not, as against a citizen of that State, discharged by a 
certificate obtained under the laws of another State, though 
such laws were passed before the inception of the contract; that 
a discharge under the laws of the State where the contract was 
made, but not to be performed, could not be pleaded in bar in 
the Circuit Court of the United States against a creditor, a 
citizen of another State at the time of the origin of the contract 
 
255. See, e.g., William Alexander Duer, A Course of Lectures on 
Constitutional Jurisprudence of the United States 306–08 (2d. 
ed. 1856) (suggesting the need for exclusive power in the federal 
government, while noting that the Court had held otherwise); 
cf. Coleman, supra note 31, at 35 (“The constitutional restriction 
prohibiting the discharge of out-of-state debts provided some legislatures 
with practical reasons for not enacting relief laws.”). 
256. The Confederate States of America, The Statutes at Large 
of the Provisional of the Confederate States of America 14 
(James M. Matthews ed., 1864). 
257. Nevertheless, it was advocated. See, e.g., J.C.L., supra note 243, at 43, 64. 
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and of the discharge; that the same is true when the action is 
brought in the courts of a State other than that of the origin of 
the contract; that a creditor of one State, who voluntarily 
makes himself a party to insolvent proceedings in another State, 
is bound by the result.  
The Supreme Court has not decided that a contract which is in 
terms to be performed within the State where the discharge is 
granted, may not be barred by such discharge, as against a 
citizen of another State seeking to enforce the contract in the 
State where the contract was to be performed and where the 
discharge was obtained. Nor has it decided the question where 
the contract was made with a citizen of the State where the 
discharge is granted, and of which both creditor and debtor 
were citizens at the time of the proceedings in insolvency, 
though the contract itself was entered into in another State.258 
If the Framers had thought that the Bankruptcy Clause would 
enhance the national economy by rationalizing debtor-creditor law, by 
the middle of the nineteenth century this goal seemed quite far away. 
Sedgwick went on to criticize Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in 
Crowninshield, which he argued had thoroughly confused matters: 
The most embarrassing cases that have arisen, however, under 
this branch of our inquiry, are those growing out of a nice 
distinction taken early by very high authority between the 
obligation of a contract, and the remedy for its infringement or 
non-performance. Out of this has grown much discussion as to 
the extent to which the legislative action of the States may alter 
the remedy without impairing the obligation of a contract. In a 
case already cited [Crowninshield], Mr. Chief Justice Marshall 
used this language, “The distinction between the obligation of a 
contract and the remedy given by the legislature to enforce that 
obligation has been taken at the bar, and exists in the nature of 
things. Without impairing the obligation of the contract, the 
remedy may certainly be modified as the wisdom of the nation 
shall direct. Confinement of the debtor may be a punishment for 
not performing his contract, or may be allowed as a means of 
inducing him to perform it. But the State may refuse to inflict 
this punishment, or may withhold this means, and leave the 
contract in full force. Imprisonment is no part of the contract, 
and simply to release the prisoner does not impair its 
obligation.” This very general language has been repeatedly 
 
258. Theodore Sedgwick, A Treatise on the Rules Which Govern 
the Interpretation and Application of Statutory and 
Constitutional Law 641–42 (1857). 
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regretted, and often criticised. And certainly it does not appear 
to have been necessary for the decision of the cause.259 
2. Bankruptcy Law Developments: Individuals and Corporations 
 It was also about this time that bankruptcy began to diverge into 
the two strains that are familiar today: namely, personal bankruptcy 
and business bankruptcy. To this point bankruptcy had begun as 
personal business bankruptcy and expanded outward. That is, under 
the early acts only persons engaged in business could be subjected to 
bankruptcy, and while that requirement was relaxed over time, it still 
remained true that most bankruptcy cases involved business or 
investing to some degree.260 After all, widely available consumer credit 
was still several decades away. 
The key change that developed in the decade before the Civil War 
was the increasing use of corporations in place of sole proprietorships 
and partnerships.261 Initially, what precisely a corporation was 
remained unclear—sometimes being something more like a 
partnership and other times being something more like the business 
entity we know today.262 Until 1830, Massachusetts provided that past 
and present shareholders in manufacturing corporations were fully 
liable for the debts of the corporation.263 
 
259. Id. at 643–44. 
260. Leonard J. Long, Emerging from the Shadow: The Bankrupt’s Wife in 
Nineteenth-Century America, 21 Quinnipiac L. Rev. 489, 493 (2002) 
(“Bankruptcy law is chiefly for the relief of business men . . . .”); see 
Edward J. Balleisen, Bankruptcy and the Entrepreneurial Ethos in 
Antebellum American Law, 8 Austl. J. Legal Hist. 61, 64 (2004); 
John Fabian Witt, Narrating Bankruptcy/Narrating Risk, 98 Nw. U. L. 
Rev. 303, 305 (2003). 
261. See Manufacturing Corporations, 2 Am. Jurist & L. Mag. 92, 94 
(1829) (describing the extensive use of corporations as one of the 
“striking features of [America’s] social system,” which set it apart from 
England at the time). 
262. See The Liability of Corporators for the Debts of the Corporation, 4 Am 
L. Mag. 363, 363–64 (1844) (discussing a South Carolina decision that 
extended personal liability for corporate debts to the shareholders 
individually); Liability of Corporators, 1 Carolina L.J. 217 (1831) 
(reprinting the trial and appellate opinions from the noteworthy South 
Carolina case); Corporations, 4 Am. Jurist & L. Mag. 298 (1830) 
(describing the history, variants, and corresponding laws of corporations 
throughout Europe and the United States). See also Long v. Penn Ins. 
Co., 6 Pa. 421, 423 (1847) (holding a shareholder personally answerable 
for the corporation’s debts, as well as a prior pledge of shares as 
collateral). 
263. Donald Kehl, The Origin and Early Development of American Dividend 
Law, 53 Harv. L. Rev. 36, 59–60 (1939). 
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As early as 1829, it was suggested that a bankruptcy system for 
corporations might be needed, but that specific article sought such a 
system primarily to enforce the capital contribution obligations of 
shareholders.264 In England, the concern was that being a shareholder 
might subject the shareholder to bankruptcy, under laws that still 
limited bankruptcy to traders.265 
Charles Warren tells us that there was an attempt to add 
corporations to the 1841 Act, but does not explain why that effort 
failed.266 And an earlier source actually suggests that the effort to 
enact a corporate bankruptcy law was distinct from the enactment of 
the 1841 Act.267 
In an 1840 letter to Daniel Webster, Justice Story argued: 
[I]f corporations, now existing, should be brought within a 
Bankrupt Law, without such a discharge [for shareholders], it 
would at once shake all confidence in corporation stock, and 
depreciate it excessively. The corporation capital in New 
England would at once lose a large part of its present value, and 
be scarcely marketable. This would be a sad consummation of 
all our public calamities, and depress us still more. 
I confess, too, I have some doubts, as to the constitutionality of 
a Bankrupt Law, which should put corporations upon a 
different footing from individuals, giving the latter a discharge, 
and not the former; and providing different rules of bankruptcy 
in the one case from the other. The act would not be a “uniform 
act on the subject of bankruptcy,” in the sense of the 
Constitution.268 
This advisory opinion might have had some influence on the ultimate 
shape of the Act.269 Partnerships filed for bankruptcy under the 1841 
Act, but for now Congress did not know what to do with 
corporations. 
 
264. Manufacturing Corporations, supra note 261, at 118. 
265. On the Liability of Shareholders in Joint Stock Companies to the 
Bankrupt Laws, 1 Prop. L. 230, 230–31 (1826). 
266. Warren, supra note 11, at 64–68; see also Tabb, supra note 182, at 16–
17 (noting that the legislators’ final compromise for the 1841 Act 
excluded corporations). 
267. Olmstead, supra note 3, at 838. 
268. 2 Joseph Story & William W. Story, Life and Letters of 
Joseph Story 331 (1851). 
269. See Morris Weissman, Some Chapters of Bankruptcy History: From the 
Bankruptcy Clause to the Act of 1898, 22 J. Nat’l. Assoc. Refs. in 
Bankr, 99, 101 (1948) (opining that the bill that Daniel Webster 
introduced may even have been drafted by Justice Story). 
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While many of the state insolvency proceedings of this era 
involved banks, in 1842 New Jersey’s Court of Chancery held that the 
State’s corporate insolvency statute could also apply to nonbank 
corporations.270 Several years earlier, the same statute had been 
applied to a nonbank corporation without question of its 
applicability.271 Connecticut reached a similar result in 1857,272 while 
Pennsylvania had previously applied its insolvency statute to a 
turnpike company.273 And railroads and other corporations could seek 
relief under the insolvency statutes of Massachusetts at this time.274 
In short, the states were beginning to experiment with inclusion of 
corporations within their existing insolvency systems at the very time 
the federal government was not even sure that it should have an 
insolvency system. But, as the years progressed, states found that 
receivership proceedings were better suited to insolvent 
corporations.275 This would have significant implications in the 
decades after the Civil War. 
All the while, the precise meaning of the Bankruptcy Clause 
remained something of a riddle. As the New York Court of Appeals 
pointedly noted, “There is some difficulty in ascertaining the precise 
position occupied by the supreme court of the United States upon the 
subject of state insolvent laws.”276 This confusion remained despite the 
Supreme Court’s effort to offer further clarification five years before.277 
That opinion would be one of many throughout the nineteenth 
century. 
 
270. Parsons v. Monroe Mfg. Co., 4 N.J. Eq. 187, 203 (N.J. Ch. 1842); 
Brundred v. Paterson Mach. Co., 4 N.J. Eq. 294, 304 (N.J. Ch. 1843).  
271. Goodheart v. Raritan Mining & Mfg. Co., 8 N.J. Eq. 73 (N.J. Ch. 1849) 
(applying state insolvency statute, but ultimately dismissing case for 
lack of evidence of insolvency). 
272. See Platt v. N.Y. & Bos. R.R. Co., 26 Conn. 544, 572 (1857) (dispensing 
with the argument that the exclusion of non-bank, private corporations 
follows from the statute’s exclusion of municipal corporations). 
273. Huntingdon, Cambria & Ind. Tpk. Co. v. Wallace, 8 Watts 316 (Pa. 1839). 
274. Perry Mfg. Co. v. Brown, 19 F. Cas. 299, 300 (C.C.D. Mass. 1847); 
Johnson v. Somerville Dyeing & Bleaching Co., 81 Mass. (15 Gray) 216, 
218 (1860); Cheshire Iron Works v. Gay, 69 Mass. (3 Gray) 531, 534 
(1855); cf. Whittenton Mills v. Upton, 76 Mass. (10 Gray) 582, 598 
(1858) (emphasizing the need to “protect the stockholders from 
liabilities which the charter and laws do not create”). 
275. Cf. Galwey v. U.S. Steam Sugar-Ref. Co., 36 Barb. 256, 257 (N.Y. Gen. 
Term 1861) (differentiating between situations best suited for 
receiverships and insolvency proceedings, respectively). 
276. Donnelly v. Corbett, 7 N.Y. 500, 503 (1852). 
277. See Cook v. Moffat, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 295, 299–305 (1847) (explaining 
and applying the Court’s prior holdings on the interstate effect of state 
insolvency laws). 
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E. After the Civil War 
On the cusp of the modern era, state legislatures continued to 
exercise their power to enact bankruptcy laws. The judiciary was 
creating the modern law of corporate reorganization. The meaning of 
Congress’s power under the Bankruptcy Clause remained the subject 
of debate, and the power itself was frequently unused. And although 
the federal government was disinclined to utilize its power under the 
Bankruptcy Clause, an effort was made to enact a federal bankruptcy 
statute in 1861.278 But the war naturally suspended further efforts in 
this regard.279  
Despite Saunders’s strong incentive to keep old insolvency laws in 
place, and thus maximize their effectiveness, Massachusetts, Vermont, 
Connecticut, and Maryland passed new insolvency laws just before 
and after the Civil War.280 The states also began to experiment with 
the use of assignments for the benefit of creditors, especially with 
regard to corporations. After some initial hand-wringing, the courts 
largely settled on the rule that insolvent corporations could use 
assignments to liquidate.281 
And the Supreme Court again attempted to settle the law 
regarding the Bankruptcy Clause, restating the various rules after 
noting:  
Controversies involving the constitutional effect and operation 
of State insolvent laws have frequently been under consideration 
in this court, and unless it be claimed that constitutional 
questions must always remain open, it must be conceded, we 
think, that there are some things connected with the general 
subject that ought to be regarded as settled and forever 
closed.282 
Three years later the court repeated its effort again.283 
 
278. Olmstead, supra note 3, at 839. 
279. See Skeel, supra note 8, at 25 (noting that the issues precipitating the 
Panic of 1857 were not addressed until the 1867 Act). 
280. Coleman, supra note 31, at 51 (Massachusetts); id. at 72 (Vermont); 
id. at 84 (Connecticut); id. at 175 (Maryland). 
281. See J.L. High, Assignments by Corporations for the Benefit of Creditors, 
3 S. L. Rev. (n.s.) 553, 553–54 (1877) (examining an assignment made 
under fraudulent circumstances). 
282. Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 223, 228 (1863). 
283. See Gilman v. Lockwood, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 409, 410–11 (1866) 
(reciting the contemporary bankruptcy doctrine and its subrules in a 
brusque and formulaic manner and indicating that the doctrine 
resolved the case at hand). 
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1. The Bankruptcy Act of 1867: A Response to the Panic of 1857 
The federal government returned to the scene in 1867, when 
Congress passed the third “Act to establish a uniform System of 
Bankruptcy throughout the United States.”284 This new federal 
legislation was a blend of Massachusetts’s insolvency law, provisions 
taken from the 1841 Act, and a few contemporary English provisions 
thrown in for good measure.285 
Like its predecessors, the 1867 Act was enacted in response to the 
financial panic resulting from a business meltdown. “The Panic of 
1857 . . . brought about renewed public discussion of the need [for] a 
bankruptcy law.”286 When the Panic hit, lawyers had to resort to state 
law to handle collection of debts and other financial troubles brought 
on, at least in part, by rampant speculation in railroads.287 Because of 
the war, the response was quite delayed, but when the Nation’s 
economy struggled to recover after the war, the issue resurfaced. 
While the inclusion of voluntary bankruptcy provisions and the 
question of their constitutionality had generated much debate during 
the passage of the 1841 Act, by the time Congress considered the 
1867 Act, “everyone, lawyers and Courts alike, had so thoroughly 
accepted the principle of voluntary bankruptcy as being within the 
Constitutional power of Congress, that the question was not even 
raised when the Act of 1867 was being debated.”288 Moreover, several 
courts at the time expressly rejected the notion that the Bankruptcy 
Clause only gave Congress the power to enact laws like those that 
existed in England at the time of either the American Revolution or 
ratification of the Constitution.289 
 
284. Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517 (repealed 1878). 
285. T.W.B., The Jurisdiction of the United States Circuit Court in 
Bankruptcy, Original and Appellate—The Extent of the Exclusive 
Original Jurisdiction of the United States District Court in 
Bankruptcy—The Limited Sphere of the Concurrent Original 
Jurisdiction of the Circuit and District Courts, Under the Present-
Bankrupt Law, 16 Am. L. Reg. 641, 647 (1868). 
286. Warren, supra note 11, at 95. 
287. Leonard M. Rosen & Jane Lee Vris, A History of the Bankruptcy Bar in 
the Second Circuit, in The Development of Bankruptcy & 
Reorganization Law in the Courts of the Second Circuit of 
the United States 153, 164 (1995). In 1857, businesses suffered at 
extraordinary levels. In New York City alone, there were 900 mercantile 
failures involving over $120 million of obligations. Id. “In 1861, there 
were 6,993 insolvencies involving $207,210,427 of liabilities. Of 256 dry 
goods businesses in New York at the outbreak of the Civil War, only 
sixteen were still solvent by the end of 1861.” Id.  
288. Warren, supra note 11, at 87. 
289. See, e.g., In re Cal. Pac. R.R. Co., 4 F. Cas. 1060, 1061 (D. Cal. 1874); 
In re Silverman, 22 F. Cas. 135, 136 (D. Or. 1870). 
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a. Treatment of Corporations 
One of the most significant of these departures from earlier 
legislation was the provision of bankruptcy relief for corporations.290 
The 1867 Act was the first federal bankruptcy legislation to allow for 
corporate bankruptcy.291  
Indeed, under the 1867 Act, corporations enjoyed the greatest 
degree of flexibility with respect to filing bankruptcy petitions of any 
bankruptcy legislation passed in the nineteenth century.292 Under the 
Acts of 1800 and 1841, corporate filings were not permitted; even the 
1898 Act293 did not permit voluntary petitions by corporations 
(though it did allow involuntary filings against corporations) until an 
amendment in 1910.294 Moreover, corporations of all types were 
permitted to file under the 1867 Act,295 whereas railroads, banks and 
insurance companies were excluded in 1898, and indeed remain 
excluded today.296 
b. Registers 
The 1867 Act introduced the concept of “non-judicial ‘registers in 
bankruptcy’ to assist the district courts in administering bankruptcy 
proceedings.”297 The Act required each district court judge to appoint 
“one or more registers in bankruptcy, to assist the judge . . . in the 
performance of his duties under [the Act].”298 These appointments 
were for an indefinite term,299 and the 1867 Act’s § 3 required that 
 
290. Vern Countryman, A History of American Bankruptcy Law, 81 Com. 
L.J. 226, 229 (1976). 
291. Elizabeth Lee Thompson, The Reconstruction of Southern 
Debtors: Bankruptcy After the Civil War 122 (2004).  
292. See New Lamp Chimney Co. v. Ansonia Brass & Copper Co., 91 U.S. 
656, 665 (1875) (mentioning that while there were a few special 
requirements for corporations’ petitions, by and large the provisions 
applicable to individuals were also applicable to corporations). 
293. Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541. 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978). 
294. Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 412, § 4, 36 Stat. 838, 839 (amending an Act 
entitled “An Act to establish a uniform system of bankruptcy 
throughout the United States”). 
295. See, e.g., In re Indep. Ins. Co., 13 F. Cas. 13, 14 (C.C.D. Mass. 1872) 
(holding an insurance company is covered under the 1867 Act). 
296. 11 U.S.C. § 109(b) (2012). 
297. David S. Kennedy & R. Spencer Clift, III, An Historical Analysis of 
Insolvency Laws and Their Impact on the Role, Power, and Jurisdiction 
of Today’s United States Bankruptcy Court and its Judicial Officers, 9 
J. Bankr. L. & Prac. 165, 172 (2000).  
298. Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 176, § 3, 14 Stat. 517, 518 (repealed 1878). 
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such registers in bankruptcy be “counsellors” of the court and learned 
in the law.300  
The registers were intended to expedite the bankruptcy process, 
because it was widely believed that one weakness of earlier 
bankruptcy legislation had been too much involvement by the judges 
themselves.301 Under the Act, registers had the power to conduct 
preliminary proceedings in the absence of an opposing interest by any 
party.302 If, however, any issue of fact or law was raised or contested, 
the register was required to memorialize the dispute in writing and 
submit the issue to the court for adjudication.303 
In an attempt to depoliticize appointments made in connection 
with the Act, publications such as the American Law Review 
advocated for term limits of three years for the office of “Register in 
Bankruptcy.”304 One article bluntly stated: “We should not then have 
(for Registers) broken-down politicians in whom the prickings of the 
stomach far exceed the prickings of conscience, nor poor, witless 
nurselings.”305  
c. Shortcomings 
A major objection to the Acts of 1800 and 1841 was the abuse of 
power by local assignees. As noted by one Congressman: “When [the 
assignees] get property into their hands the creditors can never get it 
out of them.”306 For this reason, strict provisions to govern the 
 
299. Prudence Beatty Abram & Andrew DeNatale, From Referee in 
Bankruptcy to Bankruptcy Judge: A Century of Change in the Second 
Circuit, in The Development of Bankruptcy & Reorganization 
Law in the Courts of the Second Circuit of the United 
States, supra note 287, at 59, 65.  
300  Act of Mar. 2, 1867, § 3. 
301. Noel, supra note 89, at 150. 
302. Act of Mar. 2, 1867, § 4 (“[E]very register . . . shall have power . . . to 
sit in chambers and despatch there such part of the administrative 
business of the court and such uncontested matters . . . .”). 
303. Id. (“[A]nd he shall also make short memoranda of his proceedings in 
each case in which he shall act . . . and . . . forward to the clerk of the 
district court a certified copy of said memoranda . . . .”).  
304. Warren, supra note 11, at 113.  
305. Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Cong. 
Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 4025 (1866) (senators debating similar 
concerns, with one senator proposing that administration of bankruptcies 
under the new act be placed under state courts, “where the operation of it 
could be brought home to the people at their own doors”). Some in the 
Senate sought to have registers appointed by the Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court or the circuit court judges, but the plans were denied by 
the conference committees. Noel, supra note 89, at 151. 
306. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 778 (1866). 
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behavior of assignees were included in the 1867 Act.307 The court-
appointed assignee was intended to alleviate these abuses and serve as 
a fairer way to deal with the issue of property holding during the 
course of bankruptcy proceedings.308  
Much discord arose surrounding the fees and complicated 
administration of the 1867 Act, and, by 1873, public opinion clamored 
for its repeal. 309 There was concern, especially in the South, that 
post–Civil War legislation had “gone too far in increasing the powers 
and jurisdiction of the Federal Courts . . . .”310 When the Forty-First 
Session of Congress commenced, its Members set out to drastically 
amend the 1867 Act.311 
The unpopularity of the Act was so great, however, that in 
January 1873, instead of amending the Act, the House of 
Representatives opted to pass a bill for repeal of the Act.312 That 
repeal might have passed the Senate had the Panic of 1873 not 
commenced in September 1873.  
d. Amendment 
President Grant cited the 1867 Act as the cause of the Panic of 
1873, arguing that the 1867 Act “is productive of more evil than good 
at this time.”313 The panic is more conventionally traced to the failure 
 
307. For example, under section 17, “the assignee shall, as soon as may be after 
receiving any money belonging to the estate, deposit the same in some 
bank in his name as assignee, or otherwise keep it distinct and apart from 
all other money in his possession . . . .” Act of Mar. 2, 1867, § 17. 
308. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 781 (1866). 
309. See Thompson, supra note 291, at 5 (noting discontent in southern 
states about the increase in the federal courts’ power at the expense of 
state courts); see also Warren, supra note 11, at 115 n.27 (“Impair 
confidence, and credit goes.”).  
310. Warren, supra note 11, at 114.  
311. See Thompson, supra note 291, at 5 (clamoring for the return of power 
to state courts).  
312. Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 3d Sess. 723 (1873); Warren, supra 
note 11, at 114. 
313. Warren, supra note 11, at 115 (internal citation and quotation 
marks omitted).  
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of financier Jay Cooke’s bank.314 But it was evident that the 
“conditions of the times clearly demanded relief to debtors . . . .”315  
Thus, when the Senate considered the 1867 Act for repeal, it 
determined that a need for uniform bankruptcy legislation continued 
to exist and, accordingly, struck out the repeal clause. Instead of 
repeal, the Senate opted to include several monumental amendments 
to the 1867 Act.316 This reform and overhaul of the 1867 Act so 
greatly altered the thrust of the legislation that it could be deemed 
the fourth federal bankruptcy act. 
Most importantly, the 1874 Amendments introduced a 
composition procedure,317 which in some ways resembled the 
reorganization provisions contained in modern bankruptcy acts.318 The 
provisions in question were modeled on provisions contained in the 
English Bankruptcy Act of 1869.319 
The provisions allowed a debtor to remain in possession of his 
property if a sufficient number of creditors (majority in number and 
three-fourths in value) accepted the composition proposal.320 If the 
proposal was accepted, it was binding on all unsecured creditors 
named in the composition agreement. Those creditors who “dissented” 
from the composition were paid according to a “best interests” test. 
The “best interests” test required that dissenting creditors receive as 
much payment as they would have received in a liquidation of the 
assets.321  
As with the voluntary provision in 1841, some suggested that the 
composition provision of 1874 was beyond Congress’s power under the 
 
314. A. J. Thomas, Jr. & Ann Van Wynen Thomas, The Texas Constitution of 
1876, 35 Tex. L. Rev. 907, 911 (1957). But it is perhaps unsurprising 
that Grant would look for other sources of the calamity. David A. Skeel, 
Jr., Icarus and American Corporate Regulation, 61 Bus. Law. 155, 156 
(2005) (“Grant was staying at Cooke’s Philadelphia house the night 
before the [Northern Pacific] railroad venture and Cooke’s bank imploded, 
ushering in a depression known as the Panic of 1873.”). 
315. Warren, supra note 11, at 117. 
316. See Act of June 22, 1874, ch. 390, 18 Stat. 178 (amending and 
supplementing an act entitled “An act to establish a uniform system of 
bankruptcy throughout the United States”). The 1874 Amendments 
were introduced and passed after just two hours of debate in the House, 
by a vote of 219 to 44. 
317. Bump, C.F., Composition in Bankruptcy, 3 S. L. Rev. (n.s.) 507, 507 
(1877). 
318. Tabb, supra note 182, at 20–21. 
319. Compare Act of June 22, 1874, § 17, with Bankruptcy Act, 1869, 32 & 
33 Vict., c. 171, § 126 (Eng.). 
320. Act of June 22, 1874, § 17.  
321. Id. 
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Bankruptcy Clause. In rejecting this arguing, future Supreme Court 
Justice Blatchford explained:  
It cannot be doubted, that congress, in passing laws on the 
subject of bankruptcies, is not restricted to laws with such scope 
only as the English bankruptcy laws had when the constitution 
was adopted. The authority of text writers, and the adjudged 
cases cited, and the practical construction of the provision of 
the constitution, by the fact of the enactment of provisions for 
voluntary bankruptcy, and for putting into involuntary 
bankruptcy others than traders, and for granting discharges 
without the consent of any creditor, are satisfactory evidence 
that the power to establish laws on ‘the subject of bankruptcies’ 
gives an authority over the subject, that is not restricted by the 
limitation found in the English statutes in force when the 
constitution was adopted. The power given must, indeed, be 
held to be general, unlimited and unrestricted over the subject. 
But the question recurs—what is the subject? The subject is 
‘the subject of bankruptcies.’ What is ‘the subject of 
bankruptcies?’ It is not, properly, anything less than the subject 
of the relations between an insolvent or non-paying or 
fraudulent debtor, and his creditors, extending to his and their 
relief. It comprises the satisfaction of the debt for a sum less 
than its amount, with the relief of the debtor from liability for 
the unpaid balance, and the right of the creditor to require that 
the amount paid in satisfaction shall be substantially as great a 
pro rata share of the property possessed by the debtor as it can 
pay, or can reasonably be expected to pay.322  
Although innovative, the 1874 legislation was like its predecessors in 
having a short life, meeting its demise in 1878323 as part of the full 
repeal of the 1867 act and its amendments. 
The 1867 law, as amended, lasted much longer than its 
predecessors. But once Southern debtors had overcome the economic 
problems inherent in being on the losing side of the war, the South 
resumed its traditional animosity to federal bankruptcy legislation 
and the statute was repealed.324 
 
322. In re Reiman, 20 F. Cas. 490, 496–97 (S.D.N.Y. 1874). 
323. Bruce A. Markell, Clueless on Classification: Toward Removing Artificial 
Limits on Chapter 11 Claim Classification, 11 Bankr. Dev. J. 1, 8 (1995). 
324. Act of June 7, 1878, ch. 160, 20 Stat. 99 (repealing the 1867 Act); 
Thompson, supra note 291, at 4–7. 
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2. Continuing State Regulation and Growing Use of Receiverships 
The states continued to address insolvency, both through their 
traditional statutes325 and by the growing use of receiverships, 
especially with regard to the increasing problem of insolvent 
corporations. 
When receiverships were converted from their traditional uses to 
a tool of corporate reorganization is somewhat unclear.326 But it is 
clear that equity receiverships were used to reorganize railroads—
primarily by means of a going concern sale—before the Civil War.327 
And by the late 1870s, the basic law regarding railroad receiverships 
had fully developed.328 It would be this law that would develop the 
concept of corporate reorganization, not to be federalized until the 
New Deal.329 
 
325. See, e.g., Joseph Cutler, The Insolvent Laws of Massachusetts, 
with Notes of Decisions (3d ed. 1860); Raphael J. Moses, Jr., 
State Insolvent Laws: A Compilation of the Laws on 
Insolvency of the States and Territories of the United 
States and Canada, in Force November 1, 1878 (1879). 
326. For example, one antebellum treatise on receiverships in New York does 
not touch the issue of using a receivership to restructure an insolvent 
corporation. Charles Edwards, On Receivers in Equity and 
under the New York Code of Procedure; with Precedents 
164–65 (2d ed. 1857). 
327. See, e.g., Milwaukie & Minn. R.R. Co. v. Soutter, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 510, 
511 (1864); Denniston v. Chi., Alton & St. Louis R.R. Co., 7 F. Cas. 
482, 483 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1864); Ohio & Miss. R.R. Co. v. Davis, 23 Ind. 
553, 555 (1864); Rankine v. Elliott, 16 N.Y. 377, 379 (N.Y. 1857). 
328. Leonard A. Jones, Receivers of Railways, 4 S. L. Rev. (n.s.) 18, 18 
(1878) (“The whole subject is one of recent growth, and many of the 
most important decisions embraced within it have been rendered within 
two or three years . . . .”). Important ancillary questions, like whether 
the receiver could be liable for torts committed by railroad employees, 
remained points of contention. See L. McMillen, The Liability of a 
Railroad Company, Whose Property is Under the Management of a 
Receiver, for Negligence of Employes [sic], 10 W. Jurist 385 (1876). 
329. A good summary of this law at a late stage of development, given by 
one of its leading practitioners, can be found in Paul D. Cravath, The 
Reorganization of Corporations; Bondholders’ and Stockholders’ 
Protective Committees; Reorganization Committees; and the Voluntary 
Recapitalization of Corporations, in Francis Lynde Stetson et al., 
Some Legal Phases of Corporate Financing, Reorganization 
and Regulation 153 (1922). There were unsuccessful efforts during 
this time to pass federal legislation regarding the receivership process. 
See, e.g., Rights of Railroad Mortgagees, 12 W. Jurist 280, 280–81 
(1878) (discussing proposed legislation to allow creditors more say in the 
appointment of receivers). And at least one state (Kentucky) passed a 
receivership statute. Act of Mar. 17, 1896, ch. 21, 1896 Ky. Laws 29 
(providing for the reorganization of railroad and bridge companies); see 
also The Reorganization of Railway and Other Corporations, 30 Am. L. 
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The basic problem turned on the capital structure of the 
enterprise, and the desire to maintain the value of the concern as a 
whole: 
When a corporation approaches bankruptcy, it usually occurs 
that different portions of its property have been pledged as 
security for various issues of bonds. If the company is operating 
a railroad, for example, there are several first mortgages 
covering the different divisions of the main line of the railroad. 
Then over these is probably spread the lien of a general or 
blanket mortgage. Tributary to the main line of the railroad are 
a number of branch lines, and each one of these may carry 
mortgages to secure issues of bonds. These bonds have probably 
been delivered to the parent company . . . . The parent 
company may have pledged the bonds as security for an issue of 
collateral trust bonds. The equipment of the company may be 
covered by the lien of a car trust lease. . . . Suppose, now, each 
one of these creditors should undertake to enforce his claim 
against the company, which he has the undoubted right to do. 
Is it not evident that the property would be completely 
disintegrated in the contest of creditors?330 
To solve this conundrum, the reorganization process used all this 
secured debt, and the right to foreclose, for new ends. As the Supreme 
Court explained in 1883: 
[I]t rarely happens in the United States that foreclosures of 
railway mortgages are anything else than the machinery by 
which arrangements between the creditors and other parties in 
interest are carried into effect, and a reorganization of the 
affairs of the corporation under a new name brought about. It is 
in entire harmony with the spirit of bankrupt laws, the binding 
force of which, upon those who are subject to the jurisdiction, is 
recognized by all civilized nations. It is not in conflict with the 
Constitution of the United States, which, although prohibiting 
States from passing laws impairing the obligation of contracts, 
allows Congress ‘to establish . . . uniform laws on the subject of 
bankruptcy throughout the United States.’331 
 
Rev. 801 (1896) (discussing the Kentucky law). The Kentucky law, of 
course, simply raised the inevitable state-federal question that had been 
at the heart of the Bankruptcy Clause since the Constitution’s adoption. 
330. Edward Sherwood Meade, Corporation Finance 406–07 (1910). 
331. Can. S. Ry. Co. v. Gebhard, 109 U.S. 527, 539 (1883). 
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Early cases were typically brought in state court,332 and after the 
Civil War receiverships continued, maintaining an uneasy coexistence 
with the 1867 Bankruptcy Act, which only allowed railroads to be 
liquidated thereunder.333 Eventually, receiverships could be brought by 
the insolvent railroad’s own management or at their behest.334 
It was in federal court that the equity receivership process truly 
developed into the forerunner of today’s Chapter 11.335 Federal 
jurisdiction made a key difference here: while state court judges were 
typically limited to their home state, or even to their home county, 
federal judges could assert nationwide jurisdiction over a debtor by 
filing a main petition along with simultaneous ancillary petitions 
against a debtor.336 In the days of circuit judges, such a judge could 
enter all relevant petitions against a debtor within the entire circuit in 
a single proceeding.337 
The creation of the receivership produced something akin to 
today’s “automatic stay,” in that the receiver could not be the subject 
of suit without the appointing court’s approval.338 While the receivers 
 
332. In Vermont, one such receivership was commenced “prior to 1861” and 
remained pending in the early 1880s. M.M. Cohn, Railroad 
Receiverships—Questions of Practice Concerning Them, 19 Am. L. 
Rev. 400, 410 (1885). 
333. See, e.g., In re Union Pac. R.R. Co., 24 F. Cas. 624, 625 (D. Mass 
1874); Kelly v. Ala. & Cincinnati R.R. Co., 58 Ala. 489, 500 (1877). H. 
Campbell Black, Corporations Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 
8 Yale L.J. 105, 106 (1898). 
334. D.H. Chamberlain, New-Fashioned Receiverships, 10 Harv. L Rev. 
139, 141–42 (1896). 
335. See, e.g., Wilmer v. Atlanta & Richmond Air Line Ry. Co., 30 F. Cas. 
73, 74 (C.C.N.D. Ga. 1875); Kennedy v. St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co., 14 F. 
Cas. 321, 323 (C.C.D. Minn. 1873). One of the best primers on 
receiverships in this general area is Adrian H. Joline, Railway 
Reorganizations, 8 Am. Law. 507 (1900). 
336. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co. v. Lake St. Elevated R.R. Co., 177 U.S. 51, 
61 (1900). As Joline, supra note 335, at 510, notes, the ancillary 
receivership process did develop some problems. In particular, state and 
federal courts often entered competing receiverships.  
337. Wilmer, 30 F. Cas. at 73; see also James Byrne, The Foreclosure of 
Railroad Mortgages in the United States Courts, in Stetson et al., 
supra note 329, at 77, 92 (1922) (“Meanwhile other assistants are waiting 
near a circuit judge in each of the other circuits where any substantial 
portion of the mortgaged property is situated with the papers in the 
ancillary suits which are to be filed there. As soon as a telegram or a 
telephone message tells them that the suit in the principal court has been 
begun and receivers appointed, the pleadings in the ancillary suits are 
verified and presented to the circuit judge having jurisdiction and he signs 
orders appointing receivers in all the courts in his circuit.”). 
338. Davis v. Gray, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 203, 218 (1872). 
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operated the railroad, they could “spruce it up” by issuing priority 
receivers certificates, an early form of negotiable DIP financing.339 
The receiverships of this era also laid the groundwork for the 
“first day” orders of today.340 Arguing that secured creditors were only 
entitled to the net income of the debtor, the Supreme Court cleared 
the way for full payment of trade creditors who had provided the 
debtor with goods and services on the eve of the receivership.341 Since 
railroads were deemed a kind of quasi-utility that could not be 
allowed to liquidate,342 the Court soon found it necessary to expand 
the debtor’s ability to pay trade creditors in full to include those who 
provided vital goods and services postreceivership as well.343 
 
339. Wallace v. Loomis, 97 U.S. 146, 162 (1877) (“The bonds on their face, as 
prepared for issue and sale, promised payment in lawful money. As such, 
they were guaranteed by the State.”); Credit Co. of London v. Ark. Cent. 
R.R. Co., 15 F. 46, 49 (C.C.E.D. Ark. 1882) (noting that “it is a power to 
be sparingly exercised” as it is “liable to great abuse”); Stanton v. 
Alabama & C.R. Co., 22 F. Cas. 1065, 1068 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1875) (finding 
an abuse of the priority certificate power); see also George H. Walker, 
The Priority of Receivers’ Certificates Over Mortgage Liens, 5 Colum. 
L.T. 96 (1891) (discussing the rapid spread of receivers’ certificates and 
the relatively little case law concerning them). 
340. Compare Erskine Hazard Dickson, Liens of the Receivership of a 
Business Corporation—Part 1, 47 Am. L. Reg. 273, 275–76 (1899) (the 
receiverships of old), with Daniel A. Austin, Bankruptcy and the Myth of 
“Uniform Laws”, 42 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1081, 1130–31 (2012) (the 
“first day” orders of today). 
341. Fosdick v. Schall, 99 U.S. 235, 241 (1878); see also Burnham v. Bowen, 
111 U.S. 776, 776 (1883) (“Debts contracted by a railroad corporation as 
part of necessary operating expenses (for fuel, for example), the 
mortgage interest of the company being in arrear at the time, are 
privileged debts, entitled to be paid out of current income, if the 
mortgage trustees take possession or if a receiver is appointed in a 
foreclosure suit.”). 
342. Barton v. Barbour, 104 U.S. 126, 135 (1881) (“[T]he cessation of 
business for a day would be a public injury. A railroad is authorized to 
be constructed more for the public good . . . than for private gain. As a 
highway for public transportation it is a matter of public concern, and 
its construction and management belong primarily to the 
Commonwealth, and are only put into private hands to subserve the 
public convenience and economy. . . . They take their rights subject to 
the rights of the public . . . .”). 
343. See Miltenberger v. Logansport Ry. Co., 106 U.S. 286, 311–12 (1882) 
(“[P]ayment of that class of claims was indispensable to the business of 
the road, and that, unless the receiver was authorized to provide for them 
at once, the business of the road would suffer great detriment.”). The link 
between these cases and the first-day motions of today was made explicit 
in early cases under the 1978 Code, particularly in the Eastern Airlines 
bankruptcy. See In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 98 B.R. 174, 175–76 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989) (referring to those precedents as establishing “the 
doctrine of necessity” or “necessity of payment” rule). Of course, there is 
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When the creditors had agreed on a new capitalization of the 
railroad, and the rate at which old securities would be exchanged for 
new, the railroad was sold at foreclosure to a new legal entity.344 This 
created something close to the present discharge under today’s 
Chapter 11, as unpaid creditors were left behind with claims against 
an assetless corporate shell.345 
IV. The Modern Era 
A. 1880s 
1. Continuing Debate Influenced by Growth of Interstate Commerce 
and the Fourteenth Amendment  
The 1880s saw the continued development of state insolvency 
laws, while business reorganization developed in parallel in 
receivership proceedings.346 Throughout, the debate continued over the 
meaning of the Bankruptcy Clause, and whether insolvency was best 
handled at the state or federal level. While the debate persisted, 
states continued to operate their own insolvency systems.347 And the 
Supreme Court continued its seemingly endless efforts to explain the 
contours of the Bankruptcy Clause.348 
 
no public policy against liquidation of most modern debtors, which calls 
into question the generalization of the railroad rule or at least suggests the 
need for other justification for the extension of the rule. 
344. Frederick S. Wait, A Practical Treatise on Insolvent 
Corporations, including the Liquidation, Re-Organization, 
Forfeiture, Dissolution, and Winding-Up of Corporations 387 
(1888). Details of several of the largest receiverships can be found in 
Stuart Daggett, Railroad Reorganization (1908). 
345. Importantly, these receiverships predated the development of many 
modern theories of successor liability and de facto merger. See, e.g., 
Daggett, supra note 344, at 23–29 (expounding on the receivership of 
a large railroad in the late nineteenth century, well before modern 
successor liability doctrine). 
346. Receivership practice in this period is nicely detailed in Albert Gallup, 
Railway Mortgages and Receiver’s Debts in the United States, 4 L.Q. 
Rev. 300 (1888). For state laws of this era, see, for example, Prescott F. 
Hall, Voluntary Assignments and Insolvency in Massachusetts, 8 Harv. 
L. Rev. 265 (1894). 
347. See, e.g., Brown v. Smart, 145 U.S. 454, 458–59 (1892) (upholding a 
filing under the Maryland law). 
348. See, e.g., Denny v. Bennett, 128 U.S. 489, 495–98 (1888) (“[T]he 
established construction of the Constitution of the United States against 
impairing the obligation of contracts requires that [state] statutes of this 
class shall be construed to be parts of all contracts made when they are 
in existence, and therefore cannot be held to impair their obligation.”). 
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The growth of interstate commerce after the Civil War produced 
a corresponding desire for greater uniformity in debtor-creditor law, 
which naturally suggested the need for federal legislation.349 But 
advocates of state insolvency laws noted that this need not be the 
case, rather it was argued: 
[I]t is uniformity in the rules as to bankruptcy preferences and 
composition that is desired rather than uniformity of procedure. 
The commercial want would be met substantially if the State 
insolvent laws were so far modified that the same tests of 
insolvency, the same rule as to giving preferences and securing 
favored creditors, the same rule as to the results of vigilant 
hostile proceedings, and the same as to compromises, were in 
force throughout the country, and it would matter little what 
courts or what diverse practice prevailed in reaching these 
results.350 
At the same time, others were observing that the war and the 
Constitutional amendments that resulted—most importantly the 
Fourteenth Amendment—had changed the nature of the discussion.351 
Thus, in an 1888 article, Conrad Reno, a well-known Boston 
attorney, argued that the various rules regarding state insolvency laws 
were better seen as rooted in due process, now applicable to the states 
under the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than the Contract 
Clause.352 And later, Hollis Bailey, another leading Boston attorney,353 
would argue that Saunders’s “second holding” that prohibiting the 
discharge of claims held by out-of-state creditors was unfortunate—
inasmuch as it resulted in a great mass of confusion among the 
states—and the issue was better seen as a question of jurisdiction, 
rather than a result mandated by either the Bankruptcy or Contract 
Clauses.354 
 
349. Seymour D. Thompson, “Foreign” Receivers and Judicial Assignees, 6 
Green Bag 170, 173 (1894). 
350. A Uniform System of Bankruptcy, 14 W. Jurist 486, 487 (1880). 
351. See H. Campbell Black, Legislation Impairing the Obligation of 
Contracts, 34 Am. L. Reg. 81, 90 (1886). 
352. Conrad Reno, Ogden v. Saunders Reviewed, 36 Am. L. Reg. 611, 612–
16 (1888). 
353. Cf. Dana v. Dana, 250 U.S. 220 (1919) (a famous tax case in which 
Bailey argued). 
354. Bailey, supra note 115, at 353. 
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2. Moving Toward a Permanent Federal Bankruptcy Law 
The 1880s also began the long march to a permanent federal 
bankruptcy law.355 Beginning with Chester Arthur, every Republican 
President of the late nineteenth century—which is to say, every 
President, save Cleveland—expressed support for a national 
bankruptcy law. Cleveland himself supported a bankruptcy law, but it 
was a very different sort of bankruptcy law than the Republicans had 
in mind. 
The Democrats generally supported the so-called Bailey Bill, a 
temporary law that would have provided voluntary relief to those who 
had suffered in the many financial panics that occurred after the Civil 
War.356 The Republicans, on the other hand, supported the Torrey 
Bill, named after Jay Torrey, an attorney who drafted a proposed law 
at the behest of merchants.357 His initial draft was highly reminiscent 
of the bankruptcy laws of pre-Revolution England: the law provided a 
way for creditors to force debtors into bankruptcy involuntarily, while 
debtor discharges would have been hard to obtain.358 
These two basic laws kicked around Congress for more than a 
decade, until finally the two were melded into a bill that all could 
support.359 And with President McKinley’s signature on the 1898 
Act,360 in the midst of the Spanish-American War,361 the era of state 
insolvency laws came to an end, while a new understanding of the 
federal bankruptcy power began to develop.  
B. The 1898 Bankruptcy Act 
One participant in the new bankruptcy system argued that the 
1898 law had three main goals: 
1. To reduce the fees and expenses to a minimum, and to give 
to the creditors the control of the settlement of estates, and 
 
355. See Noel, supra note 89, at 157–58 (describing the cycle of speculation 
and subsequent panic that led lawmakers to realize “that it was a 
mistake to deprive the country of bankruptcy legislation”). 
356. The story of the various bankruptcy bills is well told, in greater 
detail, in Charles Jordan Tabb, A Century of Regress or Progress? 
A Political History of Bankruptcy Legislation in 1898 and 1998, 
15 Bankr. Dev. J. 343 (1999). 
357. See Skeel, supra note 8, at 37 (discussing the Torrey bill). 
358. Tabb, supra note 356, at 367. 
359. Skeel, supra note 8, at 40–44. 
360. Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541. 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978). 
361. Indeed, on that very day Roosevelt and Jay Torrey, author of the Torrey 
Bill, charged San Juan Hill. Bruce A. Markell, Introduction: Bankruptcy, 
Impeachment, and History, 15 Bankr. Dev. J. 253, 255 n.11 (1999). 
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thereby to provide that the assets of the bankrupt shall go to 
his creditors rather than to officers and lawyers. 
2. To provide that all bankrupts and impecunious persons, 
whether they have assets or not, shall obtain a discharge 
from their debts at a nominal expense, and thereby make it 
unnecessary for any man in the United States to be longer 
hampered by a load of debt which he is unable to pay. 
3. To enforce the acceptance of compositions, and thereby put 
it out of the power of a few creditors to prevent the 
acceptance of terms of settlement offered by an insolvent, 
when manifestly better for the whole mass of creditors than a 
legal settlement of his affairs.362 
The most important aspect of the 1898 Act was that it was 
permanent, inasmuch as it contained no inherent expiration date. 
Congress could repeal the law, and several attempts at repeal would 
be made, but there was no inborn end point to the law.363 
Nonetheless, at least one author worried that the relatively 
generous discharge provisions of the 1898 Act would impair its 
permanence, making it more like the temporary relief measures that 
had come and gone before. Apparently referring to the principle 
outlined in Deuteronomy,364 he argued: 
It is perfectly apparent, however, that there exists among some 
judges, on the floors of Congress and in the community, a 
fallacious and superficial view that bankruptcy legislation 
should partake of the nature of a “Hebrew Jubilee,” and that at 
intermittent periods the country should have such a law for the 
purpose of relieving the unfortunate debtor from his burden of 
debt. While the humanitarian or relief features are meritorious, 
it should be constantly borne in mind that this principle of the 
law is merely an incident to its main purpose, and should not 
prove a menace to the permanency of a system intended for the 
perpetual benefit of merchants in general. If the “Hebrew 
Jubilee” idea is to prevail, the country will be confronted with 
successive repeals as heretofore . . . .365 
 
362. Henry G. Newton, The United States Bankruptcy Law of 1898, 9 Yale 
L.J. 287, 287 (1899). In this article, the author suggests that he served 
as a referee under the Act. Id. at 289. 
363. The first effort at repeal was voted down in 1902. Noel, supra note 89, 
at 161. 
364. See supra Part I.A. 
365. Olmstead, supra note 3, at 843. 
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Others fretted that repeal of the law would reduce the United 
States to the rank of countries like China and Japan, the implication 
of the argument being that all “civilized” nations had bankruptcy 
laws.366 Indeed, it was no accident that the passage of the 1898 
Bankruptcy Act coincided with the birth of the kind of nationwide 
economy that Alexander Hamilton had dreamed of at the beginning of 
the century.367  
1. Distinct from English Bankruptcy Law 
The 1898 Act also represented a clear break from the English-
inspired, creditor-controlled federal systems of earlier years. Cases 
were placed with referees, who were appointed by the district 
courts.368 Initially, the district judge would refer certain administrative 
tasks, including the liquidation and distribution of the estate, to the 
referee, while retaining formal judicial responsibility for the case.369 As 
the number of bankruptcy cases and workload of the district courts 
increased, the judges began to cast off some of their judicial power to 
the referees. 
The Act provided for either a composition with creditors, reviving 
the innovation first introduced in 1874, or a discharge after 
liquidation.370 Unlike its predecessors, the new bankruptcy law did not 
require a creditor vote before discharge. 
 
366. Amos Burt Thompson, The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 in Operation, 6 W. 
Res. L.J. 157, 162 (1900).  
367. See Norman W. Hawker, Triumph of the Whigs: The Fifty-Fifth Congress 
and the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 15 Midwest L. Rev. 109, 109–11 (1997) 
(discussing the political aspects of the dawn of the Gilded Age); see also 
Larry Neal & Lance E. Davis, Why Did Finance Capitalism and the Second 
Industrial Revolution Arise in the 1890s?, in Financing Innovation In 
the United States: 1870 to Present 129 (N. Lamoreaux & K. Sokoloff 
eds., 2007) (examining the transformative effects of the era’s rapid 
technological and financial innovation). 
368. As one treatise explained: 
The administration of each law is confided to particular United 
States courts, designated as courts of bankruptcy. These courts 
act to a large extent through special officers, subject to have 
their action reviewed by the judge. In 1867 these officers were 
called registers and assignees; in 1898 they are called referees 
and trustees. 
Loveland, supra note 237, at 15. 
369. See, e.g., Gilbertson v. United States, 168 F. 672, 674 (7th Cir. 1909) 
(rejecting the argument that the district judge’s delegation of 
administrative matters to a referee meant that the debtor was not 
properly adjudicated bankrupt under the Act). 
370. Thompson, supra note 366, at 157. 
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2. Distinguishing Personal and Business Bankruptcy 
It is in this law that we also begin to see a relatively clear 
separation between business and personal bankruptcy.371 But often 
these changes made the federal bankruptcy system less useful to 
business debtors.372 
For example, until an amendment in 1910, the federal bankruptcy 
law did not allow corporations to enter bankruptcy voluntarily373—in 
that sense reflecting an older view of commercial bankruptcy, albeit 
one that had in the past applied to individuals as traders.374 This also 
represented a change from the 1867 Act, as was the requirement of 
insolvency for petitions filed under the 1898 Act.375 And since the 
advent of corporate bankruptcy in 1867, discharges were never 
granted to corporate debtors: corporate bankruptcy was a liquidation-
only affair.376  
371. See Harold Remington, Bankruptcy Law and Peaceable Settlements of 
Business Failures, 18 Yale L.J. 590, 592–93 (1909) (describing the new 
law as emphasizing fairness among creditors, rather than simply fairness 
between creditors and debtors). 
372. See Benjamin L. Bird, Financial Associations Which May Be Reorganized 
Under Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act, 15 Tex. L. Rev. 65, 70–71 
(1936) (explaining that one weakness of the 1898 Act was its reliance 
upon “powers conferred upon the company [by the state], not [the 
company’s] activities” to determine the Act’s applicability). 
373. Future Chief Justice and President Taft rejected a challenge to the 
Act’s constitutionality on this basis, where the debtor argued that a law 
that distinguished between natural and artificial persons was not 
uniform, as required by the Bankruptcy Clause. Leidigh Carriage Co. v. 
Stengel, 95 F. 637, 646–47 (6th Cir. 1899). 
374. Loveland, supra note 237, at 15; see also C.E.K., Jr., Note, Right of 
the Directors of a Corporation to File for It a Voluntary Petition in 
Bankruptcy, 2 Wash. U. L. Rev. 97, 98 (1917) (“In respect to 
corporations, there being no special provisions in the bankruptcy act, 
reference must be made to the state statute controlling the authority of 
officers and directors of corporations to dispose of the property of the 
corporation for the benefit of its creditors.”). 
375. Black, supra note 333, at 112–13; see also Carleton A. Shafer, Can the 
Directors of a Solvent Corporation Without the Authority from the 
Stockholders, by a Resolution, Admitting the Corporation’s Inability to 
Pay Its Debt Commit the Fifth Act of Bankruptcy?, 1 L. Rev. L. 
Dep’t. U. Det. 1 (1916) (bringing together the decisions and statutes 
that bear upon the fifth act of bankruptcy—the 1898 Act—and 
examining their interaction with the powers of a corporation’s board of 
directors, including discussion on corporate admission of insolvency). 
376.  See Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 176, § 37, 14 Stat. 517, 534–35 (establishing 
a uniform System of Bankruptcy throughout the United States) 
(repealed 1898) (“No allowance or discharge shall be granted to any 
corporation . . . , [and] whenever any corporation by proceedings under 
this act shall be declared bankrupt, all its property and assets shall be 
distributed to the creditors of such corporations . . . .”). 
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And most importantly from a business perspective, railroads, 
which made up the majority of very large corporations at the time,377 
were no longer allowed to file a bankruptcy petition, as the 1898 Act 
replaced the 1867 Act’s general provision allowing 
“moneyed . . . corporations” to file with a provision that instead 
enumerated specific types of corporations that were eligible.378 But, as 
already noted, even before the 1898 Act was adopted, businesses had 
found a better way to address financial distress.379 
When this new order was challenged, the Supreme Court 
favorably cited the lower court opinions supporting the prior 
bankruptcy laws, and held that “Congress may prescribe any 
regulations concerning discharge in bankruptcy that are not so grossly 
unreasonable as to be incompatible with fundamental law, and we 
cannot find anything in this act on that subject which would justify 
us in overthrowing its action.”380 Thus, the scope of the Bankruptcy 
Clause finally seemed to be reaching its full Hamiltonian potential. 
 
377. See Stephen Salsbury, No Way to Run a Railroad: The Untold 
Story of the Penn Central Crisis 3–4 (1982) (listing the pioneering 
effects of railroads, including innovations in finance, corporate entity law, 
cost accounting, business administration, competition, and labor relations). 
378. Black, supra note 333, at 106. As initially drafted, the enumeration 
proved too narrow; see also R. Jackson Cram, Comment, Corporations 
Subject to Bankruptcy, 19 Green Bag 529 (1907) (describing the 
1898 Act as “defective”). 
379. See Loveland, supra note 237, at 279 (indicating that the railroads did 
not need inclusion in the 1898 Bankruptcy Act because, even before the 
act, insolvent railroads could close up their affairs under existing 
statutes); see also E.G. Campbell, The Reorganization of the 
American Railroad System, 1893–1900 (1938) (detailing how the 
Panic of 1893 and the resultant economic depression forced a rethinking 
of conventional railroad organization and financing). 
380. Hanover Nat’l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 192 (1902). The case 
remains a key decision on the “uniformity” requirement in the Clause. 
In another case, the Supreme Court explained: 
The Federal Constitution, Article I, § 8, gives Congress the 
power to establish uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcy 
throughout the United States. In view of this grant of authority 
to the Congress it has been settled from an early date that 
state laws to the extent that they conflict with the laws of 
Congress, enacted under its constitutional authority, on the 
subject of bankruptcies are suspended. While this is true, state 
laws are thus suspended only to the extent of actual conflict 
with the system provided by the Bankruptcy Act of Congress.  
Notwithstanding this requirement as to uniformity the 
bankruptcy acts of Congress may recognize the laws of the 
State in certain particulars, although such recognition may lead 
to different results in different States. For example, the 
Bankruptcy Act recognizes and enforces the laws of the States 
affecting dower, exemptions, the validity of mortgages, 
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3. Structure 
The structure of the 1898 Act is easily understood by anyone who 
is familiar with today’s Bankruptcy Code.381 Chapter I set forth 
general definitions. Chapter II addressed bankruptcy courts. 
Chapter III defined the relevant universe of debtors and the effects of 
filing a case, including the effects of the discharge. Chapter IV 
addressed bankruptcy procedure. Chapter V defined the roles of 
various officers in the case, like trustees, clerks, marshals, and the 
referees and provided for their compensation. Chapter VI set forth the 
rules regarding creditors’ meetings and proof of claims. Chapter VII 
set forth the concept of the bankruptcy estate.382 
In a short twenty pages, the United States had acquired a full-
fledged bankruptcy law, and Congress had begun to explore the 
boundaries of its powers under the Bankruptcy Clause. And in an 
acknowledgement of what had come before, the last sentence of the 
original 1898 Act provides that “[p]roceedings commenced under State 
insolvency laws before the passage of this Act shall not be affected by 
it.”383 
Within five years, more than 14,000 voluntary cases and 2,500 
involuntary cases were being filed under the Act each year.384 Almost 
3,000 cases were filed in forma pauperis.385 
C. Pre–New Deal Amendments and Continued Debate over  
Congress’s Power Under the Bankruptcy Clause 
While the 1898 Act would remain in effect until it was heavily 
amended during the New Deal and repealed with the 1978 
 
priorities of payment and the like. Such recognition in the 
application of state laws does not affect the constitutionality of 
the Bankruptcy Act, although in these particulars the operation 
of the Act is not alike in all the States. 
Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605, 613 (1918) (internal citations omitted). 
381. See Walter W. Miller, Jr., Fraudulent Conveyances—Some Reflections 
on Section 70a(4) of the Bankruptcy Act, 48 B.U. L. Rev. 222, 228 
(1968) (“The Act of 1898, both before and after its later amendments 
including the Chandler Act revision of 1938, is characterized by 
fragmentation and disorganization.”). 
382. Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541. 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978). 
383. 30 Stat. at 566. 
384. Edwin C. Brandenburg, Practical Operation of the Bankruptcy Law, 21 
Banking L.J. 26, 26–27 (1904). 
385. Id. at 28. 
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Bankruptcy Code,386 significant interim amendments were enacted in 
1903, 1906, 1910, 1917, 1922, 1925, and 1926.387 
As late as 1919, Noel worried that attempts to further amend the 
Act might result in full repeal, which suggests that the nature of 
Congress’s power under the Bankruptcy Clause remained unsettled.388 
Further to this point, in 1929 the Supreme Court was still trying to 
explain the effect of the Bankruptcy Clause on state insolvency laws, 
despite more than thirty years under the 1898 Act.389 
At the same time, receiverships came under increasing scrutiny 
and criticism.390 By the early 1930s, even a key player in the largest 
receiverships, Robert Swaine of the Cravath firm conceded: 
[Even] apart from the tendency of the present practice to break 
up the business which the courts are, at least theoretically, 
endeavoring to preserve, the waste and expense to creditors and 
security holders of the legal machinery thus brought into play is 
intolerable. Each receivership in each district in which it is 
necessary to bring proceedings involves a fee to counsel for the 
plaintiff, for the defendant, and for the receivers in that district, 
and if any additional receiver is appointed for the property 
 
386. Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. 95-598, § 401, 92 Stat. 2549, 2682 
(repealing the 1898 Act and its amendments). 
387. Act of Feb. 5, 1903, Pub. L. No. 57-62, 32 Stat. 797 (repealed 1978); Act 
of June 15, 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-232, 34 Stat. 267 (repealed 1978); Act of 
June 25, 1910, Pub. L. No. 61-294, 36 Stat. 838 (repealed 1978); Act of 
Mar. 2, 1917, Pub. L. No. 64-376, 39 Stat. 999 (repealed 1978); Act of 
Jan. 7, 1922, Pub. L. No. 67-121, 42 Stat. 354 (repealed 1978); Act of Feb. 
13, 1925, Pub. L. No. 68-415, § 128(c), 43 Stat. 936 (repealed 1978); Act 
of May 27, 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-301, 44 Stat. 662 (repealed 1978). 
388. Noel, supra note 89, at 166–67. 
389. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261, 264–65 (1929) (holding an 
“application to the state court for the appointment of a receiver was an 
act of bankruptcy” that “operate[d] within the field occupied by the 
Bankruptcy Act [of 1898]”); see also Note, Effect of National 
Bankruptcy Act on State Insolvency Statutes, 49 Yale L.J. 1090, 1090 
(1940) (discussing the impact of the 1898 Act on state insolvency laws). 
390. See Henry J. Friendly, Some Comments on the Corporate Reorganizations 
Act, 48 Harv. L. Rev. 39, 41–46 (1934) (noting that case law had also 
become increasingly hostile to many of the procedures used); Stephen J. 
Lubben, Railroad Receiverships and Modern Bankruptcy Theory, 
89 Cornell L. Rev. 1420, 1469–71 (2004) (discussing the “attack on 
receiverships”). For a good overview of receiverships at their peak, see 
Charles Thomas Payne, The General Administration of Equity 
Receiverships of Corporations, 31 Yale L.J. 685 (1922). 
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within the district, still another fee to that “ancillary 
receiver.”391 
D. New Deal Amendments and the 1938 Chandler Act:  
Expanding the Bankruptcy Clause 
 The 1929 market crash, the resulting Great Depression, and the 
advent of the New Deal brought all of these issues to a head, with one 
further round of debate about the meaning of the Bankruptcy 
Clause.392 Specifically, the Depression and New Deal resulted in 
several partial amendments to the 1898 Act393 and the 1938 enactment 
of what is known as the Chandler Act,394 which substantially revised 
the 1898 Act in an “amendment” that was longer than the original 
Act and set the Act’s form until 1978.395  
Federal reorganization had been introduced early in the New Deal 
with section 77 for railroads396 and section 77B for other 
corporations.397 The Chandler Act maintained section 77, but it 
replaced section 77B with a four new business-reorganization 
chapters.398 With the addition of these new chapters, the Chandler Act 
made the 1898 Act fully modern: the addition showed Congress’s 
willingness to expand the contours of the Bankruptcy Clause to 
 
391. Robert T. Swaine, Corporate Reorganization Under the Federal 
Bankruptcy Power, 19 Va. L. Rev. 317, 320–21 (1933); see also Samuel 
Spring, Upset Prices in Corporate Reorganization, 32 Harv. L. Rev. 
489, 498 (1918) (describing the public’s interest in reorganization). 
392. See Theodore McCurdy Marsh, Aspects of Corporate Reorganization 
Under Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act, 1 U. Newark L. Rev. 1, 1–
2 (1936) (discussing the purposes of the 1898 Act as liquidation and 
distribution to creditors rather than reorganization). 
393. See Alexander L. Paskay, Handbook for Trustees and 
Receivers in Bankruptcy 10 (1968) (“This legislation . . . did not 
materially alter the basic Act of 1898 . . . .”).  
394. Act of June 22, 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-696, 52 Stat. 840 (1938) 
(repealed 1978). 
395. See Paskay, supra note 393, at 10 (highlighting the Chandler Act’s 
changes to the 1898 Act).  
396. 11 U.S.C. § 205 (1976) (repealed in part 1978) (current version in 
scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.). Section 77 was enacted in 1933. Act of 
Mar. 3, 1933, Pub. L. No. 72-420, sec. 1, § 77, 47 Stat. 1467, 1474. 
397. 11 U.S.C. § 207 (1934) (repealed 1938). Section 77B was enacted in 
1934. Act of June 7, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-296, sec. 1, § 77B, 48 Stat. 
911, 912. For the details of section 77B, see Developments in the Law, 
Reorganization Under Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act—1934–1936, 
49 Harv. L. Rev. 1111 (1936).  
398. Act of June 22, 1938 pmbl., 52 Stat. at 840; Thomas E. Plank, The 
Creditor in Possession Under the Bankruptcy Code: History, Text, and 
Policy, 59 Md. L. Rev. 253, 269 (2000). 
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encompass a set of procedures far beyond any that were debated 
throughout the nineteenth century.  
Chapter X of the Chandler Act, titled Corporate 
Reorganizations,399 was designed for the large corporate debtor,400 as 
distinguished from a partnership or individual. Publicly traded 
debtors were supervised not only by the court and referee but also by 
the newly created SEC.401 Also, a trustee took over the debtor’s 
operations.402 Most notably, the role of the Wall Street banks and 
their law firms in reorganization was greatly curtailed.403 
Chapter XI, titled Arrangements,404 could be used by an 
individual, partnership, or corporation405 but was only designed to 
address unsecured debt.406 Although limited in its scope, and thus its 
utility, the ability of the debtor to maintain control of its own estate 
under this chapter made it attractive.407 
At the same time, the Chandler Act also added chapter XII for 
reorganization of real estate debtors408 and chapter XIII for wage-
earner reorganization.409 The latter was a federal codification of a 
system that had been tested out in the South since the onset of the 
Depression.410 
 
399. 11 U.S.C. §§ 501–676 (1976) (repealed in part 1978) (current version in 
scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.). 
400. Id. § 506(5) (defining “debtor” as a corporation) (current version at 
11 U.S.C. § 101(12) (2012)). 
401. Id. § 608 (authorizing the SEC to intervene on its own motion or upon 
request by a judge) (current version at 11 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (2012)). 
402. Id. § 556 (mandating courts to appoint one or more trustees where the 
debt is $250,000 or more) (current version at 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(2012)). 
403. See Vincent P. Carosso, Investment Banking in America: A 
History 383 (1970). 
404. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701–799 (1976) (repealed in part 1978) (current version in 
scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.). 
405. Id. § 706(3) (1976) (describing “debtor” as a person) (current version at 
11 U.S.C. §§ 101(12), 109(d) (2012)). 
406.  Id. § 707(2) (1976) (describing “debts” as unsecured) (current version at 
11 U.S.C. § 101(4), (11) (2012)). 
407. For a good discussion of the differences between the chapters X and XI, 
see In re Mfrs. Credit Corp., 395 F.2d 833, 839–40 (3d Cir. 1968). 
408. 11 U.S.C. §§ 801–926 (1976) (repealed in part 1978) (current version in 
scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.).  
409. Id. §§ 1001–1086 (1976) (repealed in part 1978) (current version in 
scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.). 
410. See Timothy W. Dixon & David G. Epstein, Where Did Chapter 13 
Come From and Where Should It Go?, 10 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 
741, 741 (2002).  
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On the corporate side, bankruptcy was increasingly federalized. 
Not only did the new chapter X and previous section 77 directly 
provide a federal tool to reorganize, but the passage of the Trust 
Indenture Act of 1939411 made it quite difficult to restructure bonds in 
any way but under the new federal bankruptcy procedures.412 That 
both the Chandler Act and the Trust Indenture Act grew out of the 
same SEC study of corporate receiverships makes it clear that this 
was by design.413 
1. Contention Regarding the New Deal Expansion 
But the road to this new reality was typical of the larger fight 
between the various branches of the federal government during the 
early years of the New Deal. The key points of contention were the 
new reorganization provisions that developed during this time, and 
efforts by Congress to read the Bankruptcy Clause in an expansive 
way to provide remedies for the ongoing Depression. 
As one commentator noted: 
Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act sets up in the federal courts 
a system for the statutory reorganization of distressed 
corporations. The procedure which it prescribes makes use of 
devices which are novel to federal legislation. It applies only to 
corporate debtors; it permits the bankruptcy court to take 
jurisdiction over corporations which are not insolvent in the 
present bankruptcy sense and it authorizes the adjustment of 
the rights of the stockholders of such corporations; it seeks to 
control secured as well as unsecured debts; it provides for the 
circumstances under which creditors may be compelled to 
accept securities instead of cash in settlement of their claims; it 
imposes limitations on the allowance of rent claims; it empowers 
the judge to scrutinize and disregard the provisions of deposit 
agreements and of trust indentures; it places restrictions upon 
the labor policies of corporations undergoing reorganization. 
 
411.  Pub. L. No. 76-253, 53 Stat. 1149 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 77aaa–bbbb (2012)). 
412. See 15 U.S.C. § 77ppp(b) (2012) (prohibiting “impairment of holder’s 
right to payment” except under narrowly enumerated circumstances); 
see also Yakov Amihud et. al., A New Governance Structure for 
Corporate Bonds, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 447, 485–88 (1999) (discussing the 
potential prohibitive effects of the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 on the 
use of indenture trustees as a governance structure for corporate bonds). 
413. Carosso, supra note 403, at 382–83; see also Mark J. Roe, The Voting 
Prohibition in Bond Workouts, 97 Yale L.J. 232, 251 (1987) (discussing 
the impact that the SEC study on corporate reorganization had on 
Congress’s enactment of the Trust Indenture Act). 
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Some or all of these provisions may possibly become the pivots 
of attacks upon the constitutionality of Section 77B.414 
The last line was an understatement at its best. While many 
supported the expansion of the Bankruptcy Clause to address the 
Depression, not all were in agreement. One author reviewed the 
history of bankruptcy going back to Henry VIII, and then argued: 
The remedies which [section 77] attempts to make available for 
railroads and the procedure regulating the same are frankly 
foreign to “bankruptcy” and there is not the slightest suggestion 
that, under any circumstances, the railroad may be adjudicated 
a bankrupt. The section creates a most novel proceeding, totally 
non-germane to the “subject of bankruptcies,” and endeavors to 
extend the jurisdiction of the Federal Courts by forcibly making 
it a part of the bankruptcy law.415 
Another author pushed for a Tenth Amendment limitation on the 
Bankruptcy Clause, arguing that the New Deal’s corporate and 
municipal reorganization provisions infringed on matters left to the 
states.416 
2. Court Treatment of the New Deal Amendments:  
Initially Limiting Under the Fifth Amendment but  
Ultimately Embracing the Modern, Broad Conception 
In 1935, the Court upheld the constitutionality of section 77, 
giving something of an advisory opinion in the face of what it termed 
“grave doubt,” but no actual challenge to the law, in the particular 
case before the Court.417 After first declaring that Congress’s power 
under the Bankruptcy Clause was not unlimited, and then reviewing 
the various enactments under the Clause to date, Justice Sutherland 
concluded: 
The fundamental and radically progressive nature of these 
extensions becomes apparent upon their mere statement; but all 
have been judicially approved or accepted as falling within the 
power conferred by the bankruptcy clause of the Constitution. 
Taken altogether, they demonstrate in a very striking way the 
capacity of the bankruptcy clause to meet new conditions as 
 
414. John Gerdes, Constitutionality of Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act, 
12 N.Y.U. L. Q. Rev. 196, 196 (1934).  
415. Albert K. Stebbins, Constitutionality of the Recent Amendment to the 
Bankruptcy Law, 17 Marq. L. Rev. 163, 172 (1933). 
416. James R. Morford, Federal Legislation for Corporate Reorganization; 
A Negative View, 19 A.B.A. J. 702, 703 (1933). 
417. Cont’l Ill. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. v. Chi., R.I. & Pac. Ry. Co., 294 
U.S. 648, 667 (1935). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 64·Issue 2·2013 
A New Understanding of The Bankruptcy Clause 
396 
they have been disclosed as a result of the tremendous growth of 
business and development of human activities from 1800 to the 
present day. And these acts, far-reaching though they be, have 
not gone beyond the limit of congressional power; but rather 
have constituted extensions into a field whose boundaries may 
not yet be fully revealed. 
Section 77 advances another step in the direction of liberalizing 
the law on the subject of bankruptcies. . . . 
 . . .  
. . . Obviously, § 77 does no more than follow the line of 
historical and progressive development projected by previous 
acts. 
As outlined by that section, a plan of reorganization, when 
confirmed, cannot be distinguished in principle from the 
composition with creditors authorized by the act of 1867, as 
amended by the act of 1874. It is not necessary to the validity 
of either that the proceeding should result in an adjudication of 
bankruptcy. The constitutionality of the old provision for a 
composition is not open to doubt. . . .418 
But that same year, Justice Brandeis wrote for the Court as it struck 
down419 what is known as the Frazier-Lemke Act,420 which had added 
to section 75, essentially forcing farm creditors to provide a five-year 
lease in place of their right to foreclose.421 The Court stated that “we 
have no occasion to decide in this case whether the bankruptcy clause 
confers upon Congress generally the power to abridge the mortgagee’s 
rights in specific property. . . . [because] another provision of the 
Constitution is controlling,” namely the Fifth Amendment.422  
 
418. Id. at 671–72 (footnotes omitted); see also Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. 
Denv. & Rio Grande W. R.R. Co., 328 U.S. 495, 505–512 (1946) 
(discussing “the basic problems of railroad reorganization under § 77 of 
the Bankruptcy Act” that the Court had recently faced). 
419. Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 601–02 
(1935). Somewhat confusingly, the Court had upheld a similar state law 
the year before, rejecting the argument that it violated the Contracts 
Clause. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934). 
Perhaps importantly, the Minnesota statute in question only extended 
the obligation to lease for at most two years. Id. at 417 n.1.  
420. Act of June 28, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-486, 48 Stat. 1289 (amended 1934 
and expired 1949). 
421. Sec. 1, § 75(s)(7), 48 Stat. at 1291 (requiring that creditor actions be 
stayed for five years so long as the debtor pays “reasonable rental”). 
422. Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank, 295 U.S. at 589. 
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As Justice Brandeis subsequently explained in upholding a revised 
version of this same provision: 
The original Frazier-Lemke Act was there held invalid solely on 
the ground that the bankruptcy power of Congress, like its 
other great powers, is subject to the Fifth Amendment; and 
that, as applied to mortgages given before its enactment, the 
statute violated that Amendment, since it effected a substantial 
impairment of the mortgagee’s security.423  
Thus, the outer margins of the Bankruptcy Clause began to come into 
view. In 1936, the Supreme Court found another limitation to the 
Bankruptcy Clause, holding that Congress’s initial attempt at 
municipal bankruptcy424 disturbed the sovereignty of the states.425 
In 1937, Congress reacted to the Court’s thwarting of municipal 
bankruptcy by reenacting the municipal bankruptcy provisions with 
revisions designed to reduce the degree of federal interference with 
state sovereignty.426 The Supreme Court upheld the 1937 municipal 
bankruptcy statute in United States v. Bekins,427 reasoning that at 
heart it was a cooperative enterprise by the state and federal 
governments that was carefully drawn so as not to infringe state 
sovereignty.428 
And by 1938, just in time for enactment of the Chandler Act, the 
Court embraced the Bankruptcy Clause’s modern broad conception: 
 
423. Wright v. Vinton Branch of the Mountain Trust Bank of Roanoke, 
300 U.S. 440, 456–57 (1937). Perhaps importantly, this case appears right 
after the better-known opinion that first suggested that the Court would 
begin to view economic legislation with greater deference. W. Coast Hotel 
Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). The Court revisited the Frazier-
Lemke Act in 1940. Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433, 440 (1940). 
424. Act of May 24, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-251, 48 Stat. 798, invalidated by 
Ashton v. Cameron Cnty. Water Improvement Dist. No. One, 
298 U.S. 513 (1936). 
425. Ashton v. Cameron Cnty. Water Improvement Dist. No. One, 298 U.S. 513, 
530–32 (1936); see also Abraham Gorenfeld, Case Note, Constitutional 
Law—Federal Bankruptcy Act—An Invasion of State Sovereignty, 10 S. 
Cal. L. Rev. 202 (1937) (discussing the 1898 Act’s effect on state 
administrative autonomy); Edward J. Dimock, Legal Problems of 
Financially Embarrassed Municipalities, 22 Va. L. Rev. 39 (1935) 
(discussing the bankruptcy power of Congress over municipalities). 
426. Act of Aug. 16, 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-302, sec. 1, §§ 81–84, 50 Stat. 653 
(adding chapter X to the 1898 Act) (originally codified at 11 U.S.C. 
§§ 401–418 (1976)) (repealed in part 1978) (current version in scattered 
sections of 11 U.S.C.). The Chandler Act renumbered the 1937 addition as 
chapter IX in 1938. Act of June 22, 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-696, sec. 3, 52 
Stat. 840, 939.  
427. 304 U.S. 27 (1938). 
428. Id. at 54. 
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The right of the Congress to legislate on the subject of 
bankruptcies is granted by the Constitution in general terms. “The 
Congress shall have Power . . . To establish . . . uniform Laws on 
the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States,” Article 
1, s 8, cl. 4. To this specific grant, there must be added the powers 
of the general grant of clause eighteen. “To make all Laws which 
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the 
foregoing Powers . . . .” The subject of bankruptcies is incapable of 
final definition. The concept changes.429 
There things stood throughout the 1940s and 1950s.430 
3. Issues Remaining Following the Chandler Act 
The key change was that corporate reorganization had been 
largely federalized in a way that precluded many of the big-city, 
corporate law firms and bankers from participating. More generally, 
courts routinely held that compensation under the Bankruptcy Act 
was to be at a lower level than might be obtained outside of 
bankruptcy, a trend that undoubtedly removed a substantial number 
of attorneys from the bankruptcy sphere.431 Thus, the post–Chandler 
 
429. Wright v. Union C. Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 502, 513 (1938) (omissions in 
the original). In some sense, Wright can be seen as the bankruptcy 
analogue to the famous United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 
144 (1938). The Court in Carolene Products held that the Filled Milk 
Act, which declared sale of certain milk products as “injurious to public 
health,” was “presumptively within the scope of the power to regulate 
interstate commerce and consistent with due process.” Id. at 144–45. 
430. The changes in bankruptcy law that were proposed and enacted during 
this era seem to have been on largely technical points. E.g., Acts of 
May 8, 1963, Pub. L. Nos. 88-16, 88-17, 77 Stat. 14; Act of July 7, 1952, 
Pub. L. No. 82-456, 66 Stat. 420; Act of Dec. 20, 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-
879, 64 Stat. 1113; see also Bankruptcy: Hearings Before a 
Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th Cong. 191 
(1958) (discussing legislation that would authorize the courts of 
bankruptcy to determine dischargeability and nondischargeability of 
provable debts); Vern Countryman, For a New Exemption Policy in 
Bankruptcy, 14 Rutgers L. Rev. 678 (1960) (discussing the importance 
of bankruptcy exemption policy); Frank R. Kennedy, Statutory Liens in 
Bankruptcy, 39 Minn. L. Rev. 697, 703–22 (1955) (examining section 67 
of the Chandler Act and its amendment in 1952); Final Report of the 
Committee on Bankruptcy, 57 Com. L. J. 204 (1952) (reporting on 
pending bankruptcy legislation in the 82nd Congress). The statutory 
liens issue was addressed by an amendment to the Bankruptcy Act that 
passed in 1966. See Frank R. Kennedy, The Bankruptcy Amendments of 
1966, 41 J. Nat’l Conf. Ref. Bankr. 5 (1967). Most of the Supreme 
Court’s decisions during the era were of a similarly technical nature. See, 
e.g., Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 377 (1966); King v. United States, 
379 U.S. 329, 332–34 (1964). 
431. See William J. Rudin, Fees and Allowances to Attorneys in Bankruptcy 
and Chapter XI Proceedings, 34 Fordham L. Rev. 387, 398 (1965) 
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Act era saw the development of a group of specialized corporate 
bankruptcy professionals.  
Conventional wisdom has it that there were few large corporate 
bankruptcy cases during this era, until the big railroad cases of the 
1970s. This is, of course, an oversimplification, as even a cursory 
review of the case law will reveal.432 
The biggest issue in corporate bankruptcy remained the question 
of when a publicly traded company, which the New Deal Congress 
might have expected would have always filed under Chapter X, could 
nonetheless file a petition under Chapter XI and thus remain a 
“debtor in possession.”433 The Supreme Court addressed the issue, 
always holding that cases could be filed under chapter XI in some 
circumstances, with a kind of repetition that made this issue 
something of the postwar analogue to an earlier era’s cases regarding 
state insolvency laws.434 While often supporting the transfer of cases 
into chapter X, the Court soundly rejected the SEC’s frequent 
argument that chapter X, with its requirement that all plans must be 
“fair and equitable,” a term the Court had previously read to mean 
 
(“Probably the most significant factor to be used in determining the 
amount of the allowance is the referee's own knowledge and experience 
with respect to the value of the services. Consideration should be given to 
the entire spectrum of economic facts, including cost of living, comparative 
value of similar services in private practice, etc. As we have already seen, 
the services rendered by the attorney for the bankrupt and the attorney for 
the petitioning creditors are limited in scope, and, therefore, compensation 
will generally be limited.” (citation and footnotes omitted)). 
432. See, e.g., SEC v. U.S. Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434, 442 
(1940) (describing the extent of respondent corporation’s indebtedness 
at the time the bankruptcy case was heard); In re Chi. Express, Inc., 
332 F.2d 276, 276 (2d Cir. 1964) (affirming “an order of the referee in 
arrangement proceeding under ch. XI of Bankruptcy Act denying 
priority status of claim of railroad for its share of interline freight 
charges collected by debtor . . . prior to filing of arrangement petition”); 
Lane v. Haytian Corp. of Am., 117 F.2d 216, 218 (2d Cir. 1941) 
(reviewing proceedings of the lower court that occurred before “the 
Supreme Court had clarified the procedure and explained the limitations 
of Chapter XI proceedings” in another case). 
433. See Availability of Chapter XI Relief Broadened, 38 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1148 
(1963) (“Chapter XI . . . provides a relatively simple procedure for 
arrangements. Generally, the debtor remains in possession, 11 and the 
investigation by a trustee and the SEC is changed for a less thorough one 
by a creditors' committee. The arrangement, which may only affect the 
rights of unsecured creditors, 13 is confirmed if it is for the best interests of 
the creditors and is feasible.”); see also In re Tex. Consumer Fin. Corp., 
480 F.2d 1261 (5th Cir. 1973) (debtor proceeding under Chapter XI). 
434. SEC v. Am. Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594, 603–07 (1965) (collecting 
prior cases that examine the interrelationship between Chapters X and XI). 
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the “rule of full or absolute priority,”435 must apply to all public 
debtors.436 
E. 1960s and 70s  
1. Renewed Interest in Bankruptcy and Increased Role of the Judiciary 
In the late 1960s, perhaps as a result of the general revival of New 
Deal–style reform efforts during the Great Society, Congress and 
others437 began to consider bankruptcy anew.438 On the personal 
bankruptcy side, the push for reform was also motivated by a 
pronounced boom in bankruptcy filings, which came despite an 
equally booming economy.439 The simultaneous nature of the 
bankruptcy boom and boom in consumer credit did not go 
unnoticed.440 
Most interestingly, in 1964 Congress gave the Supreme Court the 
ability to override the procedural parts of the Bankruptcy Act by 
rule.441 Specifically, the Court was given the power to enact 
bankruptcy rules and any laws “in conflict with such rules shall be of 
no further force or effect after such rules have taken effect.”442  
435. Case v. L.A. Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 115–17 (1939) (applying 
section 77B, but citing equity receivership cases). 
436. Am. Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. at 610–11; see also Skeel, supra 
note 8, at 160–81 (discussing the advent of Chapter 11 for corporate 
reorganization). 
437. For example, the Brookings Institution established a task force to study 
the bankruptcy laws in 1965. Frank R. Kennedy, Foreword: A Brief 
History of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 58 N.C. L. Rev. 667, 670 (1980). 
438. A helpful overview of bankruptcy practice at this point in time can be 
found in Max Schwartz, The Practice of Bankruptcy, 43 St. John’s L. 
Rev. 208 (1968). 
439. Frank R. Kennedy, Foreword, 55 Ky. L.J. 533, 533–36 (1966); see also 
Herbert U. Feibelman, Bankruptcy Cases Attain a New High, 70 Com. 
L.J. 147, 147 (1965) (“The Tables of Bankruptcy Statistics for the fiscal 
year ended June 30, 1964, published by the Administrative Office of the 
United States Courts, reveal a record number of cases filed—greatly 
more than in any year for the past decade.” (footnote omitted)). 
440. See Theodore Sager Meth, Is Bankruptcy Outmoded?, 19 Bus. Law. 
673, 673 (1964) (“The purpose of this article is to show that the 
Bankruptcy Act of 1898 is itself bankrupt as it applies to the problem of 
consumer insolvency, and further to explain how this condition came 
about, to outline the nature of its impact and to suggest along what 
lines we may find a remedy.”). 
441. Act of Oct. 3, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-623, 78 Stat. 1001 (codified as 
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2875 (2012)). 
442. Id.; see also Royal E. Jackson, What’s New in Bankruptcy?, 39 J. 
Nat’l Ass’n Ref. Bankr. 16, 17 (1965) (discussing how the bill 
“repeals Section 30 of the Bankruptcy Act” to replace it with court-
made rules). 
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Thus began a complete revamp of bankruptcy procedure, which 
unfortunately took so much time that it was barely in place before the 
entire Bankruptcy Act was repealed in 1978.443 
Throughout the twentieth century, the referees became 
increasingly like judges, and, in 1973, the Supreme Court formally 
renamed them bankruptcy judges in the newly enacted Rules of 
Bankruptcy Procedures.444 This recognized the obvious reality that 
had existed since at least 1946 with the enactment of what is known 
as the Referees’ Salary Act,445 which made the referees salaried 
employees of the federal government, who no longer collected fees for 
services performed.446 In short, bankruptcy and the Bankruptcy 
Clause now supported its own, standalone judicial system, distinct 
from the powers of the Chancellor who had appointed the original 
commissioners. 
But since the advent of the 1898 Act, the bankruptcy judges had 
labored under very limited jurisdiction, with the referees and then 
bankruptcy judges only able to exercise jurisdiction over a small 
group of staple bankruptcy matters.447 All other matters were left to 
 
443. See generally Lawrence P. King, The History and Development of the 
Bankruptcy Rules, 70 Am. Bankr. L.J. 217, 217–36 (1996) (discussing 
the evolution of Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure from their 
inception to the time of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, Act of Nov. 6, 1978, 
Pub. L. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C.)). 
444. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 901(7) (1973) (defining “bankruptcy judge” as “the 
referee of the court of bankruptcy in which a bankruptcy case is 
pending, or the district judge of that court when issuing an injunction 
under § 2a(15) of the Act or under Rule 102”) (superseded 1983). 
445. Act of June 28, 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-464, 60 Stat. 323 (repealed 1978). 
446. Sec. 6, § 40(a), (d), 60 Stat. at 326, 328 (setting forth the salaried 
compensation of referees and noting their treatment as employees of the 
federal judicial branch) (repealed 1978). 
447. George M. Treister, Summary Judgment: Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: Is It 
Too Summary?, 39 S. Cal. L. Rev. 78, 78–81 (1966); see also John T. 
Copenhaver, Jr., Summary Jurisdiction, 41 J. Nat’l Conf. Ref. 
Bankr. 108 (1967) (a bankruptcy referee describing questions relating 
to summary jurisdiction as the “most important and the most 
troublesome” of bankruptcy issues). For examples of case law that 
discuss bankruptcy jurisdiction issues, see Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 
323, 328 (1966) (“But Congress has often left the exact scope of 
summary proceedings in bankruptcy undefined, and this Court has 
elsewhere recognized that in the absence of congressional definition this 
is a matter to be determined by decisions of this Court after due 
consideration of the structure and purpose of the Bankruptcy Act as a 
whole . . . .”); Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 304–08 (1939) (using 
statutory interpretation to ascertain the scope of the bankruptcy court’s 
equitable powers); Robertson v. Howard, 229 U.S. 254, 259–60 (1913) 
(rejecting petitioners’ argument that the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction 
was limited so that ancillary proceedings were required in other states or 
districts); U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Bray, 225 U.S. 205, 217 (1912) (such 
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either state courts or the federal district courts, if diversity 
jurisdiction existed.448 By the 1960s, leading practitioners were 
suggesting that the referees needed a power and jurisdiction more like 
that of district judges.449 
In short, bankruptcy was in a state of flux at the dawn of the 
1970s, with new rules being drafted and reforms being proposed, but 
there had been little recent consideration of the scope and nature of 
the power granted by the Bankruptcy Clause. 
The decade opened with two key events that would presage large 
changes. First, on a Sunday afternoon in June of 1970, Penn Central, 
the largest railroad in the country, filed a section 77 petition.450 The 
petition came just two years after the company had been formed by 
the merger of the Pennsylvania and New York Central Railroads.451 
The filing was the largest bankruptcy case to date, and within a few 
short years almost every other railroad in the Northeast would also be 
in bankruptcy.452 
Next, in July of 1970, Congress passed legislation creating the 
Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States.453 The 
 
proceedings include, among others, all matters of administration, such as 
the allowance, rejection and reconsideration of claims, the reduction of 
the estates to money and its distribution, the determination of the 
preferences and priorities to be accorded to claims presented for 
allowance and payment in regular course, and the supervision and 
control of the trustees and others who are employed to assist them.”). 
Bankruptcy jurisdiction had long been a tortured issue. E.g., Ira Jewell 
Williams, Actions by Trustees in Bankruptcy, 48 Am. L. Reg. 543 
(1900) (discussing jurisdictional issues in bankruptcy cases in the years 
leading up to 1900). 
448. Treister, supra note 447, at 79. 
449. E.g., William J. Rochelle, Jr. & John L. King, A Proposal to Raise 
Bankruptcy Courts to District Court Level, 39 J. Nat’l Ass’n Ref. 
Bankr. 118, 119 (1965) (“Why not a bankruptcy court at district 
court level, with both plenary and summary jurisdiction over all matters 
arising under the Bankruptcy Act, except criminal matters, and with 
power to impanel juries where juries are permitted and demanded?”). 
450. Penn Central Bankrupt, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, June 22, 1970, 
at 1 (“The order was signed in the home of U.S. District Judge William 
Kraft Jr. at 5:35 p.m. after a morning and afternoon of secret 
conferences mixed with denials to newsmen that anything important 
was going on.”). 
451. Penn Central Transportation Company, List of Deals, Lehman Brothers 
Collection, Harvard Business School Baker Library Historical Collections, 
http://www.library.hbs.edu/hc/lehman/industry.html?company=penn_
central_transportation_company (last visited Oct. 6, 2013). 
452. See infra note 464 and accompanying text. 
453. Act of July 24, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468. 
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Commission produced a report in 1973454 that, among other things, 
called for bankruptcy judges to be appointed by the President for 
fifteen-year terms with full jurisdiction,455 have the administrative 
functions of the bankruptcy judge separated from the judicial 
functions,456 implement the use of uniform federal exemptions in 
personal bankruptcy cases,457 and apply a relaxed absolute priority 
rule in corporate bankruptcy cases.458 
The Commission also proposed a new bankruptcy law, which was 
introduced but never passed.459 Shortly thereafter, the National 
Conference of Bankruptcy Judges drafted a competing bill that was 
also introduced but not passed.460 With these proposals, full-fledged 
bankruptcy reform was back in front of Congress. 
2. Validity of Congress’s Act to Save the Railroad Industry 
But before Congress could consider revamping the entire 
bankruptcy system, it felt compelled to first address the collapse of 
the American railroad industry and the near collapse of the country’s 
largest city.461 Similarly, the collapse of several brokerage houses in 
 
454. The Commission’s report was published in three parts as Report of 
the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, 
H.R. Doc. No. 93–137 (1st Sess. 1973). 
455. Id. at pt. I 85–94. 
456. Id. at pt. I 88. 
457. See Richard M. Lombino, Uniformity of Exemptions: Assessing the 
Commission’s Proposals, 6 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 177, 184 (1998) 
(discussing prior proposals for uniformity of exemptions and comparing 
them to the Commission’s proposals). 
458. Vern Countryman, Justice Douglas and the Law of Business Regulation, 
91 Banking L.J. 312, 317 (1974); see also Note, The Proposed 
Bankruptcy Act: Changes in the Absolute Priority Rule for Corporate 
Reorganizations, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1786, 1796–98 (1974) (discussing 
the Commission’s objections to the absolute priority rule). 
459. H.R. 10792, 93d Cong. (1973); S. 4026, 93d Cong. (1973); see also 
Anthony T. Kronman, The Treatment of Security Interests in After-
Acquired Property Under the Proposed Bankruptcy Act, 124 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 110, 110 n.1 (1975). 
460. H.R. 16643, 93d Cong. (1973), reintroduced as H.R. 32, 94th Cong. 
(1975); S. 4060, 93d Cong. (1974), reintroduced as S. 235, 94th Cong. 
(1975); see also Kennedy supra note 437, at 673 n.35.  
461. For example, chapter IX of the Bankruptcy Act was modernized in 
1976, with the aim of making it more usable by New York City. See Act 
of Apr. 8, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-260, 90 Stat. 315 (allowing “voluntary 
reorganization procedures for the adjustment of the debts of 
municipalities”); see also Note, Municipal Bankruptcy, the Tenth 
Amendment and the New Federalism, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1871, 1871 
(1976) (examining “the trend toward increasing solicitude for state 
interests,” presenting “a suggested framework for judicial review of 
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the “paperwork crisis” of the late 1960s and early 1970s resulted in a 
new insolvency proceeding for brokers under SIPA.462 
But it was the railroads that provided a chance for new 
consideration of the scope of the Bankruptcy Clause. Faced with the 
widespread collapse of the railroad industry, Congress adopted a two-
fold approach to the problem. First, commercial railroads were 
relieved of the responsibility of providing long-haul passenger service, 
and that task was given to the newly formed Amtrak.463 Second, and 
most importantly for these purposes, Congress proposed to 
consolidate several bankrupt Northeast freight railroads into a single 
entity that would come to be known as Conrail. As summarized by 
one participant in the process: 
By 1973 the railroads in the northeast and midwest regions of 
the country were in such desperate straits that there was no 
hope for resuscitation through section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act. 
Penn Central, the major rail carrier in the northeast and 
midwest, was in a reorganization proceeding. By March of 1973, 
Judge Fullam, supervising the reorganization, aware that 
Congress was considering the plight of the Penn Central and 
other railroads, warned, “On the basis of the record to date, it 
appears highly doubtful that the Debtor could properly be 
permitted to continue to operate on its present basis beyond 
October 1, 1973.” . . . Congress came to the rescue by enacting 
the Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973. The Act created 
the United States Railway Association (USRA) and 
Consolidated Rail Corporation (Conrail). USRA was vested 
with authority to prepare a “Final System Plan” (FSP) for 
reorganizing rail service in the northeast and midwest and, 
according to that plan, determine the rail properties to be 
 
legislation challenged on federalism grounds,” and applying the 
framework to Chapter IX of the Bankruptcy Act). Although New York 
avoided filing for bankruptcy, the municipal bankruptcy procedure has 
been utilized recently by another large city, Detroit. See Ed White, 
Detroit Ruled Bankruptcy-Eligible, Clev. Plain Dealer, Dec. 4, 2013, 
at A7 (discussing a bankruptcy judge’s ruling that “Detroit is eligible to 
shed billions of dollars of its long-running debt, including the pensions of 
thousands of workers and retirees”). 
462. See Note, The Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970: An Early 
Assessment, 73 Colum. L. Rev. 802, 802 (1973). 
463. Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-518, 84 Stat. 1327 
(repealed in part 1994) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 
U.S.C.); Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe 
Ry. Co., 470 U.S. 451, 454–56 (1985) (explaining how Amtrak, created 
under the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970, is a “private, for-profit 
corporation . . . [that] is not ‘an agency of the [federal] Government’ but 
is authorized by the Government to operate or contract for the 
operation of intercity rail passenger service”). 
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transferred to Conrail by the bankrupt carriers, those to be sold, 
and those to be abandoned. Conrail, as a private but 
government-supported organization, would operate rail service 
on the transferred properties and was to issue securities to the 
estates of the bankrupt railroads in exchange for their 
properties. 
The Act required the Panel on Multidistrict Litigation to 
consolidate in a Special Court all proceedings with respect to 
the Final System Plan, and directed the Panel to select the 
members of the Special Court. . . . The Special Court is 
authorized to exercise the powers of a district judge, including 
those of a reorganization court, and has “original and exclusive 
jurisdiction” in any civil action challenging the constitutionality 
of the Act or the legality of any action or inaction of USRA. 464 
The Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973,465 and its creation of a 
special court that addressed to a specific set of debtors,466 almost 
inevitably led to a challenge that Congress had exceeded its authority 
under the Bankruptcy Clause and violated the Fifth Amendment. The 
latter argument challenged the requirement that railroads turn over 
their operations to Conrail in exchange for securities and the 
obligation of the railroads to continue operations until the date of the 
turnover. 
Several district courts that were handling the individual 
section 77 proceedings of the railroads held the 1973 Act 
unconstitutional,467 but the special railroad court, comprising a three-
judge panel headed by Judge Friendly, upheld the Act.468 In affirming, 
the Supreme Court addressed the contention that the Act violated the 
Bankruptcy Clause because the process was not sufficiently “uniform” 
because as it applied to but a part of the United States.469 The Court 
 
464. John Minor Wisdom, Views of A Friendly Observer, 133 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 63, 67–70 (1984) (internal footnotes omitted). 
465. Pub. L. No. 93-236, 87 Stat. 985 (1974) (repealed in part) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 45 and 49 U.S.C.). 
466. § 209(b), 87 Stat. at 999 (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. § 719(b) 
(2006)). 
467. See, e.g., In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 382 F. Supp. 856, 870 (E.D. Pa. 
1974); In re Lehigh Valley R.R. Co., 382 F. Supp. 854, 855 (E.D. Pa. 
1974); In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 382 F. Supp. 821 (E.D. Pa. 1974); 
In re Cent. R.R. of N.J., 273 F. Supp. 282 (D.N.J. 1974); In re Lehigh & 
Hudson River Ry. Co., 377 F. Supp. 475, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). 
468. In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 384 F. Supp. 895, 951 (Reg’l Rail Reorg. 
Ct. 1974). 
469. Blanchette v. Conn. Gen. Ins. Corp. (Reg’l Rail Reorg. Act Cases), 
419 U.S. 102, 158 (1974). 
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acknowledged the “surface appeal” of the argument, especially in light 
of the Hanover National Bank v. Moyses,470 but it ultimately rejected 
the argument because “it overlooks the flexibility inherent in the 
constitutional provision.”471 The Court went on to explain:  
The uniformity provision does not deny Congress power to take 
into account differences that exist between different parts of the 
country, and to fashion legislation to resolve geographically 
isolated problems. “The problem dealt with [under the 
Bankruptcy Clause] may present significant variations in 
different parts of the country.” We therefore agree with the 
Special Court that the uniformity clause was not intended “to 
hobble Congress by forcing it into nationwide enactments to 
deal with conditions calling for remedy only in certain 
regions.”472  
Despite the complaint of Justice Douglas—who was joined by Justice 
Stewart—that the majority had ignored the “Just Compensation 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment [and] the uniformity requirement of 
the Bankruptcy Clause,”473 the Court further expanded Congress’s 
powers under the Bankruptcy Clause. Several years later, the Court 
did find that a law passed to address a single railroad debtor violated 
the uniformity requirement, suggesting that the provision is not 
entirely without substance.474 
3. 1978 Bankruptcy Code: The Modern Framework  
The final major change to bankruptcy law occurred with the 
enactment of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code.475 Ultimately the 1978 Code 
 
470. 186 U.S. 181 (1902).  
471. Id. 
472. Id. at 159 (alteration in original) (internal citations omitted). 
473. Id. at 185 (Douglas, J. dissenting). 
474. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 470–73 (1982) (“To 
survive scrutiny under the Bankruptcy Clause, a law must at least apply 
uniformly to a defined class of debtors.”). But see id. at 475 
(Marshall, J., concurring) (“Our cases do not support the Court’s view 
that any bankruptcy law applying to a single named debtor is 
unconstitutional.”). Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, 
concurred rather than dissented because “[a]lthough the question is 
close, I conclude that Congress did not justify the specificity of RITA in 
terms of national policy. Rather, the legislative history indicates an 
attempt simply to protect employees of a single railroad from the 
consequences of bankruptcy.” Id. at 476. 
475. Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended 
at 11 U.S.C.). The Code was signed into law on November 6, 1978 and 
became effective on October 1, 1979. The 1978 Bankruptcy Code 
officially repealed the 1898 Bankruptcy Act as of September 30, 1979 
(but the 1898 Act still applied to any pending cases thereunder). For 
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continued the incremental development of bankruptcy court powers in 
relation to the district courts, albeit only after an abortive attempt to 
give the bankruptcy judges full judicial powers that the Supreme 
Court found wanting.476 Recent case law shows that this remains a 
work in progress.477 
Under the 1978 Code, business bankruptcy was consolidated into 
two basic chapters, while individual debtor provisions remained 
largely the same as under the 1898 framework. Business debtors could 
now choose between liquidation under Chapter 7,478 with the 
appointment of a trustee, or reorganization or liquidation under 
Chapter 11,479 which involves no trustee.480 The initial choice of 
chapters tends to sort by debtor size, although some larger business 
debtors ultimately end up in Chapter 7 after either a sale of all assets 
or the failure of efforts to reorganize.481 Individual debtors continued 
to be offered a choice between straight liquidation and reorganization. 
The old composition procedure, long suffering from disuse, faded away 
without many people noticing. 
F. Recent Changes to Federal Bankruptcy Law Changes and Court 
Interpretations Invoking a Rediscovered Hamiltonian View 
After nearly ten years and one veto, on April 20, 2005, the 
President signed the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
 
more detail, see Kenneth N. Klee, Legislative History of the New 
Bankruptcy Law, 28 DePaul L. Rev. 941 (1979). The differences 
between the 1898 Act and the 1978 Bankruptcy Code are nicely 
summarized in J. Ronald Trost et. al, ALI-ABA Resource 
Materials: The New Federal Bankruptcy Code 79–227 (1979). 
476. The bankruptcy court’s broad jurisdictional features were declared 
unconstitutional in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon 
Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982), and were then repealed and replaced 
by the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, 
Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333. 
477. See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011) (holding that a bankruptcy 
court lacked authority under Article III to enter judgment on a particular 
state law counterclaim, even though the counterclaim was a “core” 
proceeding under the 1978 Act). See also Ralph Brubaker, A “Summary” 
Statutory and Constitutional Theory of Bankruptcy Judges’ Core 
Jurisdiction After Stern v. Marshall, 86 Am. Bankr. L.J. 121 (2012) 
(discussing current issues with the jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts); 
Troy A. McKenzie, Judicial Independence, Autonomy, and the Bankruptcy 
Courts, 62 Stan. L. Rev. 747, 758 (2010) (examining the autonomy of, and 
process for appointing, bankruptcy judges). 
478. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701–784 (2012).  
479. Id. §§ 1101–1174.  
480. Tabb, supra note 182, at 35. 
481. Stephen J. Lubben, Business Liquidation, 81 Am. Bankr. L.J. 65, 
75 (2007). 
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Protection Act of 2005482 (BAPCPA)—an extensive overhaul of both 
the business and consumer provisions of the 1978 Code.483 
In 2006, the Supreme Court surprised many by holding that the 
Bankruptcy Clause overrode state sovereign immunity, at least with 
respect to matters “ancillary” to the central jurisdiction of the 
bankruptcy court over the debtor’s estate.484 Relying on the original 
intent of the founders, Justice Stevens, writing for a slim five-member 
majority,485 rediscovered a Hamiltonian interpretation of the 
Bankruptcy Clause that reflects a strong grant of federal power.486 Or, 
more precisely, he may have discovered a neo-Hamiltonian 
interpretation of the Clause, inasmuch as his opinion rests on the 
protection of debtors, whereas the Federalists would have seen the 
Clause as a creditor-protection measure, primarily designed to prevent 
preferences to home-state creditors. 
All the while, Congress has continued to expand the scope of the 
Bankruptcy Clause, with little apparent challenge from the other 
branches. For example, in 1969—before the current Bankruptcy Code 
was enacted—Congress invoked its powers under the Bankruptcy 
Clause when it enacted the main legislation regulating creditors’ 
nonbankruptcy collection activities, the Consumer Credit Protection 
Act,487 citing a desire to reduce bankruptcy filings.488 
 
482. Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 11 U.S.C.). See Susan Jensen, A Legislative History of the 
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 
79 Am. Bankr. L.J. 485 (2005) (detailing the decade-long struggle to 
“comprehensive[ly] overhaul” the Bankruptcy Act of 1978). 
483. See Richard Levin & Alesia Ranney-Marinelli, The Creeping Repeal of 
Chapter 11: The Significant Business Provisions of the Bankruptcy 
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 79 Am. 
Bankr. L.J. 603 (2005) (discussing business provisions); Katherine 
Porter & Deborah Thorne, The Failure of Bankruptcy’s Fresh Start, 
92 Cornell L. Rev. 67, 80 (2006) (discussing consumer provisions). 
484. Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 373 (2006). 
485. Because the opinion was Justice O’Connor’s last, and her replacement is 
known as a states’ rights proponent, some have suggested the precedent 
is unstable. Leading Cases, State Sovereign Immunity—Bankruptcy, 
120 Harv. L. Rev. 125, 126 (2006). 
486. Katz, 546 U.S. at 362–63. 
487. Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 15 and 18 U.S.C.). 
488. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a) (2012). See also 15 U.S.C. § 1671(a) (2012) (discussing 
garnishment as “destroy[ing] the uniformity of the bankruptcy laws and 
frustrat[ing] the purposes thereof in many areas of the country”). 
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V. Implications for Future Lawsuits 
But understanding the Bankruptcy Clause is not merely of 
historical interest. In 2010, Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.489 Title II of Dodd-
Frank—commonly referred to as the Orderly Liquidation Authority 
(OLA)—established a process for “liquidat[ing] failing financial 
companies that pose a significant risk to the financial stability of the 
United States in a manner that mitigates such risk and minimizes 
moral hazard.”490 The decision to invoke OLA is subject to extremely 
limited judicial review.491  
While Congress did not indicate which constitutional provision it 
was relying on in enacting this measure, several plaintiffs recently 
challenged OLA as a violation of the Bankruptcy Clause, particularly 
its uniformity requirement.492 As a necessary part of this argument, 
the plaintiffs alleged, “Title II constitutes an exercise of Congress’s 
power under the Bankruptcy Clause.”493 Next, the plaintiffs argued 
that “Title II’s delegation of unlimited power to the Treasury 
Secretary and the [Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)], 
without meaningful judicial review of the execution of that power, 
constitutes a non-uniform law of bankruptcy that must be declared 
unconstitutional and must be enjoined.”494 The basic argument was  
489. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 7, 12, and 15 U.S.C.). 
490. 12 U.S.C. § 5384(a) (Supp. V 2011). 
491. Id. § 5382(a)(1)(A)(iii). 
492. First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, State 
Nat’l Bank of Big Spring v. Lew, No. 1:12-cv-01032 (D.D.C. Sept. 20, 
2012) (No. 6). The Bankruptcy Clause claim is Count VI. Id. ¶¶ 234–
39. The merits of the claim may never be determined because the 
district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss on standing and 
ripeness grounds. State Nat’l Bank of Big Spring v. Lew, No. 1:12-cv-
01032, 2013 WL 3945027 (D.D.C. Aug. 1, 2013).  
493. First Amended Complaint, supra note 492, ¶ 235. The argument against 
rooting OLA in the Bankruptcy Clause, and perhaps instead basing it in 
the Commerce Clause, could begin with the fact that Dodd-Frank was 
handled by the congressional finance committees and not the judiciary 
committees that would normally have jurisdiction over bankruptcy 
matters. And some who were involved in the enactment of OLA swear 
that Congress never considered OLA to be “bankruptcy” legislation. Of 
course, it is not clear that such internal congressional considerations 
“matter” for Constitutional purposes. Moreover, there is some doubt 
about Congress’s ability to pass debtor-creditor legislation under any 
provision other than the Bankruptcy Clause. See, e.g., Ry. Lab. Execs.’ 
Ass’n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 468 (1982) (“We do not understand 
either appellant or the United States to argue that Congress may enact 
bankruptcy laws pursuant to its power under the Commerce Clause.”). 
494. First Amended Complaint, supra note 492, ¶ 239. 
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that the FDIC and the Secretary are vested with so much power 
under OLA that each case is apt to proceed upon a different path, 
resulting in nonuniform outcomes for similarly situated financial 
institutions. 
Only by understanding the Bankruptcy Clause and its 
development over the years is it possible to explain why this 
argument is deeply flawed. As developed in this Article, Congress is 
free to adopt different types of bankruptcy procedures for different 
debtors. Consider the New Deal state of bankruptcy law, with 
section 77 for railroads and chapters X and XI for liquidation, 
reorganization, and composition proceedings for other corporations 
and individuals.495 At this same time, Congress created the FDIC496 
and vested it with authority over bank insolvencies.497 The OLA 
litigation proceeded from the faulty notion that Chapter 11 provides a 
one-size-fits-all solution, but it is quite clear that one reason 
Chapter 11 and its predecessors have been so successful rests in the 
flexible nature of the proceedings. In short, the OLA litigation 
reflected a misunderstanding of the Bankruptcy Clause. 
The debates about whether the Bankruptcy Clause allowed more 
than the bankruptcy laws of Georgian England are now but a distant 
memory. Based on current precedents, the Clause allows for a strong 
federal power over all types of creditors, constrained perhaps by the 
Fifth Amendment when dealing with secured creditors,498 but subject 
only to a weak internal requirement of uniformity.499 
The key question for litigants, which may largely depend on the 
future makeup of the Court, is whether this broad understanding will 
prevail or whether it represents the fleeting high tide of the 
 
495. See supra Part VI.D. For a general discussion on the trends and evolution 
of bankruptcy law in the 1930s, see Skeel, supra note 8, at 73–100. 
496. Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, sec. 8, § 12B(a), 48 Stat. 162, 
168 (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 1811(a) (2012)). 
497.  Sec. 8, § 12B(l), 48 Stat. at 174 (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 1821 
(2012)). 
498. James Steven Rogers, The Impairment of Secured Creditors’ Rights in 
Reorganization: A Study of the Relationship Between the Fifth 
Amendment and the Bankruptcy Clause, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 973, 997–98 
(1983) (examining whether the Takings Clause should be considered a 
substantive limitation on the Bankruptcy Clause). 
499. See In re McFarland, 481 B.R. 242, 259 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2012) 
(internal citation and quotation marks omitted) (“The uniformity 
required by the Bankruptcy Clause is geographical, not personal. The 
Clause neither recognizes nor grants individual rights, and it is not a 
straightjacket that forbids Congress to distinguish among classes of 
debtors.”). See also Jonathan C. Lipson, Debt and Democracy: Towards 
a Constitutional Theory of Bankruptcy, 83 Notre Dame L. Rev. 605, 
612–14 (2008) (calling for greater clarity on the outer limits of federal 
bankruptcy power that other constitutional provisions may provide). 
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Bankruptcy Clause’s reach. To date, the only times the Supreme 
Court has found a bankruptcy law to exceed Congress’s powers under 
the Bankruptcy Clause has been when the Court believed that the 
law violated the Fifth Amendment, by prohibiting a secured creditor’s 
foreclosure without adequate compensation,500 and when the law in 
question applied to but a single debtor.501 Over two centuries after its 
adoption, it is quite clear the Bankruptcy Clause is a source of 
congressional power far more often than it is a serious limitation. But 
that source might become more significant as the Supreme Court 
begins to scale back the Commerce Clause from its New Deal 
heights.502 In the past, it made little difference if Congress acted under 
Clause 3 or Clause 4 of Section 8. But going forward, that distinction 
just might matter. As such, understanding the Bankruptcy Clause 
becomes more important. 
Conclusion 
 This Article proposes a new understanding of the Bankruptcy 
Clause that is more consistent with the history and progression of 
bankruptcy law in the United States. Congress rarely invoked its 
powers under the Bankruptcy Clause for the first century following 
the country’s founding, likely due to the general understanding that 
states retained the power to regulate bankruptcy, subject to certain 
limitations. It was not until the growth of interstate commerce and 
the new state-federal dynamic brought by the Fourteenth 
Amendment that Congress passed the first permanent federal 
bankruptcy law in 1898. These external factors led to the inevitable 
evolution of the Bankruptcy Clause to the Hamiltonian view we 
largely subscribe to today: a broad power that works with other 
constitutional provisions to ensure consistent interstate regulation. 
 
500. See supra Part IV.D.2. 
501. See supra note 474 and accompanying text. 
502. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2587–88 
(2012) (holding the Commerce Clause constitutionally insufficient to 
uphold the individual mandate of the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010)). 
